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Abstract
Many of the 38,000 foreign fighters ISIS has managed to attract to Syria and Iraq will return 
home.  As increasing numbers of ISIS cadres flee the battlefield, some as defectors and 
others as returnees still aligned with ISIS’ goals and ideology, the challenges for the West will 
be how to identify and sort out true defectors from returnees, and determine if they are at 
risk to support again or rejoin a terrorist group.  In this context, the authors of the article 
stress that it will be incumbent on Western states to find adequate ways of determining who 
among returnees is a security risk at present, who may become one in the future, specifically 
by returning their allegiance to this violent group, and who can be safely reintegrated into 
society for the long term. The authors also highlight important policy alternatives for dealing 
with returning foreign fighters who will continue to pose both an immediate security threat 
and a long-term challenge. 
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Introduction
The U.S. Pentagon has reported a considerable drop in the number of foreign fighters 
flowing to Iraq and Syria, from 2000 to 500 a month according to some estimates.1 While 
such numbers are encouraging and offer evidence of foreign fighter attrition from Iraq 
and Syria, one must not underestimate the rate at which the group continues to replenish 
itself, which according to some sources, is far greater and faster than that of al-Qaeda at its 
peak.2  The “Islamic State” also continues to suffer significant territorial losses in Iraq and 
Syria.3  Such setbacks are likely to continue to weaken the group’s recruitment campaign and 
efforts, especially important given that the group also relies on recruits from the territories 
it controls.4 
Despite the significant setbacks in the battlefield, ISIS continues to attract followers. 
During our ISIS Defector Interview Project, we interviewed dozens of defectors and foreign 
fighters from Syria, Europe, Central Asia, and the Balkans who had served in “Islamic State” 
controlled territories. We found that a vast majority of these were truly defectors, and 
no longer support or ever intend to go back to the ranks of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, or to 
serve them at home.  However, we also found that some were more accurately viewed as 
“Islamic State” returnees, but not defectors, having only temporarily disengaged from the 
battleground—sometimes even being allowed to temporarily return home by the group, or 
more chillingly, sent home to recruit or otherwise serve the group’s goals in the West.  These 
returnees remain aligned with the so-called “Caliphate” and contemplate returning to Syria 
and Iraq and, in some cases, we learned that they have already returned to the battlefield 
and rejoined the terrorist group.  Some of those who truly defected from ISIS, even risking 
their lives to do so, also returned to supporting or actually returned to the group.  In the 
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case of some of these defectors, despite having disavowed ISIS for a considerable period of 
time, the challenges of living back home caused them to flip and return to the group.  Some 
were actually contacted by ISIS, or unable to reintegrate well at home, and again took up the 
cause.  This article relies on a sample of sixty-three ISIS defectors/returnees imprisoned by 
authorities, collected between May 2014 and August 2017.
The sample of nine out of sixty-three total was collected between May 2014 and February 
2017 from returnees of Western European and Balkans countries as well as Syrians fleeing 
ISIS by escaping into Turkey. One of the returnees was interviewed in a prison setting. He 
was imprisoned by the authorities following his defection from ISIS and return from Syria. 
Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, allowing the participants to tell their 
stories of being recruited into the group, serving, and then defecting, followed by detailed 
questioning involving a series of twenty-five questions and going in depth on topics they had 
personal experience with inside the group. The defectors were judged to be genuine on the 
basis of four things: referral from prison authorities and prosecution records, referral from 
defectors who knew them from inside the group, insightful knowledge about experiences 
inside the group, and intense post-traumatic responses during the interview evidencing 
they had been present and taken part in events they were describing. The subjects were 
contacted via smugglers, other defectors, personal introductions, and via prison authorities, 
thus the sample is entirely nonrandom.  The defectors did not give their real names except 
for those in prison or already prosecuted.
Before and during the course of the research, the participants were informed about the 
authors’ credentials in the field of counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism so as to 
secure interviews. The participants were informed that this research is part of a larger 
research project and is not sponsored or reporting to law enforcement. Informed consent 
was gained from each  participant, with special care taken for those in prison to ensure 
they were speaking freely and knew that they may be under surveillance that neither they 
nor we could  control.  In the case of those interviewed  in prison, the authors filed proper 
applications to gain access to the correctional facilities, and  abided fully by the policies and 
procedures of those facilities.  The authors did not pose any questions that could lead to the 
disclosure and admission of potential crimes or participation in illegal activities. This was 
important in the sense that it represents an ethical issue and any potential disclosure of 
incriminating evidence may be utilized against our participants in a court of law. That said, 
the interviewees were fully aware that in the event they voluntarily disclosed incriminating 
information, such as information about an impending attack, the principle of confidentiality 
would no longer apply. Our results cannot be generalized from this non-representative 
and small sample to apply to all returnees/defectors, yet the issues these interviews raise 
are deeply important for policy considerations in dealing with ISIS returnees because they 
describe the pathways into terrorism and back out for some, and how some at least deal 
with having returned from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.
Some security experts predict that as ISIS continues to lose territory and its brutal grip 
on local populations in Syria and Iraq, it will migrate to other territories, with Southeast 
Asia (Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia), Libya, and even the Balkans being cited as 
possibilities.5 When we interviewed Syrian defectors from June 2015 to February 2017 in 
the ISIS Defectors Interviews Project, many told us that in the event of losing their territory in 
Syria and Iraq, ISIS cadres plan to shave their beards and blend into normal society in Syria 
and elsewhere to mount guerilla warfare attacks.6 Certainly, of the 38,000 foreign fighters 
ISIS has managed to attract to Syria and Iraq, many will return home—some disaffected 
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and defecting from the group, some disillusioned in the short-term but still longing to build 
an Islamic “Caliphate,” and still others sent back to recruit and attack at home.  Already 
Western consulates in Turkey report an increase in their citizens showing up to report “lost 
passports” and wishing to return home.7
As ISIS continues to lose most or all of its territory, it is important for Western governments, 
particularly from the Balkans and Western Europe, to prepare for the reality that in this 
flood of returnees only some will be defectors, while others will simply be returnees who will 
continue to support the Islamic State.  Many of these returnees will be dangerous and may 
return to Syria and Iraq at some point, or go elsewhere, or act at home on behalf of ISIS or 
its potential successor organizations.  Whether all returnees from ISIS constitute a danger to 
their homelands is unknown, although those who left ISIS but are not necessarily defectors 
nor disillusioned with Islamic State’s claim to be able to construct a utopian Islamic Caliphate 
are likely more easily manipulated to attack at home and return to service.  In our interviews, 
we found the dream of the “Caliphate” was a very potent one, and while many understood 
that ISIS would never be able to deliver it, that nevertheless remained as a hoped-for ideal. 
As increasing numbers of ISIS cadres flee the battlefield, some as defectors and others as 
returnees still aligned with ISIS’ goals and ideology, the challenges for the West will be how 
to identify and sort out true defectors from returnees and determine if they are at risk to 
flip back again to supporting or rejoining the group.  It will be incumbent on Western states 
to find ways of determining who among returnees is a security risk at present, who may 
become one in the future (e.g. by returning their allegiance to the group), and who can 
be safely reintegrated into society  for the long-term.  The questions for those handling 
the likely flood of ISIS returnees include identifying the variables that can be manipulated 
potentially to lessen the possibilities of return to the group.  This article offers a small insight 
into those returnees who have not entirely renounced ISIS, or who have re-connected with 
the group  over time, identifying what appeared to be the causes.
Sample
This analysis is based on nine cases chosen from a total of sixty-three ISIS defectors/
returnees imprisoned by authorities (See Chart 1). The sample of sixty-three was identified 
by the smuggler who had brought them to Turkey, via a defector network, by virtue of their 
cases being public and having gone through prosecution, or because of the fact that they 
were imprisoned as ISIS (or in the case of the two Central Asians as ISIS affiliate) members. 
Table 1  ISIS Cadres Interviewed
Total #  of ISIS Cadres Interviewed 63




Iraq (18) (18 Prison)
Total: 63
# ISIS defectors reversing their decision or continuing 
their loyalty to ISIS (also subjects of this paper).
                                   9
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Nine Cases Discussed
The age of the participants at the time of the interview ranged from fifteen to forty-nine, with 
the majority being under thirty.  Their professions before joining ISIS included farming, trade, 
and professional jobs, with the majority being blue collar, farm workers, or unemployed.  All 
but one  of the nine cases were men.  Of  the nine cases culled for this analysis, one was 
female, one was a minor, and the rest were adult males.  These nine cases (the returnee or 
the defector representing all geographic areas of the sample) were specifically selected from 
the rest of the total sample because, unlike others, they: 1) expressed conflicting feelings 
about having left ISIS; 2) expressed the potential desire to return to the group; 3) expressed 
outright, continued affiliation and support for ISIS, and/or; 4) we learned that the person 
actually returned to fighting with ISIS. 
Methods
All of the nine defectors were interviewed in-depth using a semi-structured interview 
instrument (with open-ended questions included) between May 2014 and February 2017. 
One of the interviews took place in a prison setting. The person had defected, but was 
arrested by the authorities upon his return.  Most interviewees did not give their names 
and real names are used only for those whose cases are public and already in the press. 
The interviews served to develop an understanding of  their motivations for joining ISIS, 
what attracted them, what they found positive, how they were trained and ideologically 
indoctrinated into the group, what they witnessed inside ISIS, and what disturbed them 
enough to defect  or to leave for those who did so.  
For the forty-five out of sixty-three interviewees who were true defectors,  their main reasons 
for leaving included the brutality and corruption of ISIS (including its hypocritical and un-
Islamic nature), being coerced into actions they found morally or otherwise repellant, and 
sheer terror for their own or family members’ lives.8 Note that Speckhard and Shajkovci 
interviewed sixteen ISIS cadres imprisoned in Iraq, and with the exception of one prisoner, 
they could not determine their current level of support or loyalty for ISIS.
With the exception of the nine who continued or clearly returned their allegiance or who 
physically returned to ISIS, we could not determine if the remaining sample of interviewed 
ISIS defectors/returnees who denounced ISIS at the time of their interview ever returned 
to ISIS or expressed allegiance once again to the group. The nine who continued or clearly 
returned to their allegiance, or who actually physically returned to ISIS, are the subject of 
this analysis with the focus being on their motivations for doing so and the potential factors 
regarding their decisions to continue or return to supporting ISIS. 
Results
Out of the sixty-three interviewed ISIS cadres, we found nine of them to have either 
reversed their defection by returning to the battlefield or to have continued their ideological 
commitment to ISIS. Among the nine subjects who, despite having left the group, were 
conflicted about ISIS and continued  or returned to supporting the group (physically or 
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ideologically), one was Belgian, three were Albanians from Kosovo, two were Bosniaks, and 
three were Syrians in Turkey.  We know that four of these physically returned to the group, 
and one who was jailed in Kosovo had come and gone previously and flipped again back to 
ISIS in prison. 
Reasons cited for leaving ISIS included homesickness, battle fatigue, fear of ISIS leadership, 
disillusionment with ISIS living up to its utopian ideals, problems that needed attending to 
at home, anger over ISIS hypocrisy and/or mendacity, and the prospect for females of being 
forced to remarry.  Yet despite this, upon return to their home countries, or in the case 
of Syrian defectors fleeing to Turkey, they expressed allegiance to the group, with nearly 
half returning to it.  While our research ethic was never to ask our respondents to directly 
incriminate themselves, including asking them directly if they still wanted to return to ISIS, it 
became clear to us from what they voluntarily offered that of these nine subjects, all of them 
either continued or returned their allegiance to ISIS at some point after leaving the group 
and that half of them actually returned to the ISIS battlefield.
Discussion
After interviewing more than five hundred terrorists (or their family members and 
close associates when they are already dead) between us, it is clear that the individual 
vulnerabilities and motivations for joining terrorist groups are always contextual and vary 
even by neighborhood, even within the same city.9 The same is true for this sample.  
Among the thirty-three Syrians interviewed in our sample of sixty-three, the desire to join 
the uprising against Assad, alongside heavy coercion from ISIS, was a huge factor for joining 
the group.  Some of the fighters from other militias joined the “Islamic State” only when they 
were captured and offered a choiceless choice: die or join the group.  Other Syrian militia 
members joined ISIS voluntarily, citing it as more Islamic, more successful in battles, and 
better financed in terms of weapons and providing better salaries than their group—reasons 
they gave for switching allegiances.  Likewise, the Syrian respondents told us that Syrian 
youth easily believed the lies of ISIS preachers who promised youth unheard-of salaries, 
marriages, and even cars if they joined.  This happened despite the fact that many of the 
Cubs of the Caliphate were actually groomed for vehicular suicide missions and received 
only some of these rewards.  Local Syrian civilians who joined ISIS also referenced the fact 
that when ISIS overtook their areas, “Islamic State” took over all the means of employment 
and sustenance in the territories they controlled, and that to fail to join meant suffering, 
possible targeting for punishments, and potential starvation.  Female Syrians told us, and 
male Syrians confirmed, that local Syrian women also often married into ISIS as a means of 
feeding themselves and their families.
European foreign fighters, by contrast, were repeatedly referenced by the Syrians as already 
indoctrinated into Salafi militant jihadi ideas before coming to Syria, and were seen as the 
“true believers” who had come for “jihad.”10  Western foreign fighters, male and female, 
enjoyed exalted status above the Syrians in the “Islamic State” and were given many perks 
including free housing, arranged marriages, sometimes cars—and for the men, sex slaves.11 
Our interviews in Europe and the Balkans point to a completely different set of motivations for 
joining ISIS than many of the Syrians had.  High unemployment in the Balkans and in Muslim 
enclaves in Europe, alongside the marginalization and discrimination of first and second-
generation Muslim minorities in many Western European countries, played an important 
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role in these recruits finding ISIS attractive.  Offers of a real salary, arranged marriages, sex 
slaves for men, traditional living for women, free housing and other amenities, along with 
the honors bestowed by ISIS on foreign fighters who come to Syria and Iraq, attracted many 
who also felt their lives to be lacking dignity, purpose, significance, and honor.
More importantly, however, our total sample of interviews revealed that the significance 
of the ISIS captured territory and what appeared to be the real possibility of establishing 
a utopian Islamic “Caliphate”—given the oil wealth and battlefield successes of ISIS—were 
strong motivating factors for joining.  The dream of the “Caliphate” was important to them. 
Those from the Balkans who went early on to join the uprising against Assad and later 
found themselves in the ranks of ISIS also referenced their own personal experience of 
war as children and youth, and the duty they felt for Muslims to defend one another from 
tyrannical and violent leaders and unjust attack.12  In fact, all of those interviewed in Kosovo 
by Speckhard (n=6), referenced the fact that others, including Americans, had come to 
save them from killings and rapes decades ago, and that now it was their Islamic duty to 
help Syrians defend themselves from Assad’s atrocities—events they had viewed on video 
and found extremely disturbing.  However, once in Syria, they discovered the unexpected 
complexities of multiple actors with differing goals and the various militias warring with 
each other.  Those we interviewed left while others who stayed in Syria became enamored 
of what became the Islamic State.
Likewise, many foreign fighters from Central Asia, Europe, and the Balkans were recruited 
into “Islamic State” by friends and family members, or with offers of marriage—creating 
and deepening already existing friendship and familial bonds—making it harder to exit the 
group.  Some of the reasons we identified that seem to draw foreign fighters back to the 
group include: the friendships and camaraderie that also arose between foreign fighters, 
along with their deepened Islamic identities, sense of purpose, significance, heroism and 
dignity forged in ISIS; the material as well as spiritual rewards of participation; the potential 
of dying for a greater purpose with the religious promises of “martyrdom,” versus living a 
life of ennui; and the manner in which the group promoted its brand as representing an 
ultimate quest for Muslim dignity, self-rule, and justice. Whereas Syrians were more aware 
of the brutalities of ISIS toward other Sunnis (e. g. the decimation of the Sunni al-Sheitaat 
tribe) and their hypocritical lies, the Syrians in our sample also expressed vulnerabilities 
to returning to ISIS, such as longing for “true” Islamic living and Syrian freedom with the 
overthrow of Assad, as well as having become invested in the possibility of a real Islamic 
Caliphate.
Alongside the motivations for joining, the problems facing foreign fighters back home—
factors that played in their decisions to join such as high unemployment, underemployment, 
discrimination, marginalization, difficulty living a conservative Salafi lifestyle in the West, 
messy and unsatisfying family relationships that they had fled—all still existed as problems 
once they returned home.  And these problems continued on without new or satisfying 
solutions.  In addition, having lived in a conflict zone and having witnessed and taken part in 
extreme brutality also took a heavy psychological toll upon returned ISIS cadres, who now 
in safety told us of enduring symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  Their high 
arousal states in particular—feeling jumpy, fidgety, and on high alert—do not match the 
calm, bored ennui of being back home, or of hiding in Syria without a clear purpose.  Equally 
important, they are lacking good psychological treatment along with the ability to safely 
admit the disturbing things in which they took part.   Many returnees long again for the 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 1 ( January 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Speckhard, Shajkovci, & Yayla,  ISIS Returnees  8
clarity of purpose and experiences of the battleground with the potential rewards of death 
by “martyrdom.”  Only one returnee in our sample received psychological assistance—
an Albanian from Kosovo who was offered psychological help in France for the traumas 
of having served in “Islamic State.”  He stated that before taking the offered therapy he 
suffered nightmares and what sounded like symptoms of PTSD, but that the treatment 
greatly helped him to reintegrate.  Some of the aforementioned factors also serve to explain 
why some foreign fighters seem to overlook the group’s limitations and territorial setbacks, 
dismissing reality while hoping for the best upon return. 
Case Examples
ISIS, like al-Qaeda before it, has been adept at convincing adherents that to die killing 
enemies of the group is to die a “martyr’s” death with all the Islamic rewards of “martyrdom” 
conveyed to the suicide terrorist.  Of course, most Muslims would not recognize this terrorist 
ideology as their Islam. Yet, during the course of our interviews we have learned how the 
group has managed to hijack Islamic scripture by promising fighters  that suicide terrorism 
is an act of “martyrdom” that wipes away sins, gains the adherent immediate entry to 
Paradise, and grants family members Paradise upon their deaths as well. Our defectors 
told us of many Arabs and some Westerners who joined ISIS for the express purpose of 
gaining a “martyr’s” death—even volunteering for suicide missions.  When one is faced with 
a seemingly insignificant and purposeless life, and problems of rampant unemployment, or 
if one is carrying guilt over “sins,” a significant death with an immediately improved afterlife 
can become an important allure to returning to ISIS, as one of our Balkan defectors told us:
I am thinking about it [returning to Syria].  There is a possibility.  There is a bigger purpose 
in dying than staying here.  Here is worse than you think.  The cause I was fighting for, the 
brotherhood, and the life I had in Syria was powerful.  I had a reason both to live and to 
die.  I had a reason to live because I had income and food on the table every day.  I also 
did not mind dying because I believe in God and justice.  What I mean is that I don’t have to 
worry about starving, like here [in Kosovo].  I have stability, and I don’t mind dying because 
it is for a greater purpose: to free innocent Muslim brothers and sisters who are being 
killed every day. (D.K, age thirty-five, interviewed in June 2015, Kosovo)13
A thirty-four year old Albanian Kosovar explained how he had found purpose and meaning 
in ISIS and only returned for a short time to Kosovo—for a break from the battlefield, “I am 
temporarily disengaged.  I will return.  I have established my life in the Islamic State.  This 
[Syria] is my new home.”  He denied defecting saying, 
Defecting means switching allegiance and commitment.  I have not abandoned my 
brothers and sisters in Syria.  I will be there for as long as I need to.  I will help my brothers 
and sisters in Syria.  It is my new career and my new life.  Even though I love my family in 
Kosovo, I have found a new purpose in life (R.B., age thirty-four, interviewed in March 2016, 
Kosovo).
Two middle-aged men who went to join ISIS from Bosnia but had returned to be with their 
families stated, “Our families are in Bosnia.  The war is not over yet.  We hope to bring our 
families to live with us in the Islamic State.” (M.S., age forty-seven and B.I, age forty-nine, 
interviewed between May and September 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
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Another thirty-five-year-old Albanian Kosovar explained that it is hard to reintegrate into a 
society that labels those who went to assist in the uprising in Syria as terrorists and that he 
intends to return to ISIS, “[There is] no reason to live here, stigmatized by Kosovars.  Difficult 
to return when people call you a terrorist.” (A.K., age thirty-five, interviewed in June 2015, 
Kosovo)
Syrian defectors in Turkey also told us about languishing in refugee camps and looking 
impatiently back to ISIS, idealizing what they had defected from and hoping still that ISIS 
could liberate their country from Assad. One defector stated :
I complain to my friends here in Turkey [about ISIS atrocities].  I always complain to them.  
I tried to convince them, at a time when they tried to convince me to go back.  “Let’s go 
back.  We will have money and pay.” I told them, “Money is not everything.  You need to be 
patient here.  Inshallah, you will feel relieved soon.  It won’t be long.  It won’t be long.  They 
[ISIS] are not righteous.” They didn’t believe me.  A lot of my friends went back and they are 
still there.  The others were convinced because I told them about the reality of things. (Abu 
Yousef, age twenty-nine, interviewed in November 2015, Turkey)
Syrian Tahir, age fifteen when we interviewed him, returned to ISIS despite having become 
disaffected with ISIS cadres tricking small children into suicide missions and also pushing 
him to take one during his time inside Islamic State.  He returned after ISIS fighters came 
and told him that they could take his town back from the Kurds but needed his help as a 
guide.  Homesick and desperate to return home, he was easily manipulated by them.   Tahir, 
we later learned through those who knew him, was killed on a landmine as he tried to guide 
the fighters in their unsuccessful bid to overtake his village.  (Tahir, age fifteen, interviewed 
in November 2015, Turkey).  
Umm Rasheed, a twenty-one-year-old Syrian woman who had been indoctrinated by ISIS 
after being orphaned as a teen and married into the group, was forced by circumstances 
into three serial marriages (after each husband died in battle).  The single mother of a small 
child had been living in a Turkish refugee camp for nine months but still expressed deep 
confusion about ISIS when we spoke to her in Turkey.  Her case made it clear to us that those 
who escape from terrorist groups need supportive therapy and remain deeply vulnerable 
to the ideologies they have been forced to live under, especially if they fell under ISIS rule as 
youth, as she did.
Despite having run from them when she believed they would force her into yet a fourth ISIS 
marriage, Umm Rasheed appeared completely disoriented in her life in Turkey, telling us, “I 
would do the same thing again if given the opportunity.  I escaped because I have a small 
child, but I want to go back after the baby is grown.  I want to go back.  When my son is three 
or four years old, if ISIS still exists, I will go back and fight with them.” 
Having known poverty in her family home and then repeated tragedy in her late teens as her 
parents and three husbands were all killed and then knowing poverty again as a refugee, 
she idealized the prosperity and powerful position she had briefly held in ISIS, married to 
a Saudi foreign fighter and being herself a member of the ISIS hisbah.  She claimed, “ISIS is 
a really good group, I have to help them.  If they allow me to keep my son, I would marry 
[again] but I don’t know yet.  They are not as bad as people tell.  ISIS is good.  Woman are 
covered over there.”
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Like many who had fallen under the total indoctrination of ISIS, she still believed that “Islamic 
State” represented the true Islam and all others were enemies.  She also had personal 
experience to back up some of her beliefs.  She had been relatively rich in ISIS until each 
of her husbands were killed in battle.  Likewise, she had seen the civilian killings caused by 
Coalition bombings that made her conclude that the West was an enemy to Syrian civilians, 
“Those coalition forces are not killing us, our soldiers, but they are attacking civilians, and 
everyone sees that.” She claimed to have seen dead women and children killed by Coalition 
airstrikes as well.
While she had risked her life to escape ISIS and was clearly relieved to be away from the 
battlefield and not forced to remarry yet a fourth time, she still idealized the “Islamic State” 
and was unclear about what to believe, “They lie about us and create negative propaganda,” 
she said of the West.  Also having so many of her close family killed in battle and having been 
taught by ISIS that they were “martyrs,” it may have been hard for her to let go of this idea. 
When asked about others joining the group, she said, 
Advise them to come and join ISIS.  Go! Die in the road of Allah.  When you die for the 
religion you save yourself.  I want my child to be an ISIS fighter and martyr.  That son must 
go through the way of his father, follow his path, I wish I was a ‘martyr’ as well. I can die 
when he’s ten.  Martyrdom is the most important rank you can reach.
When asked if she would take other Syrian refugees back to ISIS with her, she answered, 
Of course if someone wants to go I will take them.  I invited a lot of women in Raqqa to 
become ISIS members.  Inshallah, ISIS will become the real state of the region and I will 
become the martyr for them.  What you hear here is all lies.  You think they won’t last but 
if you go to Raqqa you see everyone is living peacefully there. 
Having lost her girlhood dream of becoming a doctor, her parents having been killed by 
regime bombings, and having to marry young and repeatedly with little chance to grieve 
and then having been trained by ISIS as a young woman to be sadistic in torturing other 
women who infringed upon their strict rules, it is likely this widowed single mother was so 
traumatized by all she had seen that she could not clearly work through ISIS claims of being 
righteous (Umm Rasheed, age twenty-one, interviewed in May 2016, Turkey).
In Belgium, 27-year-old Younes Delefortrie (his real name) told of being raised by an alcoholic 
and violent mother and feeling that the Catholic Church he regularly worshipped in as a child 
had failed to protect him.  When introduced to Islam by second-generation North African 
Belgians who have strong extended family ties, he was captivated by a religion that bans 
alcohol and immediately converted.  He gave up drugs and alcohol and over time moved 
beyond those Muslim friends to an extremist version of Islam and eventually went to Syria 
in 2013.  Delefortrie spent only five weeks in Syria in a group composed of al-Nusra and 
ISIS cadres and returned to Europe when the groups started fighting each other, giving as 
his reasons that he wanted to make a better living,  reunite with his wife, and escape  the 
battleground.  
Yet, when he returned to Europe, he was returning to a troubled marriage,  a conviction on 
terrorism charges, release on a travel ban, and overall failure. After having tried to restart 
his life, he had  his business shut down by Gert Wilders, who complained that his bakery 
loaves “have blood on them.” Disillusioned with life in Belgium, Delefortrie expressed in 
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his interview his wish to return to ISIS.  Idealizing their “Caliphate”, he justified the 2015 
Bataclan Paris attacks as retaliation for Coalition bombings and said he hoped for the ISIS 
“Caliphate” to extend to Brussels.  Journalists who have interviewed him at home report an 
ISIS flag hanging in his bedroom and Delefortrie dressed in a hoodie adorned with the ISIS 
flag.  The judge who decided Delefortrie’s case saw him as not enough of a danger to society 
to lock him up; however, there are clear signs of his vulnerability to rejoin old comrades 
and his continued adherence to an ideology that addresses his childhood traumas and that 
supports terrorist attacks on European soil.  His case would seem to support an argument 
for  for providing remedial therapy for ISIS returnees (Younes Delefortrie, age twenty-seven, 
interviewed February 2016, Belgium).
Fitim Lladrovci (his real name), a twenty-five-year-old Albanian Kosovar interviewed in prison 
in Kosovo, raises many of the war-related issues associated with others from the Balkans who 
went to Syria.  As a young boy, Lladrovci had witnessed his own family attacked by Serbs and 
vividly recalled that an American woman had saved their village.  He, like many of the other 
Albanians who initially went to fight against the Assad regime, recalled how traumatized and 
helpless they felt during their war.  As a result, he felt that it was his Islamic duty to help. 
He, like the others interviewed, felt that the Kosovo government had supported Albanians 
going to help with the uprising in Syria, but later hypocritically condemned him as a terrorist. 
Lladrovci travelled first to Syria in 2013 and joined the Free Syrian Army for four months. 
Like many Albanians in the conflict zone, he became disenchanted when the militias started 
turning on each other and returned home.  Recalling that time, he stated, “I joined the FSA. 
[When they] started fighting al-Nusra, I decided to return to Kosovo.”  Despite trying to 
return to his normal life, he kept abreast of developments in Syria, particularly the rise of 
ISIS, as he became enamored of their claim for an Islamic “Caliphate.”
Lladrovci had, during his brief time in Syria, met many of the Albanian foreign fighters who 
later became leaders in ISIS, so he knew he could play an important role if he joined.  Recalling 
how he tried to settle back into normal life in Kosovo, Lladrovci stated, “I got back and tried 
to move away from those kind of things, go back to my own life, but it was impossible.  When 
I saw ISIS created, my desire [to return] was so great.  The second trip in ISIS was totally 
exciting. The first time was boring, just guard duty.” 
Like many of the Albanian foreign fighters from Kosovo, Lladrovci expressed extreme 
disappointment with the Kosovo government for criminalizing his initial acts of fighting with 
the Free Syrian Army to assist in the Syrian uprising and equating it to joining a terrorist 
group, more specifically, 
Once I came back in 2014, arrests started to happen in Kosovo and police took me in to 
question me. … They came and arrested me, took my computers and phones.  They found 
evidence.  It wasn’t like I didn’t admit it.  I told them I went to [Syria to] help the people.  It 
shouldn’t be a surprise. Even the Kosovo Islamic community made a call for going [to Syria] 
and helping, so it wasn’t like I ever denied it. 
Yet, despite there being no law on the books in Kosovo for joining the uprising in Syria at 
the time he served the Free Syrian Army, his act of helping the Syrians was criminalized as 
terrorism.  “[I was] put on the potential terrorist list.  Arrested for nine hours.  At the time, we 
didn’t have a law,” Lladrovci recalled, obviously angry about what he saw as hypocrisy on the 
part of the state.  Lladrovci, however, also had a criminal streak—with a history of stealing 
and petty criminality in his early life (according to those who knew him) —and he easily lied 
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to the government, “In front of prosecutor I said that I regret and have no intentions of going 
back.  He believed me.  I went home and the first thing I did was contact the people in Syria.”
As ISIS declared its “Caliphate”, Lladrovci became excited by the idea of joining and getting 
in on the ground floor.  The first time in Syria he had left his wife behind, but this time 
he recalled, “It was at that period, people were taking their wives, wives were joining their 
husbands. Why not? I can do that too.  So, I got in touch with Lavdrim Muhaxheri and Ridvan 
Haqifi, [They were] big shots at the time.  I made some very good connections since my 
first time.” Material considerations played a part as well.  Lladrovci told his ISIS friends that 
he wanted to bring his wife and asked them, “Can I get a house?”  The answer back, “Yes 
conditions here are excellent for you.  We are just waiting.”
Lladrovci continued to misrepresent himself to the authorities, recalling, 
I started searching for ways how to get there.  I decided to go from Montenegro.  I took a 
bus with my wife, flew from Podgorica.  I was on the [potential terrorist] list so once I got 
to the border of Kosovo, I didn’t need a passport to cross to Montenegro, I showed my 
ID—they saw the name and questioned me.  “Yes, I’ve been to Syria but now we are going 
to Ulcinj and taking my wife.  We are going to work.  My wife shouldn’t be punished, for a 
stupid decision, why should she suffer?”  
Lladrovci lied charmingly to the authorities and passed into Montenegro unstopped.
Once inside ISIS, Lladrovci recalled fighting for ISIS on an almost daily basis and had no 
regrets whatsoever about ISIS killing civilians, taking sex slaves, beheading so-called spies 
and enemies of the “Islamic State,” and killing other Sunnis—most notably decimating the 
al-Sheitaat tribe in a genocidal battle where thousands of men, women, and children were 
killed by ISIS.  He had so completely drunk the ISIS poisonous ideology of believing the 
“Islamic State” was righteous that he rarely questioned their brutalities or corruption. 
However, when he began to witness discrepancies that reflected his own life and values as 
they were played out upon insiders, he became upset with the leaders of ISIS.  Lladrovci, 
whose father died when he was young, was raised by his mother and perhaps easily felt 
sympathy for widows.  Likewise, he had vivid recollection of himself, his mother and an older 
brother being attacked by Serbs when he was only eight—an age that he would also relate 
to during his time in ISIS. 
Lladrovci recalled, “When wives got sick they [ISIS] wouldn’t take them to the hospital.  They 
can’t travel alone.  [According to ISIS] wives are only there to cook and take care.  For me that 
was a huge sign something is wrong.”  Lladrovci’s wife fell ill and was not cared for by ISIS.  He 
continued, “There was not only my case, there was another person’s wife. She was sick with 
cancer, had four kids.  They didn’t take care of her or allow her to go back [home for medical 
treatment].”  He also became upset seeing that ISIS was only paying a widow’s pension for 
the first month then refusing to pay further payments and not helping the women to get out 
to buy necessities, effectively forcing these women to remarry in order to survive.
As is the case with  many who join ISIS, part of the attraction to the group is its promise 
to deliver justice and dignity to all Muslims.  Lladrovci was no different in this regard.  He 
became enraged when he saw hypocrisies and injustice as it applied to ISIS members.  His 
refusal to simply follow the group motto of “hear and obey,” and his tendency to speak out 
about these injustices did not endear him to the ISIS leadership. He recalled, “I told you 
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I cannot tolerate injustice, so I always confronted them [the ISIS leaders] and argued.  At 
some point, we even went to the shariah court.  Because of that they started distancing 
themselves from me.”
The final straw for Lladrovci was an eight-year-old child who probably represented for him, 
his own fatherless, boyhood, unprotected-self during war. “So, there was this eight-years-
old kid,” Lladrovci recalled, whose father had brought him to Syria against the wishes of his 
mother.  
His mother was in Kosovo.  They didn’t allow him to use the Internet.  Imagine this kid 
not being able to speak with his mother!  His father went to Iraq to fight, so he left his 
kid with some Arabs.  He told the Arabs, “Please send my kid to the Albanian group.”  He 
got wounded.  From the hospital he wouldn’t call his son or anything.  At some point the 
hospital was bombarded.  We thought he was dead.  This boy had no food to eat and no 
one was taking care of him.  Within the [ISIS] law he was supposed to get money, but other 
Albanian kids were mocking him.  So, he came to me one day, “Abu Musab brother, sorry 
to bother you, I don’t have anything.”  He had ten cents in his pocket while the other kids 
had 10 Euros.
Lladrovci got upset and complained to the Albanian leaders, 
I got very distant with Muhaxheri, but with Lavdrim, I spoke to him, “He is being mistreated, 
you have to help him.” The answer, “You have to mind your own business.” But for me it 
was very important.  I loved that boy and you have to help him somehow.  There was one 
night during bombings around the house of Lavdrim Muhaxheri.  He [Muhaxheri] was 
scared and took his wife and left this kid all alone, knowing they were bombing and aiming 
at the house.  I couldn’t tolerate it.  The Coalition, I think, was bombing and aiming at his 
house specifically.  Later he recalls that the boy was also beaten, “Ramadani and Astrajevi, 
beat him very badly.”  (Lladrovci denied that the child was raped.) 
Unable to help the boy, Lladrovci started risking his life by taking the boy daily on the back 
of his motorcycle to an Internet café to talk with his mother.  Ultimately, Lladrovci decided 
to defect with his wife and take the boy back to his mother, probably because he truly cared 
for and identified with the boy’s plight, and quite possibly because he also saw it as an 
insurance policy to avoid a prison sentence upon his return to Kosovo.
Again, Lladrovci spoke cavalierly about the details of his escape, saying he paid smugglers 
$3000 to get the three of them out of Syria—the money he freely admitted to stealing 
from homes ISIS cadres pillaged.  Nowhere in his interview did Lladrovci express concern 
for the homes that were taken from Shia to house ISIS cadres, nor for looting homes, the 
genocidal killings and enslavement of Sunnis, Shia, and Yazidis, rapes of Yazidi women, or 
ISIS beheadings.  Nevertheless, he did feel bad for ISIS widows who were not paid their 
widow’s pensions and were forced to remarry in order to survive, and for this boy whom ISIS 
mistreated.  Thus, he decided to risk everything and defect from the group.
To an experienced psychotherapist speaking with Lladrovci (Speckhard), his personality 
in regard to his time in ISIS appears naïve, undeveloped, and somewhat psychopathic. 
Expressing no regret for serious war crimes, combined with total surprise that he was 
imprisoned upon his return from ISIS to Kosovo, Lladrovci stated, “The court gave me the 
letter that when I came here [to Kosovo], I’ll be free.”  Yet the Kosovo courts did not honor 
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the arrangement that Lladrovci claims to have negotiated.  He was initially sentenced to five 
years for “participating with terrorist organization and for illegal possession of weapons,” 
but his sentence was later reduced to three and a half years. Lladrovci was serving his time 
in prison at the time we interviewed him.
“I’m threatened inside the prison,” Lladrovci complained. “There are people who are praying 
all the night to kill people in Kosovo.  They are on first barrier [in the prison].  They are going 
to kill me for sure.”  As a defector, Lladrovci knew that other ISIS inmates would like to kill 
him, but he did not blame ISIS at all for that—he blamed Kosovo. 
Suffering alone in prison, he also got very angry at the state for not keeping the bargain he 
claimed they had made for rescuing the boy, and Lladrovci began returning in his mind to 
freedom all the while idealizing his time in ISIS and their so-called “Caliphate” where he again 
believed justice would be served, “The things that the IS has done, I’m willing to forgive them 
for everything.  Compared to what they have done in Kosovo [to me].  It is way worse, I will 
never forgive them,” Lladrovci complained from prison. 
Lladrovci acknowledged that he had indeed defected from ISIS and would have been killed 
had he been caught, but now in prison he was again enamored with ISIS, “[y]es it was a time 
when I decided ad- Dawlah [the Islamic State] was not for me.  But when I came here to this 
kufr [unbelieving] state and institutions, they made me think I am for ad-Dawlah.” Discussing 
how hard prison can be, Lladrovci rationalized, 
I was trying to help my country. Being alone in the jail for sixteen hours by myself [he is in 
solitary for his own protection] everyday, of course I’m going to think to kill.  I never used 
to hate persons like you—civilians. Now I’m hating institutions, courts, because these are 
the people who put me in this position.  They are the reason.  They put me in the problems 
with ISIS.  They are the reason why I was arrested and I’m leaving my family.  The way I’m 
standing in the jail.  The “Caliphate” is quite better than where I am treated by Albanians.
Lladrovci never admitted that in this victim stance he takes no responsibility for his own 
actions and simply blames others.
Lladrovci’s case also argues for in-prison rehabilitation treatment for those in Europe who 
will not be serving long sentences, as he becomes more violently committed to ISIS each 
passing day in prison, “[w]hen I stay in my cell, I don’t want to watch Turkish TV.  I read Koran 
and reflect.  There is no doubt that life in the Caliphate was better.”
When confronted with the fact that he is comparing apples and oranges—freedom to 
imprisonment, and is being contradictory, given that when a male ISIS defector is caught he 
is beheaded—Lladrovci stated, “Be honest, death is easier.  When you die, you go to hell or 
heaven.  To be alive and mistreated it really hurts.  I’m losing the hope; I can’t stand myself 
like this.” 
Over years of interviewing terrorists, we have often heard them say that prison is 
psychologically untenable and that they would rather take a suicide mission than return 
to a prison cell.  Indeed, Chechen suicide bombers were overrepresented by those who 
had fugitive status within Russia. They would rather take a “martyrdom” mission than risk 
arrest, torture, and prison.  Some Palestinians also said they would rather die fighting than 
return to prison.14 Belgians involved in the 2016 airport attacks also said they wanted to 
avoid arrest and prison and preferred “martyrdom.”  This is a chilling thought: if the person 
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emerging from prison is not fully disengaged from the terror group, he or she may be more 
than willing to be sent on a suicide mission rather than get re-arrested.  This is something 
Western nations will have to think over when they begin to imprison ISIS returnees.  Holding 
the returnees in cages and not offering useful rehabilitation, including not helping them to 
admit what they are indeed responsible for, may keep society safe while they are locked up, 
but may make even more of a monster out of those already strongly indoctrinated by ISIS—
and increase societal danger upon their release. 
After being totally disillusioned by his imprisonment, Lladrovici explained that he flipped 
from being an ISIS defector to a full supporter and encouraged others to go to ISIS, “[a]fter 
I came back from Syria and Iraq, two persons came and I said, ‘Don’t go there,’ and I made 
them promise not to.  But since I’m arrested, I’m going to say go there.” 
He also idealized depending on God for everything, despite ISIS currently losing in Syria and 
Iraq, “Yes things have gotten worse.  They’ve lost territory, weapons, and money.  They don’t 
have good military tactics.  They are not doing very well, but the point is, we only depend on 
Allah’s will and that is what is important.”
Having learned to view the world through the lens of Islamic State and the claim that they 
alone are representing Islam correctly, Lladrovci also fails to distinguish terrorist acts against 
innocent civilians from collateral damage during acts of war.  When asked about the airport, 
restaurant, and nightclub terror attacks carried out by ISIS cadres in Brussels and Paris he 
answered, 
Alhamdulillah [praise be to God], they [the Coalition] are bombing in Syria and Iraq! 
Restaurants! They bomb children all the time in Syria and they complain after… That’s 
why they [ISIS] bombed in the [Brussels] airport. It’s almost the same.  They have tortured 
in Syria, now they have the same in their cities.”  He added, “I am not like the Islamic 
Community of Kosovo  to put a candle and say I’m crying for them.” 
Having been taught well by ISIS, he also now judges people’s worth by asking, “But do they 
follow shariah?”  Lladrovci, consumed with issues of social justice, also asked important 
questions about controversial interrogation practices, like, “Do you know what Americans 
did to the Muslims in the jails, especially jails in the Middle East?”
When calmed a bit, Lladrovici stated, “If you love justice you should work both sides, not leave 
only one,” and admits, “I know it’s not good to do terror in Europe or Kosovo.”  However, the 
difficulty of being in solitary confinement in prison continues to eat at his soul.  He admitted, 
“But then you have the pressure like this, put in jail, and you are dirty in everywhere—then 
of course you will be a terrorist.” 
His case profoundly illustrates the challenges faced by Western governments that are 
unwilling to lock individuals like him up for a lifetime—shifting views and the idealizing of 
ISIS that may occur when faced with the challenges of prison as well as simply the return to 
“normal” life.  (Fitim Lladrovci, age twenty-five, interviewed in June 28, 2016, Kosovo).
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Policy Implications
This original, field-based research reflects our sixty-three interviewed ISIS cadres worldwide. 
Out of sixty-three interviewed, we found nine of them to have either reversed their defection 
and returned to the battlefield or continued their ideological commitment to ISIS. In this 
paper, we examined all nine cases using a psycho-social, case study methodology. While we 
cannot know the entire sample of ISIS returnees, nor what percentage is likely to reverse or 
continue their loyalty to ISIS, we believe that our sample gives the reader important insights 
into the factors that lead to discontinuing their loyalties toward the terrorist group, and then 
later in some cases reversing that position.  This field-based research helps to develop an 
understanding of factors that may play into terrorists’ recidivism, particularly in the case of 
returning ISIS foreign fighters. 
These nine examples raise issues of enduring ideological indoctrination to groups like 
ISIS, strong ties with ISIS that persist even upon return from the battlefield, and the glum 
depression of having returned from the excitement of ISIS to a life of frustrated boredom, 
seeming insignificance, and economic challenges.  Given that those who lived under ISIS 
are often initially attracted to join it as a result of childhood traumas, current challenges 
and deprivations, possible psychopathic traits as well as failures in relationships and life—
all problems they initially believed the terrorist group could ameliorate or at the minimum 
distract them from—we can expect that they also return to the same issues that have not 
disappeared during their stint with the terrorist group.  As a result, returnees, even those 
who claim to have deradicalized or disengaged from the terrorist group, may  continue to 
be vulnerable to further involvement in terrorism.  For that reason, all returnees and those 
suspected of having traveled to terrorist groups should be carefully assessed by qualified 
mental health workers and possibly religious leaders (e.g. qualified imams in the case of 
ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab, for instance).  Moreover, those who have these psycho-social 
vulnerabilities should receive supportive therapy to ensure they do not involve themselves 
in terrorism again. 
We must also keep in mind that many who traveled to join ISIS will return even further 
handicapped by additional traumas experienced in ISIS that may manifest as symptoms 
of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  This requires careful assessment and treatment. 
One Albanian interviewed in Kosovo who had spent time fighting in Syria stated that he 
greatly benefited from a French treatment program that helped him come to terms with the 
atrocities in which he had taken part.  Feelings of guilt, fear, shame, nightmares, flashbacks, 
bodily arousal, and avoidance are all symptoms of post-traumatic stress that may occur 
from having been involved in ISIS.  Those who were involved during their development also 
need supportive therapy to help them recover from shattered world assumptions (e.g. the 
world is predictable, safe, human beings are caring, etc.) and from loss of childhood dreams 
and innocence.  Umm Rasheed, for instance, who wanted to be a doctor as a teen girl and 
put considerable effort into her dream was turned into a sadistic torturer by ISIS: a group 
that provided her security when she had lost everything as a young woman.  She will need 
supportive therapy to overcome her identification with a brutal group and to overcome her 
feelings of shame once she begins to admit that what she participated in was morally wrong.
Prison, or the threat of it, also appears to be a major stressor driving some back into the 
arms of ISIS.  There is a tension in all societies between repressive measures against those 
involved in terrorism and rehabilitative measures that may put society at increased risk. 
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Policy makers need to assess the risk of radicalized individuals being imprisoned without 
treatment—that is, whether they will seed their terrorist ideas throughout the prison. 
Likewise, short prison sentences risk returning would- be terrorists back into society, but 
long ones may make choosing to die as a terrorist seem like a good choice.
The direct effects of imprisonment on cognitive changes or cognitive aspects of radicalization 
are poorly understood,15 yet it is well known that prisons often represent potentially fertile 
recruiting grounds for those representing groups like ISIS.16  The stressors of being in prison 
are many, and it is often necessary to join a group to gain protection and camaraderie, 
and feelings of resentment for the government can easily be exploited in prison.  However, 
the prison environment also may provide a venue and opportunity for those disengaged 
from groups like ISIS to receive treatment and interact with others who could have a 
positive effect if they are placed in a controlled environment where they may have access 
to more progressive or liberal religious literature17 and contacts and treatments that could 
challenge their existing radical worldviews.18 Such programs need to be individualized, highly 
specialized, and carried out by highly skilled professionals. They must also include prisoner 
dispersion19 to isolate those who are vulnerable from terrorist recruiters and leaders to 
minimize group control over prisoners in isolated conditions and the immediate undoing of 
any prison treatment program that could potentially encourage prisoners to rethink their 
support for terrorism and, most importantly, ensure their reintegration into society once 
out of prison. Whether imprisoned upon their return, or free, it appears ISIS returnees and 
defectors harbor many vulnerabilities for return to the group, to recruit for it, and to offer 
it support, and they would benefit from well-thought-out treatment plans that effectively 
address both their original reasons for joining and the challenges they face upon return.
Given that most of the defectors we spoke to were truly repulsed by ISIS and harbored no 
positive feelings for the group at the time of our interviews (n=43), we must also stress that 
most of those who we spoke to did not remain aligned to ISIS, nor appear easily vulnerable 
to return.  This does not mean, however, that they never will flip.  Likewise, while Syrian ISIS 
cadres with whom we spoke cited Westerners as the “true believers,” not all were.  A European 
woman who returned pregnant via an extremely perilous escape after her ISIS husband was 
killed, for instance, never really endorsed the group, and only followed her husband to Syria 
to remain married.  She had no illusions about ISIS after having been pressured to leave her 
baby behind in order to leave with their blessings.  Many of the Albanians who went to Syria 
early in the conflicts also said they went for humanitarian reasons to help in the uprising 
against Assad, but quickly returned upon seeing the factions turning upon each other.  They 
also held no interest in the ISIS “Caliphate,” either while in Syria or upon their return. 
All of these cases demonstrate that it will be important for governments, when dealing with 
ISIS returnees, to look carefully into the motivations and vulnerabilities of each individual 
for having traveled to Syria and Iraq and for having fallen into the ranks of ISIS. Those who 
appear as truly defected must  be given a chance to prove themselves through the justice 
systems of their countries while being monitored by their governments to ensure that they 
do not continue to have ties with ISIS, intentions of going back, or intentions to carry out 
attacks in the name of ISIS in their countries. Such policies will be important as governments 
consider the impact on those who have been deceived into joining terrorist organizations in 
Iraq and Syria and now have second thoughts.  This is especially crucial considering that not 
all who have joined ISIS were religious or ideological fanatics. As evidenced in our research, 
some joined for what they believed to be humanitarian reasons and quickly backed away 
from ISIS when they saw its extreme brutality.  
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During the course of our interviews with government officials and religious and civil society 
figures, some stressed the importance of introducing amnesty in the case of those who 
wish to return but have not committed crimes.  The issue of granting amnesty remains 
contentious and open to debate and it is very difficult to distinguish between those who 
committed crimes and who have not.   Already one ISIS defector imprisoned in Germany 
who claims not to have killed anyone while there was denounced by ISIS themselves as a 
killer.20  However, providing adequate legal tools and venues for the returnees to prove their 
innocence  is necessary to fight the narratives of alienation and victimization  that groups 
like ISIS seek to exploit.  That said, new policy initiatives must strike a delicate balance 
between ensuring security, including imprisoning those who might threaten society, while 
encouraging full rehabilitation of those who really have defected.
On the government side, it is difficult to prove which groups a returnee was in and produce 
evidence strong enough for courts to indict them on terrorism charges.  Yet, it is important to 
remember what ISIS cadres told us about their one to three-week long shariah indoctrination 
classes (occurring after the ISIS Caliphate was declared and functioning as a “State” of 
sorts)—that these classes ended with sworn bayats and demonstrations of loyalty being 
carried out by each cadre beheading an ISIS prisoner.  If true for returnees who joined ISIS 
once it was a “State,” they have committed war crimes and truly have blood on their hands, 
and psychologically have crossed a barrier from which it may be hard to return.
Conclusion
Arguably, the group’s battlefield losses due to aerial bombardments and ground combat, 
alongside the recent introduction of laws that criminalize material support and travel to 
combat zones with the purpose of joining terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria, will 
continue to slow, if not completely halt, the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq.  Equally 
important, the group’s aura and appeal are likely to continue to dwindle in light of accounts 
and narratives that depict the extreme violence and brutality of life under the “Islamic State” 
and ISIS-controlled territories, as is also evidenced in our recent research in Syria, Europe, 
and the Balkans.  Some, however, will continue to fall prey to the group’s slick recruitment 
strategy, the promise of a “righteous” Islamic life, and the allure of successes that resulted 
in the creation of the “Islamic State.”  However, as foreign fighters begin to stream home, 
a whole new set of challenges will begin.  Now is the time to start planning how best to 
respond.
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Abstract
Containerized cargo is the single largest security vulnerability in maritime shipping. Recent 
consolidation in the maritime shipping industry, along with freefalling shipping rates and 
increased vessel sizes, combine to cause concern for the future of containerized shipping 
security. Maintaining security in the maritime shipping industry is critical. Programs including 
the Container Security Initiative and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism apply 
risk-based approaches. However, with fewer market players after industry consolidation, it is 
time for regulators to review the success of current programs and search for new initiatives. 
New partnerships and outreach may use current efforts as a framework to respond in a 
dynamic environment to improve the industry’s overall security. This essay investigates 
the way ahead, while proposing solutions. Changes to C-TPAT and CSI may be necessary to 
maintain a secure Maritime Transportation Security (MTS).
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Introduction
Containerized cargo is an ongoing security challenge for the Maritime Transportation System. 
With gargantuan container vessels plying international routes, it becomes nearly impossible 
to ensure the safety of these trade lifelines. Recent consolidation in the maritime shipping 
industry, combined with free-falling shipping rates, combine to cause concern for the future 
of containerized shipping security. Compounding the present difficulties, container ships 
are growing in size and capability. Where once it was possible to inspect every container on 
a given ship, it is now unthinkable with vessels carrying over 20,000 containers.
Maintaining security in the maritime shipping industry is critical to preparing and responding 
to the parallel growing security threat. Programs including the Container Security Initiative 
and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism apply risk-based approaches. However, 
with fewer market players after industry consolidation, it is time for regulators to review the 
success of current programs and search for new initiatives. New partnerships and outreach 
may use current efforts as a framework to respond in a dynamic environment to improve 
the industry’s overall security.
This essay presents a path forward for U.S. security professionals by providing specific 
recommendations for the Department of Homeland Security. By leveraging existing 
programs, policy-makers can make some minor changes which may pay large dividends. 
Regulators should take the industry’s mergers as an opportunity to engage in an effort 
to shape security measures in a changing environment. An understanding of the current 
situation requires a review of the evolution of containerized shipping and the industry’s 
development. A discussion of current regulatory approaches follows, with examples and the 
effects of recent industry re-alignment. Finally, the essay provides tools that U.S. regulators 
may adopt to make the industry safer and more secure.
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The Evolution of Containerized Shipping
The New Era of Containers for Intermodal Shipping 
Fewer technological advances contributed more to globalization than the advent of 
containerized shipping. In the span of 60 years, shipping containers evolved from novelty to 
ubiquity. Originally designed to assist intermodal transportation by Malcom McLean in 1955,1 
containerized shipping became a lightning rod for commerce. The first container ship, Ideal 
X, sailed in 1956 with 58 containers from New Jersey to Houston. Because of the decreased 
shipping costs, mainly due to efficiencies with loading/unloading and locking mechanisms 
(to prevent pilfering), the idea quickly took hold.2
The conflict in Vietnam created a large demand for McLean’s containers.3 With the U.S. 
military needing a way to quickly and efficiently move massive amounts of war materiel to 
the jungles of Southeast Asia, containers saw heavy use. By 1968, McLean’s containers had 
the industry’s attention, with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) issuing 
its first standard.4 Shortly thereafter, the ISO issued additional standards in identification 
and size, giving rise to the 20 and 40 foot common containers in use today. This set the 
groundwork for a new form of low cost intermodal transportation.
While ports initially resisted the shift to containers,5 the cost savings of up to 50% was 
hard to ignore. When international maritime trade boomed, ports quickly came onboard. 
By the late 1960s, ships slid down the ways with the ability to carry 1,000 TEUs (twenty- 
foot equivalent units). While this pales in comparison to the 20,000+ TEU vessels available 
today, 1000 TEU was enormous for its time. The number of countries with ports capable 
of servicing container vessels jumped from 1% in 1966 to 90% in 1983. Costs to ship cargo 
dropped dramatically from nearly $6/ton to less than $0.25/ton.6
With rapid expansion, many companies initially tried to cash in on the intermodal container 
craze. However, competition grew fierce and industry consolidation began. Paralleling the 
railroad consolidation in the U.S. in 1980, containerized shipping evolved into a business run 
by giant operators. When the dust settled, the entire market, responsible for transporting 
trillions of dollars in global trade, consisted of ~10 companies.
Current Market State 
Since 2000, the shipping market has consolidated. While the top three shippers combined 
for 23.7% of overall market share, by 2016, the same top three companies comprised an 
astonishing 39.9% of the market.7 The top shipper, Maersk Sealand, expects to continue 
growth through 2017 in the wake of Hanjin Shipping’s bankruptcy in 2016, pushing the top 
three shippers to an estimated 42.8% market share.8 The main reason for consolidation 
is the pace of mergers and acquisitions in maritime shipping, with five major shipping 
companies closing up shop from 1999-2016.9 Maersk Sealand alone is responsible for more 
than 3 million TEU in capacity, capturing nearly 15% of the global market.10
While the numbers alone are not particularly insightful, the trends provide an opportunity for 
analysis. The Hanjin bankruptcy is a symptom of the shipping industry’s financial troubles. 
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While Maersk increased shipping volume by 9% in 2016, its total revenues dipped by 13%, 
mostly due to the sharp 21% decline in maritime shipping rates.11 The effect on maritime 
security may not be obvious at first glance. Still, as one looks deeper into the industry’s 
financial woes, new vulnerabilities emerge.
Current Regulatory Framework
Before investigating the impact of market consolidation, dipping freight rates, and the 
evolution of containerized shipping, it is important to look at the current state of security 
programs. The three primary security initiatives directed at maritime container shipping 
include the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
(C-TPAT), and the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code.12 Each, in turn, provides 
its own benefits to maritime security that may require re-evaluation in the face of industry 
changes.
Container Security Initiative
The United States developed CSI as a response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.13 
U.S. officials were quick to identify maritime shipping as a possible threat vector for 
terrorism. The program’s “core elements” are to 1) identify high-risk containers, 2) employ 
screening before shipping, and 3) leverage technology to prevent impeding commerce. It is 
the only program of the three identified with the sole focus of improving container security. 
The program has seen uncertain success, but in 2017, the program boasts that it prescreens 
over “80 percent of all maritime containerized cargo imported into the United States.”14
By employing teams of customs officers at ports around the world, CSI casts a global net.15 
With 58 ports participating under treaties with the United States, the host countries receive a 
purported benefit of shared intelligence and a better working relationship with U.S. officials.16 
The customs officials use technology to screen containers as they are loaded, or prior to 
loading, on ships destined for the United States. 17 X-rays, radiological detectors, and bomb-
sniffing canines are standard methods to ensure security of the US-bound containers.18
Still, the program has limitations. To start, the inspectors are primarily concerned with 
containers with the United States as a final destination.19 With the growth of mega-ships, 
and a mix of containers destined for a variety of international destinations, the inspectors 
are unable to screen non-U.S. bound containers with the same level of detail. Further, while 
technology is getting better, the impact of larger ships capable of carrying 20,000 containers 
or more means that the potential delay for finding and inspecting U.S. containers has 
increased. Finally, while the goal has always been 100% coverage for U.S.-bound containers, 
CSI is still only able to pre-screen 80% since its 2002 inception. Industry consolidation 
provides an opportunity to re-invigorate CSI, which appears to have plateaued.
C-TPAT
While not focused on containerized shipping, C-TPAT is another important CBP program 
addressing the security of maritime shipping. Since so much shipping consists of containers, 
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the broad C-TPAT requirements have a distinct impact on the container market.  Like CSI, 
C-TPAT grew out of the response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Its primary focus is 
on detecting and interdicting the shipment of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).20 The 
C-TPAT program officials set guidelines for port security at foreign locations in exchange for 
preferential treatment and training opportunities.21
C-TPAT is distinct from CSI in that C-TPAT allows participation from industry players, 
whereas CSI focuses on foreign port authorities. In addition, C-TPAT covers other modes 
of transportation beyond the maritime domain. The primary driver for encouraging 
participants to increase their own security measures is the financial incentive of quicker 
customs processing upon arriving into the U.S.22  The concept is similar to the TSA Pre-Check 
program at U.S. airports. While some individuals will see a distinct financial advantage in 
bypassing otherwise unreasonable lines (either at the airport or ports of entry), other 
individuals may see no advantage and therefore little incentive to participate.  
U.S. regulators may be able to leverage a consolidated maritime shipping industry to improve 
C-TPAT’s reach and overall effect. Still, given that the program is designed to create incentives 
for firms conducting business in the U.S., new approaches may be necessary to address the 
fact that all of the top maritime shipping companies are global operators.
ISPS
The International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS) is an international treaty adopted 
under the Safety of Life at Sea framework.23 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
developed the code in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in an 
effort to bolster and standardize security in the maritime domain. As with all international 
treaties, it is up to individual nations to implement the agreement. The United States has 
implemented some of the ISPS regulations through the Maritime Transportation Security 
Act of 2002 and follow-on regulations.24
The ISPS was designed to create a standard for nations to follow, and to assist industry in 
complying with the landscape of security regulations. While the code applies broadly to 
many parts of the maritime transportation system, the specific mention of containers is 
rare. No part of the ISPS code is dedicated to container security or the special considerations 
necessary for container transport. 25
As a framework mechanism to address shipping security, the ISPS code provides an in-place 
avenue for improving containerized cargo security in the face of the industry’s changes.26
Automated Targeting System
CBP uses a system called ATS (Automated Targeting System) to fuse intelligence and law 
enforcement data for guiding CSI and C-TPAT programs. CBP maintains internal guidance 
for how and when to use ATS output, but it generally includes information about various 
shipping elements, such as origin or en route ports of call. As one of the internal CBP 
products designed to work under both the CSI and C-TPAT frameworks, it provides a tool for 
managing risk and for smart decision making in maritime transportation security. 27
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Given its unique situation, straddling many aspects of CBPs security responsibilities, ATS 
may provide one way to leverage the industry’s consolidation into bolstering security in the 
future, as discussed below.
Economic and Security Effect from 
Consolidation
The maritime shipping industry’s consolidation has substantial ripple effects on economic 
and security concerns. Economic incentives, such as those under C-TPAT, are closely related 
to the industry’s security posture.
One of the biggest changes coming from consolidation is the formation of new strategic 
alliances.28 For example, the World Shipping Council now controls approximately 90 
percent of global container capacity.29 The development of larger ships puts pressure on 
shipping rates. Alliances are necessary to compete and maintain profit as shippers face the 
conundrum of increased capacity and decreased margins.30 Separately, regulatory costs of 
meeting environmental requirements eat into profits.31
As profit margins shrink and shipping companies merge and create alliances, security 
professionals should take note. While the impact on revenue does not directly affect 
companies’ duty to meet security regulations, it does mean that security must compete with 
other operational demands. As Hanjin line bled red ink, it is hard to imagine that self-policing 
their ISPS compliance was a top concern for them.  To complicate matters, many security 
programs have stagnated, including CSI and C-TPAT as described above. With no evolution in 
the regulatory environment, shippers are incentivized to maintain the status quo.
Some experts believe that maritime security concern has peaked.32 Counter-piracy efforts 
are effective, while importers and exporters have reached a happy equilibrium with port 
states.33 As Bennett notes, “[a]s the perception of threat falls, so will the cost of protection.” 
This may be an industry boon, but it belies the fact that not all parties value security equally. 
During the zenith of counter-piracy efforts, the extra security efforts in place undoubtedly 
ensure a safer maritime shipping infrastructure.34
On the positive side, industry consolidation should make inspecting and enforcing compliance 
easier, with fewer entities to track. As companies go defunct and merge, it becomes one less 
“account” for C-TPAT.35 While maritime shippers represent a very small part of C-TPAT (less 
than 1 percent of overall participants), they are some of the biggest players in terms of sheer 
volume.36 The opportunity for increased per capita engagement is difficult to overlook. None 
of the biggest maritime shippers are U.S.-based companies. With fewer companies involved, 
regulators can streamline international outreach and perhaps garner broad agreements on 
common concerns.
As the shipping industry changes, the economic incentives to “participate” in voluntary 
security programs may shift. Still, the changes open new avenues of outreach using some of 
the renewed approaches discussed in the next section.
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U.S. Response Proposal 
In the face of a changing maritime shipping industry, many agree that it is time to re-evaluate 
and adjust security strategies. As discussed above, the U.S. has several robust framework 
programs in place that are capable of providing the foundation for an evolved maritime 
security system. In order to best respond to the new dynamics of maritime shipping, 
particularly in containerized cargo, key changes in resources, improved ATS, and higher 
incentive tiers for C-TPAT and CSI may make all the difference
Resources
The first element of improving security for containerized cargo is bolstering resources. As 
ships grow and the industry consolidates, shipping containers will become more centralized. 
While 20,000 TEU destined for the United States may have previously been spread over 3 or 
4 vessels, all 20,000 TEU may now be located on a single ship. In order to keep commerce 
flowing without undue delay, CBP needs additional inspectors. The U.S. Coast Guard needs 
additional inspectors. Finally, planners must allocate funding resources to improving 
screening technology.
Profit margins are razor thin, and shipping companies are less likely to pour their own 
resources into meeting security requirements unless they are absolutely required. Adding 
resources on the enforcement side will prevent a pendulum swing on the industry side, 
providing consistency for future changes in the industry. No matter how the industry 
changes in the future, a robust, fully-resourced enforcement enterprise can respond more 
nimbly to market dynamics.
Improved ATS 
The second most promising mechanism for improving maritime shipping security is 
developing, growing, and maintaining a robust Automated Targeting System. ATS links the two 
major U.S. security programs for CBP, CSI and C-TPAT. One can reference the Transportation 
Security Administration’s machinations in trying to keep up with the speed of air travel to 
show the benefit of “smart” targeting criteria.
While the ATS risk analysis dimensions provide a good baseline, the system can certainly 
benefit from input improvements. Increased intelligence sharing and gathering, combined 
with closer partnerships with industry could generate better results.
One of the main benefits of maritime shipping industry consolidation is that there are now 
fewer entities with which to deal. One can imagine that dealing with fewer entities could 
mean closer (and better) relationships between industry and regulators. Closer working 
relationships with major maritime shipping companies will lead to better intelligence and 
better ATS decision outputs.
Combined with an increase in resources devoted to learning more about the industry, an 
enhanced ATS can keep containerized cargo secure through better risk-based response 
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action. It will also ensure that shippers have an incentive to “play along” by streamlining the 
process and reducing delay which directly eats into their profits.
Higher Incentive Tiers
A final approach that may improve containerized shipping security is providing additional 
incentive tiers at higher levels. As more and more C-TPAT partners reach top tiers, it may 
be necessary to create even higher tiers, maintaining an incentive for better-than-average 
performance. Incentive tiers that increase with time and overall performance are common 
across disciplines with California low-emission high occupancy vehicle lane access and TSA 
PreCheck programs as notable examples.37
As more C-TPAT partners reach the highest tier, the marginal benefit of the improved 
processing time decreases. While one approach may be to make the requirements to reach 
the tier more restrictive, similar to the California carpool lane example, another option is to 
add higher tiers, creating additional exclusivity and benefits to the “best” security partners. 
Only the most sophisticated and capable partners would likely be able to meet increased 
guidelines.
Consolidated maritime shippers can afford to implement a higher security standard if 
presented with better incentives. While the incentives may not be worthwhile to smaller 
entities, the largest companies would perceive a drastic incentive with only a 1 or 2 percent 
decrease in processing time. New “mega” shipping companies provide an opportunity for 
regulators to offer such a higher-level incentive.
Conclusion
The maritime shipping industry has evolved. While many of the security programs were 
developed immediately in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
past 16 years have introduced a new norm. Industry consolidation, reduced focus on security 
due to a decrease in perceived risk, and decreased profits have created a new system of 
incentives for industry partners.
The current maritime transportation regulations provide a good framework. Still, the status 
quo is not acceptable, and changes are needed. In the face of a changed industry, several 
strategic changes would create a better system that is capable of responding to current 
threats while insulating itself against future industry change.
Increased resources, better application of CBP’s ATS, and better incentive tiers are methods 
of improving the current security system, each with their own benefits. As the industry 
consolidates, new opportunities to create a safer maritime transportation system are 
becoming apparent. Regulators should seize the opportunity before the industry changes 
so much as to render the current framework unusable in attempting to meet future changes.
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A parent logs into a child’s computer and a chat room window pops up on the screen. The 
parent starts scrolling through the chat history and realizes that the child was speaking to 
an ISIS recruiter. In this hypothetical situation, the child has not conducted any crime, yet the 
parent is worried. What should the parent do? Call the police? Is there anyone else that can 
help the parent with this situation? 
Scenarios like this one are why communities and governments across the globe are 
developing intervention programs to assist vulnerable individuals. Interventions operate 
primarily within the non-criminal space, meaning that the programs serve individuals who 
need help, but have not committed any crime. Interventions provide these people with an 
off-ramp to radicalization by offering individualized plans to increase the subject’s resilience 
against violent extremism. 
Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, are leading global efforts in intervention 
programs, while communities in the United States struggle to implement intervention 
programs. In the U.S., communities still lack a solid understanding of what interventions are 
and how to conduct an intervention. A new book, Preventing and Countering Extremism and 
Terrorist Recruitment: A Best Practice Guide by Hanif Qadir, an intervention specialist in the 
UK, provides needed insights from the practitioner’s personal experiences with conducting 
hundreds of interventions. 
The book is structured in four parts. The first part explores Qadir’s own personal experience 
with extremism. The next section outlines current intervention efforts in the UK. This section 
is followed by an exploration of extremism and the push and pull factors affecting vulnerable 
people. The book concludes with a theological overview of Islam’s view of extremism and 
terrorist groups. 
Qadir starts the book off with his personal journey towards joining Al-Qaeda and then 
leaving the group. As such, the introductory chapter provides a successful case study of a 
once radicalized individual turned into a community member who now helps others who 
fall victim to violent extremism. The chapter details how Qadir created the Active Change 
Foundation, a community non-profit organization that seeks to help vulnerable youth. It also 
documents the challenges he faced while trying to operate the organization. After reading 
this chapter, it is clear to the reader that Qadir is both qualified and experienced to write a 
book on interventions.
In the next section, Qadir provides an overview of current UK Countering Violent Extremism 
(CVE) efforts, a program known as Prevent, and describes the underlying issues of 
violent extremism. Unlike other academics studying radicalization, Qadir emphasizes two 
contributing factors to the problem of violent extremism: foreign policy and the lack of critical 
thinking skills amongst the youth. Qadir argues that by ignoring the roles that foreign policy 
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actions and government treatment of Muslims play in fueling grievances, we contribute to 
the problem. Moreover, the lack of investment in education to improve critical thinking skills 
puts the youth at a greater risk of being manipulated by recruiters. The chapter concludes 
with an overview of future and current challenges wherein Qadir points to issues such as 
the lack of trust in authority amongst the youth and the adaptability of terrorist groups. 
This adaptability allows these groups to quickly adjust their strategies in accordance with 
changes in the world that pose significant challenges to efforts that seek to counter violent 
extremism. 
The book continues with a section on how to tackle extremism. The section includes Qadir’s 
views on the tactics used by recruiters and the push and pull factors affecting vulnerable 
people. In this particularly useful section for practitioners is a step-by-step guide for 
conducting interventions. Here, Qadir outlines five key steps for intervention, which include 
consideration, planning, technical, risk mitigation, and governance steps. The section 
concludes with seven case studies of interventions that Qadir conducted over his career. 
Although the case studies are limited in detail for privacy concerns, they still serve as useful 
examples of how to respond to different scenarios.
The final section of the book is titled “The Islamic Standpoint.” In this section, Qadir provides 
an overview of the historical roots of extremism in Islam. He discusses the origin of Kharijite 
terrorists and how Kharijites falsify the Quran to promote their worldly objectives. This 
section provides practitioners with insights on how to counter the narratives of extremist 
groups.
Qadir’s insights on how to ensure that interventions are successful will be valuable to those 
in the fields of homeland defense and security studies. Interventions and CVE efforts are 
long-term strategies and should be treated as such. There are no quick-fixes to the problem, 
rather Qadir argues that practitioners should take the time to understand communities fully, 
which includes understanding community dynamics. For a successful intervention, Qadir 
argues that trust is key and factors such as the environment in which the intervention takes 
place can influence the degree of trust between an intervention provider and vulnerable 
individual. For instance, police stations do not make ideal environments for an intervention.
Qadir also identifies problems within the UK’s Prevent strategy from which practitioners 
can learn. The UK’s strategy is known to promote moderate voices of Islam as a means to 
silence extremist voices. However, eliminating spaces for individuals to express grievances 
and debate issues enables recruiters to fill the void and offer subjects a listening ear and 
alternative. The UK’s Prevent strategy is controversial, and Qadir takes note of this, but also 
proposes ways to mitigate opposition such as highlighting the program’s successes. This is 
advice that CVE practitioners in the U.S. can and should adhere to, especially since there are 
misperceptions and opposition to U.S. CVE efforts.
The major weakness of this book, the lack of citations and dialogue with current research 
in this field, can also serve as the book’s strength. This type of detailed account of a 
practitioner’s experience with interventions is largely missing from the current literature 
on countering violent extremism initiatives. However, since the book is based on Qadir’s 
personal experiences with both violent extremism and conducting interviews, the book 
focuses primarily on Islamic violent extremism. The strong emphasis on this form of 
extremism should not lead to the take-away that interventions should only attempt to 
counter efforts by groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. As Qadir argues, interventions should 
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not focus on one form of extremism. However, it is unclear whether these insights can travel 
to cases of other forms of radicalization.
Although Qadir offers insights in terms of how interventions should be conducted, the 
account is scant on recommendations for the structure of intervention programs. Questions 
left unanswered include who should conduct the interventions and how involved law 
enforcement authorities should be in the process. Qadir does mention that specialists with 
knowledge about extremism and interventions and individuals who have credibility within 
the community should be the ones conducting interventions. However, it is unclear who 
these ideal intervention providers are and how to determine if an individual meets the 
requirements. Moreover, Qadir’s own personal background with violent extremism begs 
the question as to whether the ideal intervention provider is a former violent extremist. 
Several intervention models such as EXIT Sweden and Life After Hate in the United States 
are also operated by former, albeit right-wing, extremists. Nonetheless, the use of formers 
in countering violent extremism initiatives, at least in the United States, remains highly 
controversial. 
Despite these unanswered questions, Preventing and Countering Extremism and Terrorist 
Recruitment serves as an excellent resource, and one of the only non-government guides for 
practitioners conducting interventions. The valuable insights provided in this book warrant 
the book’s place on any CVE practitioner’s bookshelf. 
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Abstract
Nuclear power plants rely on digital components, like supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) devices, to perform daily operations. These devices can contain software 
vulnerabilities. To address SCADA and other cyber threats, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) has issued directives for licensed operators to submit cybersecurity 
plans for their facilities. While the guidance is on par with other sectors, the application 
may be inadequate. Protection against cyber-attacks becomes more important as SCADA 
systems become more standardized and connected to other networks. In addition to 
resilient components, improvements like redundancy, whitelisting, and intrusion detection 
systems can help improve a SCADA network. Ultimately, the nuclear power industry may 
need to undergo a culture shift in order to reduce the vulnerability of these systems. An 
information- sharing and analysis center can also provide lessons learned and expertise to 
the NRC and nuclear power plants in the U.S.
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Introduction
Like other power plants, nuclear power plants rely on digital components to perform daily 
operations. Many of these components are supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
devices that can contain software vulnerabilities.1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) claims 
that “critical systems” in a nuclear reactor facility are not connected to the Internet or the 
facility’s internal network and therefore that the cybersecurity risk to these critical systems 
is minimized.2
However, the stakes in nuclear power are always high. Not only do the facilities provide 
electricity to communities, but they also contain nuclear fuel. Accidents at nuclear power 
plants are well-publicized. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima Daiichi are names 
that invoke the dangers of nuclear power, and they will likely not fade anytime soon. 
Additionally, terrorists can target nuclear power plants seeking to gain access to nuclear fuel 
to create a “dirty bomb,” or an explosive device meant to spread radioactive particles over a 
large area.3 Cyber-attacks add to the list of threats to a nuclear power plant, and they have 
the unique property of attacking from afar and anonymously. This paper will discuss SCADA 
systems in commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S., focusing on 
• incorporation of digital and networked components in U.S. commercial nuclear power 
plants, 
• a summary of policy for cybersecurity in nuclear power plants, 
• cybersecurity threats to and vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants, and consequences 
of a successful exploitation, and 
• recommendations to improve the cybersecurity of the nuclear power plant infrastructure.
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Incorporation of Digital and Networked 
Components 
The Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector (or Nuclear Sector) of the U.S. is one 
of the 16 critical infrastructures (CI) as defined in Presidential Policy Directive-21.4 A basic 
understanding of power plant construction and functionality is useful to help the reader 
appreciate the risk to this sector. Instead of burning fossil fuels, nuclear power relies on a 
process called fission which involves splitting atoms of a fissile material like Uranium-235. 
Fission creates thermal energy that can be used to generate electricity. However, it also 
produces radioactive elements that must be trapped within a containment barrier. If these 
radioactive elements are released, long-term environmental and public health consequences 
can result as seen in Chernobyl, Ukraine and Fukushima, Japan.5 According to the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), the high-impact consequences of mishandling nuclear assets 
make the Nuclear Sector the “most highly regulated and heavily guarded” of all the U.S. CI 
sectors.6
A nuclear reactor presents additional challenges over fossil fuel combustion. One challenge is 
the generation of thermal energy when the reactor is shut down; unfortunately, the meaning 
of a nuclear reactor shutdown is not synonymous with “no longer producing heat.” Even if 
the fission reaction is stopped by the reactor’s shutdown mechanism, the radioactive decay 
of fission products continues to generate thermal energy called “decay heat” that must be 
removed to prevent damage to the reactor fuel. Coolant must continue to flow through the 
reactor core to remove this decay heat. If heat is not removed, the core could melt. This 
situation occurred in the Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor in Middletown, PA in 1979 where 
a combination of equipment failures, design flaws, and operator error led to a meltdown of 
the reactor core even though the reactor was shut down.7 The cleanup took approximately 
12 years and cost $973 million.8 The public confidence in nuclear power dropped as well.
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Figure 1. Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in PA9
SCADA System Benefits and Risks 
 SCADA systems can help reduce the number of personnel required to operate a power 
plant safely. In nuclear power plants built in the 1960s through the 1980s, SCADA systems 
were analog systems with hardware and software designed for a specific function, and 
modifying these systems was more difficult than hacking a networked component because 
physical access was required.10 As these legacy systems were upgraded, programmable 
code usage increased the potential functions of SCADA systems, and because security was 
not initially designed into these systems, they have increased the vulnerability of a civilian 
nuclear power plant.11
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Figure 2. Summary of how a SCADA system with programmable logic controllers (PLC) can 
work12
Nevertheless, the problem posed by programmable code was not initially an alarming issue 
in systems that used SCADA components. For example, in the case of the Massachusetts 
Water Resource Authority, operators believed that the isolated SCADA systems were specific 
to a particular plant, so specialized knowledge and physical access was required to cause real 
damage.13 Over time, SCADA systems have implemented open protocols and commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) software reducing the possible customization in a power plant.14 
Additionally, third parties requesting data from the nuclear power plant typically receive 
that data through an Internet connection, thus increasing possible avenues of attack.15
With 100 commercial nuclear reactors in operation at 61 power plants, there are many 
potential targets.16 Each of these power plants can contain over one thousand “digital 
assets” which includes SCADA systems.17 The opportunity for a cyber-attack exists through 
these digital assets, but according to the NEI, most of these assets are not connected to 
radiological safety and security.18
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Figure 3. Distribution of nuclear power plants across the U.S. as of November 201519
Cybersecurity Policy in Nuclear Power 
Plants
In the U.S., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the regulatory body for all nuclear 
power plants.20  Although the DHS is the sector-specific agency for the Nuclear Sector, the 
NRC provides oversight.21  Thus, nuclear power plants in the U.S. have only one set of rules 
to follow, which helps simplify the policies and procedures required to operate a nuclear 
reactor.
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After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC directed nuclear power plant 
operators to improve the physical security and cybersecurity of their facilities.22 By 2009, the 
NRC had codified the cybersecurity requirement in CFR Title 10, Chapter 1, Section 73.54.23 
This regulation requires an NRC-approved cybersecurity plan from current operators as well 
as those applying for a license to operate nuclear reactors. According to this regulation, the 




•	 emergency preparedness, and
•	 support systems and equipment.24
The NRC and NEI provide additional guidance through Regulatory Guide 5.71 Cyber Security 
Programs for Nuclear Facilities and NEI 08-09 Revision 6 Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power 
Reactors.25 The description of protected systems is very broad. This is likely due to the 
variance in design of nuclear power plants, but it forces power plant operators to analyze 
their own power plants to determine which digital assets would fall under safety, security, 
emergency preparedness, or support systems.
Nuclear Power Risk Analysis 
This determination is similar to a risk analysis where assets are prioritized based on threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences if an asset is damaged or disabled.26 Depending on their 
connectivity and function, SCADA systems could be classified as high risk. For example, 
SCADA systems involved with safety, security, or emergency preparedness likely have large 
consequences if they fail, and if the SCADA system is connected to the Internet through 
a path like a corporate network, the number of threats increases dramatically because 
physical access is no longer required. The trend in U.S. nuclear power plants appears to be 
isolation of SCADA systems connected to “critical safety and security systems.”27
According to the NEI, all licensed operators have cybersecurity plans that have been approved 
by the NRC.28 Additionally, the NRC has approved the plan of action and milestones (POAM) 
for each power plant and regularly verifies the status of this POAM.29 For example, the NRC 
set one milestone to occur by December 31, 2012 and it included requirements such as:
•	 identification of critical systems and their critical digital assets,
•	 isolation of critical plant systems allowing outbound communication only,
•	 implementation of security controls for portable media, and
•	 implementation of cybersecurity controls for the most important assets.30
Some organizations like the Chatham House, however, believe that there are fundamental 
flaws in both the timeliness and culture of cybersecurity protection in commercial nuclear 
power plants.31 While power plants may meet the requirements set forth by the NRC, the 
efficacy of a cybersecurity program is measured using performance against threats, not 
agreement with regulations.
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Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities and 
Consequences 
There are several cases of a commercial nuclear power plant succumbing to a cyber-attack 
or malfunction after 2001 that can provide a test of the cybersecurity controls in place. 
One example is the Slammer worm attack on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in Oak 
Harbor, OH in January 2003.32 The Slammer worm infected a contractor network connected 
to the nuclear power station’s business network which bypassed the properly configured 
firewall of the business network.33 The worm then infected SCADA systems through a remote 
computer using a virtual private network (VPN).34 The plant operators eventually lost the 
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for almost five hours which required operators to 
walk around and manually check on plant parameters.35 While no power outage occurred, 
the loss of the SPDS could slow corrective actions if a malfunction occurred within the 
reactor plant. 
Figure 4. Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station36
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The Davis-Besse case highlights the vulnerability of SCADA systems when connected to 
the Internet. Plant operators desired to monitor plant parameters remotely and connected 
SCADA systems to the business network.37 Lewis writes that the “openness and connectivity” 
with internal networks and external business partners is the largest security deficiency in 
SCADA systems.38 The NEI shares this view, stating that the first line of defense is isolation 
through air gaps or hardware-based isolation.39 However, external connections to a network 
can change daily, so believing that an isolated network stays isolated may be optimistic and 
mistaken.
Hatch Nuclear Power Plant
The Hatch nuclear power plant near Baxley, GA experienced an unexpected shutdown of 
one of its reactors after a software update on the business network reset data on a control 
network in March 2008.40 The reactor safety program interpreted the reset as a loss of water 
to cool the reactor core and initiated an automatic shutdown.41 While no damage occurred, 
there was a loss of electrical power generation because the plant was shut down for 48 
hours.42 The parent company, Southern Company, had to purchase electricity from another 
provider which cost $5 million.43 The Hatch case shows that SCADA systems that are fed 
incorrect data can still take physical action based on that data; if connected to these SCADA 
systems, an attacker could cause a denial of service (DoS) of electrical power or worse.
Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant 
In August 2006, the Browns Ferry nuclear reactor was shut down manually after two pumps 
responsible for pumping cooling water through the core failed; these pumps were controlled 
by variable frequency drives (VFD) which contain microprocessors that send and receive data 
over the control network.44 The VFD failed due to excessive traffic on the control network, 
and while no damage to critical systems occurred, a loss of electrical power generation 
occurred similar to the Hatch power plant incident.45 This was not due to a cyber-attack, 
but it shows how fragile SCADA systems can be. An attacker could execute a DoS attack by 
flooding the control network with useless data, and SCADA systems could fail and prevent 
critical components from operating, resulting in a loss of electrical power or potential reactor 
core damage.
Figure 5. Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant46
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Recent Power Plant Hacking 
In a recent wave of attacks starting in May 2017, a hacking group targeted the business 
networks of companies that operate nuclear power plants. One of these companies was 
the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation which operates a nuclear power plant near 
Burlington, Kansas.47 The DHS and FBI reported that an advanced persistent threat (APT) actor 
was responsible for these attacks.48 The attackers generally attempted to exploit the insider 
threat by spear- phishing, or targeting specific users in order to gain sensitive information 
or credentials. The APT sent emails containing malicious attachments to senior engineers, 
hoping to steal the credentials of a recipient who opened an attachment.49 The APT used 
other avenues of attack, like the watering hole attack, where a regularly-visited website is 
hacked to attack the users who visit, and a man-in-the-middle attack, where attackers route 
Internet traffic of users and their destinations through the attacker’s machine.50
APTs differ from other attackers in that they generally focus on intelligence gathering, trade 
secret theft, disruption of operations, or even physical destruction of equipment; they have 
many financial and personnel resources, and some are backed by nation states.51 While 
these attacks were aimed at the business network rather than the operational network, 
the information that the APT could gain from infiltrating business networks could make any 
future attacks on the operational network much more effective and dangerous.
The SCADA Vulnerability Market
In addition to increasing connectivity, power plants are using SCADA systems with open 
protocols and COTS.52 This can allow hackers to gain knowledge about SCADA systems. An 
attacker can purchase a commercially available SCADA system, probe it for vulnerabilities, 
and use those discovered vulnerabilities against a power plant using the COTS SCADA system 
to gain unauthorized access. In fact, there is currently a market for this exact information, 
and exploits are selling at a relatively low cost.53 For example, while Apple iOS 9 vulnerabilities 
can sell for up to $1 million, anonymous users can purchase SCADA vulnerabilities with an 
$8,100 annual subscription fee.54 Gleg, ReVuln, and Exodus Intelligence are three companies 
devoted to finding SCADA vulnerabilities, and while their stance is to improve security by 
discovering vulnerabilities, the companies take no responsibility for what users with ill 
intentions may do with those exploits.55
Recommendations to Improve Cybersecurity 
Because SCADA systems can control critical processes in a nuclear power plant, protection 
of these systems from cybersecurity threats is paramount. However, replacing all SCADA 
systems with more robust systems, known as “rip and replace,” is likely infeasible due to 
the massive cost and downtime of critical processes required to overhaul control systems. 
For example, in the oil and gas sector, replacing 200 gas turbine controllers could cost up to 
$70 million before accounting for the cost of lost production.56 Because nuclear equipment 
could be radioactive, disposal could further increase the cost of a rip and replace strategy.
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Improvement of Control Networks 
It may be more economically feasible for older power plants to improve the control networks 
on which the SCADA systems reside. Specific network improvements include redundancy, 
whitelisting applications, and adding an intrusion detection system (IDS) to the network.57 
Redundancy can help with patch management by shifting normal processes to one SCADA 
component while the other is being updated. Additionally, redundancy can assist with 
inadvertent activation of automated safety functions. In the case of the Hatch power plant, 
if two SCADA components were required to activate the safety shutdown, the plant may 
have avoided the shutdown. Whitelisting can help ensure that only approved applications 
are allowed to run on control networks that can reduce the potential effects of malware. An 
IDS can alert operators to abnormal conditions on the control network. In the case of the 
Browns Ferry shutdown, operators could have been alerted to abnormally high network 
traffic and mitigated the circumstances that caused the pump VFD to fail.
The conventional wisdom within the NRC, the DHS, and the NEI is that SCADA systems 
are protected when they are isolated or air-gapped.58 However, critics argue that truly air-
gapped systems do not exist.59 The Stuxnet worm demonstrated that even air-gapped Iranian 
centrifuges were susceptible to infection.60 The primary method of infection of Stuxnet was 
through USB flash drives which do not require a network connection.61 Also, the Davis-Besse 
case shows that system administrators may be unaware of all connections to its SCADA 
control network.62 
Minimize the Insider Threat 
Another significant cybersecurity problem within commercial power plants is the insider 
threat.63 The Three Mile Island accident highlighted the need for competent operators; as a 
result, nuclear power plant operators are typically well-trained.64 However, this training may 
entrench nuclear operators in a certain way of performing their duties, and information 
security personnel may have difficulty trying to steer nuclear operators away from risky 
activities. One of these activities is connecting an operator’s personal computer to the 
SCADA control network; this can expose the control network to any malware residing on the 
personal computer.65 The attacks in 2017 demonstrate that APTs are relying on the insider 
threat as one way to hack into networks.
Although the operators interact directly with the control networks, supervisors and senior 
executives can also benefit from cybersecurity training. While those in a supervisory role 
are well-versed in physical security for nuclear facilities, cybersecurity is considered a low 
priority.66 This could be a result of recent adoption of digital systems in nuclear power, lack 
of reported cybersecurity incidents at nuclear facilities, and a focus on physical security.67
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Nuclear Power Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (ISAC)
There may be a dearth of cybersecurity experts in the nuclear field, so a national organization 
could help provide support to nuclear supervisors. As in other CI sectors, an ISAC could be 
created for nuclear power plants.68 This can be an effective way to concentrate cybersecurity 
expertise and provide a method for nuclear facilities to disclose anonymously cybersecurity 
incidents and lessons learned. The NRC could fill this role, but Kesler argues that the NRC 
lacks cybersecurity expertise.69 Additionally, since the NRC functions as a regulatory body, 
nuclear power plants may be less likely to disclose cybersecurity incidents to the NRC than 
to an independent organization.
Conclusion
SCADA systems are pervasive throughout commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. 
Some of these systems are involved with the safety, security, and emergency preparedness 
of the power plant, and licensed owners must have an NRC-approved cybersecurity plan 
for these systems according to 10 CFR 73.54. However, the nuclear sector may be lagging in 
the application of cybersecurity. Since 2001, two reported incidents involving cybersecurity 
resulted in a shutdown of a nuclear reactor, and one reported incident was the result of a 
computer worm. SCADA technology is becoming more standardized and more connected, 
and there is a market for their vulnerabilities, so protecting these systems is paramount. 
SCADA systems can be designed to be more resilient against cyber-attacks, but for older 
nuclear power plants that cannot feasibly rip and replace SCADA systems, improving the 
control network may be a more economical option. Cybersecurity training for operators 
and supervisors can improve security, and a nuclear ISAC could provide lessons learned 
from cybersecurity incidents at nuclear power plants and provide needed cybersecurity 
expertise to the NRC.
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Terrorism, counter-terrorism, and their intersection have produced painful experiences 
for peoples and communities in many societies. The convergence of terrorist attempts to 
harm states and states’ attempts to prevent their efforts raises important questions about 
the influence they have on each other. This relationship forms the core focus of Illusions of 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, proceedings of the British Academy edited by renowned 
terrorism scholar, Professor Richard English. The nine chapters in this volume are unified 
by the deceptively simple question: how does one shape the other? If scholars were to 
take stock of what we have learned about this intimate relationship, they would find that 
very little actually is known about the interaction between powerful states and individuals, 
groups, and loose networks of violent extremists devoted to violent acts of aggression. 
The introductory chapter exposes the gaps in the existing literature, and establishes the 
relevance of the book by reasoning that scholars have neglected to produce a robust and 
multi-disciplinary discussion of the dynamic, interactive relationship between terrorism 
and counterterrorism. In spite of the existence of valuable pioneering scholarship that was 
subsequently “complemented by a vast explosion of research and publication after 9/11,” 
there is a need for “a more comprehensive and candid assessment of the ways in which 
terrorism and counter-terrorism operate” (p. 3). English highlights the problematic nature 
of engaging with the definition of terrorism and determining whether current definitions 
are fitting with current international terrorist practices. Additionally, he underscores the 
importance of re-assessing issues of proportionality and success in countering post-9/11 
terrorist threats. Over-reliance on existing policies and practice without understanding 
what a good counter-terrorism model actually looks like creates a quagmire for scholars and 
practitioners. The analytical challenges illustrated by English and reinforced by the financial 
expenditures measured over nearly two decades include the unknown effects of the over-
application of force, insufficient understanding of what role regimes play in terrorist support, 
and misreading the psychological structures of terrorists. The aim of the book is to push the 
debate on these issues and the broader topic forward through multidisciplinary dialogue 
among scholars embarking on variegated substantive approaches.
In chapter two, Alia Brahimi contextualizes the major themes of the book and embeds 
them in the “9/11 decade.” This decade shows, according to the author, that the broad and 
overarching sledgehammer approaches to combating terrorism, much like the narrower and 
precision counter-terrorism operations of the Obama years, have done much to reinforce 
the illusory promise of military power as the ideal counter-terrorism prescription (p. 38). 
Brahimi analyzes many of the factors that have led to counterterrorism successes and 
failures and posits valuable counter-terrorism lessons for the future. 
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Rashmi Shingh, in chapter three, builds on the products of the counter-terrorism operations 
that took place under the rubric of the “Global War on Terror” over the past decade and 
a half. Shingh explores three major lessons extrapolated from this securitization program 
under the GWOT label. First, she scrutinizes the most significant changes that have taken 
place in the strategic character of warfare. Second, she examines the “law of unintended 
consequences” (p. 45). Third, she assesses the extent to which the “Global War on Terror” has 
enhanced al-Qaeda’s ability to mobilize and has strengthened its violent ideology. Western 
approaches have by and large misread the degree to which people support radical Islamic 
views, extremist groups like al-Qaeda, and ISIS. There has also been a misunderstanding of 
the effects of the over-application of military force.
In chapter four, David Omand considers the limits of Western counter-terrorism policy and 
attempts to ascertain where those limits ought to lie. The author develops the concept of the 
“‘thermodynamics’ of counter-terrorism,” and applies it to a comparative analysis of British 
and American experiences in counterterrorism. His analysis culminates in the question: 
“[h]ow can a government best exercise its primary duty to protect the public in the face of 
a severe terrorist threat and yet maintain civic harmony and uphold democratic values and 
the rule of law at home and internationally?” (p. 57) This question exposes the crisis of public 
confidence regarding government efforts in the “Global War on Terrorism.”
Chapters five and six by Conor Gearty and Adrian Guelke, respectively, delve into the tension 
that exists between effectively countering terrorism and respecting and defending human 
rights and civil liberties. This is an inadvertent and unfortunate by-product of the war against 
terrorists who may or may not be aware of the strain that the threat of terrorism alone places 
on the preservation and protection of liberal democratic principles and freedoms. The result 
is a discussion about “taming democracy” (p. 77-83) and the cultivation of “militarized” and 
“imperialist” democracy (pp. 83-90). Achieving a fresh and effective approach to counter-
terrorism, notes Guelke, can be next to impossible, given the “blowback from the actions of 
[previous administrations such as] the Bush Administration.” (p. 109) 
Chapter seven by Audrey Kurth Cronin hits at the heart of the concept of “ghost chasing,” 
as the FBI terms it, with authorities pursuing an illusion of terrorism and terrorist 
threats that are oft-times conflated. State portrayal of terrorism stems from state-level 
overreaction, resulting from the unpredictability of future threats, thus imbuing terrorists 
with the confidence to continue acting in pursuit of their violent doctrines. This leads to a 
tendency for states to drape themselves in the mantle of victimhood. The author illustrates 
that understanding terrorists’ true capabilities is critical for the ability of states to act on 
counterterrorism opportunities. 
In chapter eight, English analyzes contemporary dissident Irish Republicanism as a case 
for explaining terrorism’s endurance. The chapter paints a convincing portrait about the 
mutual relationship between terrorism and counter-terrorism. It drives home the point 
that misreading the societal roots of terrorism will ultimately lead to flawed approaches 
in countering it. English argues that effective counterterrorism policy requires greater 
awareness of how terrorism is grounded in societal level forces. 
The proportionality dimension and potential repercussions of state counter-terrorism 
policies and practices are fleshed out in chapter nine by David A. Lake. The author analyzes 
the extent to which state counterterrorism responses are proportional to the threat posed 
by terrorism. 
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This volume brings together leading scholars and experts from across academic fields and 
subfields to examine the intricate dynamics of counter-terrorism after 9/11. The relationship 
between terrorists and state actors combating this international threat in the post-9/11 
security environment  provides the unifying framework of the volume. It is evident that 
the book has been designed in a way so that academics and practitioners can engage  the 
content with relative ease. Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, accordingly, achieves 
its stated objectives. Although one might expect a volume comprised of expert-written 
chapters to provide all the answers, effectively countering terrorism in the unpredictable 
security environment of the 21st century requires counterterrorism experts to pose more 
questions and engage further with empirical data to first produce a clear picture of the threat. 
This concise volume is packed full of valuable perspectives on a costly era of confrontation 
between states and terrorist networks. It identifies multiple avenues for further in-
depth research and investigation of the complicated relationship between terrorism and 
counterterrorism. It would be useful reading for scholars, practitioners, and students of 
terrorism and counterterrorism. 
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Abstract
To close the gap in operator-driven policy for the homeland security enterprise, we argue 
for a bottom-up policy process that acknowledges operator knowledge and opinions. We 
propose a practical approach to enable policy-makers to incorporate operator knowledge 
and experience, or operator driven policy (ODP), into policy through the Quadrant Enabled 
Delphi (QED) approach. We set out the theoretical requirements for QED, based on cognitive 
science. Using the EARTh-X QED workshop as a case-study, we demonstrate the application 
of QED focused on emerging Arctic security threats, and highlight key lessons for applying 
QED. Finally, we recommend an appropriate operator-driven policy-making process that 
incorporates the QED approach as a bottom-up policy process.
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Introduction
Operators are the tip of the spear for the security enterprise; they are the boots on the 
ground and the hands that bear the brunt of ensuring a mission succeeds. “Operators” 
in the context of this paper are those personnel working on field-level operations (for 
example, Coast Guard officers and sailors assigned to sectors or stations, and Customs 
and Border Protection Officers assigned to Ports of Entry). It is they who willingly go into 
harm’s way to protect, serve and safeguard the American people. Despite this, there does 
not exist a consistent, structured methodology for eliciting operator input at all levels of 
strategic development.1 Policy that does not include consideration of operator needs is 
policy that can inadvertently increase the difficulty of mission performance and introduce 
vulnerabilities into the homeland security enterprise. We seek to change this pattern through 
the development of Operator Driven Policy (ODP). Toward this end, we offer the Quadrant 
Enabled Delphi (QED) method as a mechanism for systematically working with operators to 
better understand their operational needs and construct policies that best serve them to 
engage in continuous versus rigid planning. The article first introduces the policy process 
and the role of operator perspectives; then it  considers the strength and weaknesses of the 
classic Delphi method as an approach for incorporating operator perspectives; finally it  sets 
out theoretical underpinnings for an operator driven approach, and details the QED method 
as an alternative to the standard Delphi approach. We use a case-study  to demonstrate 
the QED method and approach, and to highlight lessons learned in applying QED. Finally, 
we propose an ODP process for using QED to incorporate operator perspectives within the 
policy process.
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Transforming Policy to Serve Operators
Policy-makers generally define policy as a course of action adopted and pursued by a 
government, political party, or other body.2 From the standpoint of meeting an organization’s 
mission objectives in support of national and homeland security, however, a more useful 
interpretation is that “policy” is the intersection of politics and performance. Put another way, 
it is the point at which “will” or “guidance” as expressed by law, regulation, or authoritative 
direction, is interpreted in such a way as to drive strategies, plans, and tactics toward realizing 
that will or guidance in support of sustained and successful outcomes. One can view policy as 
the joining of requirements with the abilities, capabilities, and constraints of operations, but 
frequently policies are viewed as originating from the leadership of an agency or government 
office.3 ODP is proposed as a less expensive and more effective form of policy-making than 
current approaches. ODP is based on acquiring and synthesizing information on the needs 
and concerns of operators (our clients) to frame strategic planning, implementation, and 
resourcing while also meeting legal and enterprise-wide requirements.4 In short, ODP is 
a hybridized bottom-up approach to policy-making in contrast to conventional top-down 
approaches.5 By ensuring that policy and strategic development are fully informed by both 
political (e.g., societal drivers as expressed through legislative or executive action) and operator 
levels (e.g., practical constraints on enforcement actions or implementation of strategy), the 
homeland security enterprise will be more effective in executing its mission while achieving 
cost-savings. To serve ODP, we developed the QED method as a practical approach to enable 
policy-makers to solicit and incorporate such information into Operator and Headquarters-
driven policy development. The premise here is that good policy should incorporate the 
perspectives of operators in concert with those of experienced policy-makers, rather than 
valuing one perspective over the other.  This premise was demonstrated when President 
Trump specifically tasked executive departments and agencies with conducting a bottom-
up review of all immigration policies, asking law enforcement professionals (i.e., operators) 
to identify reforms to protect national interests.  In his October, 2017 letter to House and 
Senate leaders, he noted that those professionals identified dangerous loopholes, outdated 
laws, and easily exploited vulnerabilities.6
Operator-Driven Data and the Need for 
Systematic Policy Development
Operator needs span the continuum from procuring equipment to the means to acquire, 
share, and act on information through communication and coordination. Needs in the field 
can include everything along this continuum, often in a rapidly evolving incident setting where 
there is little stability. While certainly important to the enterprise, the critical distinction 
between operators and rear echelon personnel is the direct and immediate service of a 
mission imperative (although rear echelon personnel can also be operators, provided they 
have experience at the field level). For example, operations centers need to be in constant 
communication with higher-level unity of command centers to receive regional alerts and 
requests to respond. Specificity and precision of situational awareness are important to 
ensure that resources, assets, and responses are utilized in the most efficient manner. This 
seemingly straightforward process belies the complex (i.e., emergent) and complicated 
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nature of field operations and the policies that enable or constrain them. To address this 
complexity through a dynamic process of strategic planning, resourcing, and execution, we 
need to examine the current process by which policy is formed. 
The prevalent model of policy development is a top-down process typically driven by senior 
management in Washington, DC.7 Senior leadership, often politically appointed and lacking 
in field operations experience, interprets political signals or statutory imperatives to drive 
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution decisions.8 Leadership reinforces this 
model in organizational structures where they select primary policy-makers from external 
sources such as academia or think tanks, or where there is no requirement of relevant 
field experience.9 To underscore this point, consider that as of June 2018, the “Strategy 
and Analysis” subunit within DHS Policy has no permanent personnel with operational 
field experience, being entirely staffed by individuals with academic or headquarters-level 
civil service backgrounds.  This results in a Dunning-Kruger effect in which policy-makers 
may not understand field conditions and are potentially unaware that they lack such 
understanding.10  While there are some benefits to creating policy at a high organizational 
level (e.g., headquarters units tend to have broader viewsheds than field units, they are 
closer to political and economic realities, and have access to the resourcing necessary to 
implement policy), they frequently omit the operators from the decision-making process, 
relying instead on working groups of administrators who are readily available in Washington, 
DC, rather than allocating often limited resources to bring field personnel to the table.  A 
partial exception to this is when subordinate Headquarters units are staffed predominantly 
by field personnel, such as the U.S. Coast Guard where Headquarters tours are part of an 
overall rotation and assignment process that focuses predominantly on field operations. 
This situation means that when resourcing occurs, the need to include views from the 
ground is not always met.
Consider the following real-world example of this type of top-down decision-making process 
and its consequences. In 2006, Congress created a requirement that the DHS implement a 
program in at least three foreign ports to test the feasibility of screening 100% of maritime 
cargo containers destined for U.S. ports.11 Before the pilot program was fully implemented 
or the feasibility of the screening approach could be assessed, in 2007 Congress passed 
and the President signed another law establishing a July 1, 2012 deadline requiring that 
100% of all U.S.-bound cargo from foreign ports be scanned.12 The statute authorized the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to extend the initial 2012 implementation deadline for two 
additional years every two years, repeatedly, provided that DHS met certain conditions. 
The implicit policy of the Department, that the conditions preventing implementation exist 
and remain true, has been consistently communicated to Congress on a biannual cycle. 
However, the explicit policy of the Department has been that DHS would make every effort 
to comply with the law. Had field operators been consulted by those preparing the SAFE Port 
Act or the 9/11 Act or had they been allowed to provide input during the biannual review 
cycle, certain fundamental policy failures would have been readily identified. It would have 
become clear that the cargo screening requirement would produce only a slight increase in 
security while imposing impossible-to-meet operational burdens, because of the obvious 
issues with implementing an unenforceable policy requiring significant expenditures by 
trading partners in their own port facilities. Additionally, the policy required the installation 
by foreign partners of equipment originally manufactured only in the United States and 
slowed commerce with every cargo container scanned. The policy also failed to create the 
institutional capacity to review the 20 million or more images that would be produced a 
year by successful scanning. Instead, due to the divergence of top-down policy and in-the-
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field reality, the implementation deadline for the law has been extended three times since 
it came into effect, but the law continues as written despite the recognition by Congress 
that the requirements are infeasible and would come at an unacceptably high cost both 
monetarily and in terms of displacement of other effort.13 
While there are no guarantees that policy-makers will heed operator insights and inputs, in 
cases such as the 100% scanning deadline, doing so could have prevented an unenforceable 
law from being enacted.  Addressing why the law and its resultant policies persist is beyond 
the scope of this article, though it is frequently discussed in trade journals dedicated to 
global supply chains.  The critical factor is that, absent input from people who actually 
understood field operations and could have immediately identified the challenges, a 
seemingly reasonable but impractical mandate was issued.
Soliciting Operator Inputs: Re-Thinking 
the Delphi Method 
To solicit systematically the input of operators, the authors examined various methods for 
acquiring information from experts in a field, starting with the Delphi Method. We found 
that the Delphi Method, originally developed by the RAND Corporation in the early 1950s 
to solicit and understand the view of experts related to national defense, is a well-used 
methodology for gathering and creating consensus among subject matter experts.14 The 
term originates from Greek mythology – Delphi was the site of the Delphic oracle, the most 
important oracle in the classical Greek world. The Delphi method can be characterized as a 
method for structuring information derived from a group of experts to derive a consensus 
on the best available knowledge with respect to a complex problem.15 In general, the 
approach utilizes standard survey instruments and the subsequent synthesis of the results 
to acquire expert opinions.16 The historic strength of the Delphi method was that it provided 
a structured approach for eliciting and reporting expert knowledge, and in some cases 
systematically achieving consensus among subject matter experts. It is still used today by 
the RAND corporation to do their futures scenarios planning.
However, the Delphi method has several shortcomings. Due to the overuse of surveys, 
individuals are less likely to respond unless they have extremely strong opinions and are 
more outspoken. There has also been a decline in response rates during iterative surveys, 
particularly those involving three or four rounds.17 Additionally, use of pre-workshop surveys 
as a core component of the Delphi approach is not optimal because it creates a strong 
group bias (among the survey preparation group) that is not necessarily representative of 
collective experience or knowledge of the experts. This predisposes subsequent Delphi-
based workshop rounds to this bias, rendering the outputs less accurate.18 Finally, the 
traditional RAND Delphi does not take into account the plurality of cognitive skill-sets of 
participants involved in the process and often introduces significant bias into the outputs 
in other ways. Introduced biases can result from: pre-determined scenarios and/or surveys 
sent to workshop participants that introduce a first level bias; facilitators who are not 
trained in cognitive elicitation methods and who may not be able to work with a plurality of 
individual communication and interpretation styles; lack of standardization in methodology, 
both across and within the method and its applications that may produce qualitative data 
that cannot be compared; and preference for participants who are available versus those 
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who are truly expert attendees (see the “Participant Backgrounds” Section, below).  These, 
among other factors, can yield results that may be inaccurate or misleading.19 To address 
these shortcomings, we developed the Quadrant Enabled Delphi (QED), and propose that 
the QED is needed to solicit expert input that serves the development of precise and targeted 
ODP based on the critique above.20 
Theoretical Basis for an Operator-Driven 
Policy Approach 
Two main bodies of knowledge inform the structure of Operator-Driven Policy developed 
through the Quadrant Enabled Delphi: theories of human organization, specifically agent 
types, and theories of cognition. 
Human Organization: Agent Types
Each of us behave as autonomous agents (e.g., individuals) and possess cognitive elements, 
which are subject to social influence and infrastructural (e.g., economic) constraints.21 The 
concept of “agents” and “roles” is not new and occurs in diverse fields of study ranging from 
artificial intelligence22, to sociology23, to psychology.24 A cognitive agent (i.e., a person) has 
three key features: cognition (perception), reason (preferences), and purpose (intentions).25 
These features encompass the general concept that agents are intelligent actors who respond 
to social and institutional stimuli in multiple ways including hysteresis (e.g., not responding 
to a stimulus until it carries risk), learning (e.g., becoming more efficient), and values (e.g., 
the Prisoners’ Dilemma).26 Roles are carried out by agents based on both their formal and 
informal situation within a network or group.27 The dynamics of human responses to change 
are often studied at the scale of institutions and/or populations.28 Agents can be categorized 
into three broad categories: “initiators” (or alpha agents); “supporters” (or beta agents); 
and “opportunists” (or gamma agents).29 Agent types can be likened to the theoretical and 
empirical roles of leaders and followers in a group context concerned with achievement of 
a common goal.30
In the context of expert workshops, alphas can be outspoken and persuasive, are often 
articulate, and are generally concerned with moving toward a unity of effort regardless of 
personal gain or opinions. Betas represent most attendees who are willing to listen to a 
range of inputs and form conclusions based on discussion. Gammas are individuals, who, 
like alphas, are often outspoken and persuasive but are focused on advancing a specific 
agenda regardless of whether it advances unity of effort. Each class of participant requires 
different interactions with facilitators to ensure their voices are heard and their expertise is 
equally represented in products. For our purposes, this must be accomplished as part of an 
operator-driven approach. 
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Decision Making and Cognition
An extensive body of knowledge provides relatively deep, but highly variable, insights and 
data regarding the mechanisms of decision-making and cognition. Despite the general 
thought that “better data equal better decisions,” there is overwhelming evidence that 
emotions strongly influence cognitive decision processes.31 Quantitative evidence further 
supports the idea that perception, rather than objective data, often drives decisions.32 As 
a consequence, we propose incorporating several specific processes into consideration for 
an operator-driven approach: cognitive traps/biases, cognitive walkthroughs to access both 
explicit and implicit knowledge possessed by workshop participants, and distinguishing 
types of knowing and knowledge.
Cognitive Traps (CTs)
For many settings across government, especially at the federal level, decision-making is 
handled by a group of individuals who come together as representatives of different agencies 
and services. Such interagency decision-making processes result in a series of “cognitive 
traps” (CTs, also referred to as “Cognitive Biases”): that is, an inability to explore mentally 
new strategies or actions beyond those that are well known and familiar. Such cognitive 
traps must be addressed to enable operator-relevant and effective decision-making.33 CTs 
help us to understand the resultant processes that can enhance or impede decision making 
during an operator-driven process, particularly with respect to knowledge of agent types 
(individuals) and social niches (in professional teams). For groups of participants that have 
legacy issues (see Addressing Elephants below), repeated actions may be an impediment to 
listening to alternative viewpoints due to conditioned actions and responses.34
The dynamics resulting from the interactions of these different kinds of cognitive biases 
in a group produce coordinating cues and signaling behaviors, which are often relayed 
subconsciously as well as overtly.35 Visual and verbal cues signal to others the status of a 
given agent in the group.36 These fundamental qualities of individual and group behaviors 
must be considered in the context of the explicit and implicit knowledge of the participants. 
Cognitive Walkthroughs
The use of cognitive walkthroughs is a critical component of an operator-driven approach 
and is based on observations that daily interactions with computers and other digital 
technologies are changing the way we perceive, analyze information, and make decisions.37 
The use of cognitive walkthroughs ensures that these emergent cognitive patterns are 
leveraged, particularly among younger participants. For example, Norman’s Human Action 
Cycle describes the steps a person takes when interacting with a computer system,38 starting 
with the formulation of the user’s goals through to accomplishment of those goals.
Knowing
Explicit knowledge is generally defined as “knowledge that the knower can make explicit 
by means of a verbal statement that can be elicited from them by suitable enquiry or 
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prompting.”39 Implicit knowledge is generally defined as any other kinds of knowledge 
including those often characterized by phrases such as ‘gut feelings’ and ‘I just know,’ or 
other complex, subjective, and subconsciously, driven means of coming to a decision fork 
and/or conclusion.40 In this construct, implicit knowledge corresponds roughly to what 
Polanyi called “tacit knowing”: we can know more than we can tell, but such knowledge is 
difficult to  describe linearly  and relay.41 Doctors and decision-makers in the military and 
law enforcement rely on tacit knowledge in decision-making contexts.42 In the military, 
especially, tacit knowledge is often identified as intuition and cultivated to support rapid 
decision making in complex and urgent situations.43 The original Delphi Method primarily 
addressed explicit knowledge, allowing “experts” to provide question-answer information 
that was compiled into a report. Operator-driven approaches are designed to acquire and 
enhance both explicit and implicit knowledge, as the latter is often possessed and valued 
by the most experienced, effective, and expert operators. We propose augmenting these 
types of knowing with something called “local and place-based knowledge” (LPBK), which 
can provide location-specific context for decision-making: a critical component of operator-
driven policy which can ensure that decisions are relevant to the geographic and temporal 
scales on which field agents conduct operations. Since collective knowledge constructs 
institutions, policy development strategies which don’t capture the diversity of knowledge 
available (explicit, implicit, and LPBK) necessarily fail to address real-world scenarios while 
also generating outcomes based on incomplete or flawed data inputs.44 
The QED Methodology
The QED methodology was designed by the University of Idaho’s Center for Resilient 
Communities to serve ODP and is built on the cognitive science and human organization 
principles described above. QED replaces the traditional Delphi pre-workshop survey with 
recursive, in-person social processes. Facilitators bring experts together in-person, elicit 
subject-area knowledge, and build consensus while iteration occurs through a series of both 
structured and semi-structured sessions in 1-2-day long workshops. 
In QED, facilitators initially present a series of carefully crafted challenge questions to a 
diverse group (the Delphi group) to initiate discussion. These questions are specific to the 
topic at hand but crafted so as not to introduce bias. Facilitators then oversee responses 
of the panel of experts, helping them express their opinions concisely and accurately while 
recording the points raised. Facilitators select members in consultation with the organizing 
or hosting agency because they are subject matter experts in fields related to the challenge 
questions; they represent a broad range of relevant organizations and agencies; and they 
provide a diverse mix of operator experiences. The success of this process depends on the 
expertise, professionalism, and communication skills of both participants and facilitators. 
We describe a case study of the implementation of QED below in order to explain the 
methodology, and we then describe the core elements of QED. 
Case-Study– Emerging Arctic Threats
The workshop on Emerging Arctic Threats (EARTh-X) convened in Washington, D.C. on 
February 1 and 2, 2017, and was attended by 85 security and intelligence professionals 
from over 35 U.S. and Canadian federal and state or provincial agencies. The workshop 
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was held under the Chatham House Rule: individual participants were not named, although 
the names of agencies and institutions represented were recorded, to ensure anonymity in 
workshop reporting and to foster open dialog during the meeting. The workshop goal was 
to establish an understanding of the emerging security landscape in the Canadian-United 
States (CANUS) Arctic by eliciting the most severe emerging security threats, developing 
a consensus on the highest priority threats, identifying capability gaps in tackling these 
threats, and generating consensus recommendations in response to the identified threats 
and gaps.45 The workshop employed the QED methodology using a sequential and recursive 
format, a quadrant layout for facilitation, and the 80/20 rule for prioritization of data.
1 - Sequential and Iterative Phases
The QED structure for the EARTh-X workshop entailed four iterative phases of facilitated 
brainstorming, discussion, rating, and consensus-building.
Phase 1 involved horizon scanning during which major security threats in the Arctic and the 
severity of those threats were identified through facilitated brainstorming. The workshop 
domain experts enumerated collectively 198 threats in the Arctic security sector.
Phase 2 involved prioritization of the major security threats for the Arctic through the Red 
dot/Green dot exercise (see below). The 80/20 rule dot method resulted in 14 threats ranked 
as highest severity, ranging from “Dark Target Tracking in Theater” to “Effects of Thawing 
Permafrost on Critical Infrastructure.” After narrowing the threat list to the most serious 
threats for the maritime, air, cyber, land, and all security domains, the threats were ranked 
in terms of overall priority, timescale, and spatial scale.
Phase 3 involved framing the threat continuum by identifying and prioritizing capability 
gaps in responding to the threats through facilitated rating. Following threat identification, 
participants identified 47 capability gaps hindering effective security operations in the Arctic 
domain. In a similar manner to Phase 2, participants ranked the capability gaps. The highest-
ranked capability gaps ranged from “[L]ack of Persistent Sensors / Surveillance Frameworks” 
to “[L]ack of Situational Awareness.” This phase also enabled extraction of serious barriers 
to effective security operations in the Arctic, for example, the lack of critical information and 
information-sharing protocols.
Phase 4 involved identifying and prioritizing solutions through facilitated brainstorming 
and rating of solutions. The final outcome of the QED process at EARTh-X, based on the 
enumerated threats and the capability gaps, was a set of consensus recommendations on 
potential solutions to enhancing CANUS Arctic security. Participants achieved consensus 
through a facilitated group discussion of the group rankings of proposed solutions, that is, 
as a collective social process between facilitators and participants. For example, the group 
resolved to “revisit a comprehensive strategy for surveillance as a process” and to “develop 
tools and processes for better situational awareness for ground operations.”
2 - Quadrant Layout and Facilitation
The meeting venue with seated participants (i.e., operators) was divided into quadrants with 
a facilitator (or “quadrant manager”) for each quadrant (see Figure 1). The central facilitator 
(or “room manager”) coordinated the overall discussion and roamed among the different 
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quadrants. Each quadrant facilitator engaged the participants in their quadrant through 
verbal, visual, and physical cues. Quadrant facilitators also liaised with the central facilitator 
to adjust information elicitation based on the agent types in their quadrant. During the 
two-day EARTh-X workshop, the central facilitator role was shared between two people, 
alternating between primary and secondary roles.
For the EARTh-X workshop, quadrants represented air, maritime, land, and cyber domains. 
The quadrant facilitator in each quadrant had operational expertise specific to that domain, 
and this allowed them to not only serve as a resource to the participants in their quadrants 
but also to understand the comments recorded for their quadrants. 
Figure 1. Quadrant layout for group facilitation in Quadrant Enabled Delphi (QED) method. 
Note that quadrants are defined by participant numbers, e.g. seats at the table, not 
quartering of the workspace
3 - The 80/20 Rule
As a means of leveraging the collective intrinsic and extrinsic knowledge of participants, QED 
uses the 80/20 rule to allow for rapid prioritization and sorting of group inputs.  The 80/20 
rule stems from the “Pareto Principle” which has multiple interpretations and applications 
depending on the context used, but is simply phrased as “80% of the output results from 
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20% of the input” and has been applied to quality control in electrical circuits, business 
management, and human decision-making processes.46 
During the EARTh-X workshop, reaching a consensus on ranking, for example, the 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure in the Arctic was accomplished through a series of 
iterative sessions including group generation of vulnerabilities and threats, group rating of 
those vulnerabilities and threats, and spatial mapping of vulnerabilities and threats. The 
ranking sessions involved participants placing color-coded adhesive dots on tabulated 
sheets generated during brainstorming to differentiate items and to assist with prioritizing 
them.
Key definitions used for the application of the 80/20 rule for ranking results in EARTh-X 
included:
• Severity - defined as the impacts and consequences of an event occurring: Severe 
(Critical)=immediate loss of safety and/or life, and/or critical infrastructure to multiple 
people; Significant (Acute)=predisposes the loss of safety and/or life and/or critical 
infrastructure within weeks; Moderate=may predispose the loss of safety and/or life 
and/or critical infrastructure within months. 
• Timescale - defined as the time period in which a threat was most likely to manifest: 
Horizon 1 (1 to 5 years); Horizon 2 (5 to 10 years); Horizon 3 (10 to 30 years).
• Spatial scale - defined as the scale of impact of a threat or vulnerability: Local, National, 
and International.
The 80/20 rule modification guided the numbers of dots each participant received and how 
many cycles of the dot exercise were conducted for rating severity, timescale, and spatial 
scale for the generated vulnerabilities and threats (see Figure 2 for one visualization of 
results from ranking threats).
Accessible Outputs—Reporting Back and 
Actionable Data
After the first day of the EARTh-X workshop, the team conducted an analysis of the output. 
This generated a ranked and weighted score from the first 80/20 rule refinement, resulting 
in sets of 3-8 consensus “highest priority” threats and capability gaps. Those data were 
then discussed at the beginning of the second day and used as inputs for the next rounds 
of 80/20 rule exercises. Once the workshop had concluded, the leadership team produced a 
draft summary (within two weeks) and distributed it to the participants for comment and to 
verify and validate the results.47 
Once the participants had validated the report, it was provided to policy-makers (who were 
also participants in the exercise) engaged in developing strategies related to the Arctic, where 
it became the basis of strategic risk landscape analysis.  This ensured that operator input 
was embedded in the strategy development process, while also enabling broader issues 
such as national objectives to be accommodated. 
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Figure 2. Cube framework for representing Emerging Arctic Threats from the EyesNorth 
QED Workshop held in 2017 (Alessa et al. 2017).
Lessons for the Application of QED
The QED method was developed and refined to ensure that systematic and rigorous data 
are acquired directly from the operators themselves. A closer examination of the QED 
methodology includes the following key components: 
1. careful consideration of participant demographics, identifying and enlisting subject 
experts; 
2. consistent methodology across QED sessions including operator selection; 
3. establishment of trusted spaces for maximizing free expression of ideas;
4. rigorous validation and prioritization of information using a 80/20 rule exercise, and;  
5. accessible and comparable outputs between and across QED events. 
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QED can establish settings where operators can express their expert perspectives and 
field-informed views without fear of reprisal or stigmatization. Additionally, QED leverages 
cognitive science and principles of human organization to enable data collection at the 
individual and group level. It also reveals group dynamics which can be used as proxies to 
understand broader-scale dynamics at agency and department levels. Finally, it also reveals 
the “unknown unknowns” by accessing, structuring and analyzing the tacit and implicit 
knowledge of a group of carefully selected expert “human databases” whose collective 
reasoning leads to insights that are otherwise not visible.
In addition to the facilitated discussion and brainstorming sessions, the QED method 
includes a written information submission mechanism that increases the number of 
solutions generated by larger groups, particularly by allowing beta agents, who often 
have well thought-out opinions but may not be comfortable vocalizing in a larger group, 
to express them freely. It also allows a larger number of inputs in a much shorter period, 
leading to concept diversity and a more robust set of decision options. Our experiences 
are consistent with data suggesting that in response to three different problems requiring 
creative thinking, the number and quality of inputs produced by “nominal groups” (whose 
members spent reflective periods working alone after or during group sessions) was of 
higher utility to decision makers. 
Participant Background
A critical starting point for a successful QED process is ensuring that the attendees are 
representative of the appropriate subject matter expertise and roles that constitute the 
operational landscape from unity of command to unity of effort. Workshop attendees 
cannot be random or opportunistic, but should be carefully identified through an “ideal 
participant paragraph” in the participant solicitation and through leveraging peer networks. 
Here is an example of an Ideal Participant Paragraph: 
Observing and monitoring system designers, data managers, and the operational 
users of the data generated by these networks are ideal participants for these 
workshops. Individuals whose responsibilities include processing, analyzing, and 
disseminating data for resource management, security and defense operations are 
also encouraged to attend. These include watch-standers for natural disasters such 
as wildfires, search and rescue, and humanitarian and disaster response. Individuals 
involved in countering illicit activities such as illegal, undocumented and unreported 
fishing (IUUF), and local stakeholders whose place-based knowledge can provide 
context to regional datasets are also welcome to attend.48 
Ensuring that participants have appropriate backgrounds also entails ensuring that the 
room is secure (peers respecting peers) and that new individuals cannot freely enter and 
engage with the QED cohort. 
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Quadrants
The “Q” in QED is critical because it structures the room and the participants into four sections 
or quadrants (Figure 1). This was based on our experience with the EARTh-X workshop and 
several other QED workshops that were run in 2017 and 2018, in which it emerged that there 
are typically four domain areas of critical interest, e.g., marine, air, land, and cyber domains in 
the case of EARTh-X. The use of four quadrants also allows for a straightforward room layout 
utilizing the four corners of a rectangular meeting space.  Nevertheless, it is possible to run 
the process using say, 3 or 5 domain areas.  However, use of a quadrant-based structure is 
also resonant with whole-brain theory, also known as the Four Quadrant Model, in which a 
quadrant-setting supports “Creators,” “Investigators,” “Activators,” and “Evaluators,” as sub-
sets of agent-based operators.49 The selection and use of quadrant facilitators/managers 
allows for a diverse team of facilitators who have the knowledge necessary to work the 
given subject during elicitation. Each quadrant represents a key area of focus for a given 
challenge in the issue at hand. Facilitator expertise, knowledge, and process understanding 
are critical to quality assurance and accuracy. If clarification is necessary, facilitators can 
pose the correct questions. This construction of information inputs is particularly important 
to the 80/20 rule dot exercise phase of the QED process.
Facilitators – Forming the QED Team
One of the more critical factors that determines the success of a QED workshop is the training 
and quality of the facilitators themselves. Facilitators must have the following qualities: 
1. possess field and/or operator-relevant experience;
2. can parse information and inputs in the context of domain expertise;
3. possess outstanding listening and intervention skills, and;
4. have training in QED facilitation.
Beyond content expertise, quadrant managers are systematically trained in the QED 
approach to acquire specific skills that allow them to engage attendees and ensure that they 
participate in ways best suited to their personalities. Skilled facilitation may be necessary to 
ensure all opinions and views are safety elicited, and to maintain the professional decorum 
of the group. If not carefully managed, strongly expressed opinions or shared experiences 
may result in confrontations between participants. A quadrant manager uses a range 
of techniques to interact with attendees, ensuring that the entire suite of agent types is 
engaged appropriately. These include cognitive and trust-based interventions tailored to 
each participant that may be detached or overt.50
Rotating the central facilitator role between sessions prevents fatigue during QED sessions 
and allows each to utilize and leverage individual strengths in group management and 
content expertise. The quadrant-enabled aspect of QED helps ensure harmonization of 
participation and improves the quality of information provided by the group. Ultimately, 
QED provides a structured, trust-based information exchange space where operators can 
provide honest input in the task of informing superiors within their organizations.
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Selection of facilitators for QED is based on nomination and invitation. Trusted, capable 
facilitators are identified by already qualified personnel and generally vetted by being invited 
to serve as a quadrant facilitator during a workshop. Once identified and vetted, prospective 
facilitators undergo a 3-day training program that provides the key background (scientific 
theory), critical interaction skills (toolbox), and processes (workflows and analytical tools). 
The course takes place in a neutral location where students can freely explore a range of 
topics under each of these three areas. The third day is composed of a compressed QED 
workshop process with actual participants. 
Trust Spaces
A critical component of QED is that of trust. We use the term “trust”   here to mean the emotional 
state in which individuals feel secure enough to freely express their professional opinions 
in a setting free of perceived or actual consequences to personal or professional safety.51 
Constructing trust spaces hinges on asking the right questions, those that specifically serve 
the resolution and illumination of the issue, and providing the means for the respondents 
to give honest answers without fear of repercussions. Facilitators can utilize several means, 
outlined below, to ensure that they construct adequate trust spaces. 
Chatham House Rule
The Chatham House Rule originated at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a non-
profit, non-governmental organization based in London whose mission is to analyze and 
promote the understanding of major international issues and current affairs. The Chatham 
House Rule is designed to provide anonymity to speakers to encourage openness and 
sharing of information. It is used throughout the world as an aid to free discussion. The 
Chatham House Rule reads as follows:
When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants 
are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of 
the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.52
Social Reinforcement and Trust Building in 
Real Time
Trust spaces rely on several layers of social intervention that can be difficult to balance, 
depending on the dynamics of the expert group physically present in the room. Ultimately, 
it begins with a strong and cohesive QED facilitation team whose backgrounds make them 
capable of empathy and relativity to the attendees themselves. A capable and empathetic, 
yet disciplined QED team conveys confidence in both their knowledge of procedure (i.e., 
confidentiality and respect) as well as their content expertise. More functionally, a trust 
space must be physically constructed by holding the workshop in a secure room where 
outsiders cannot randomly come and go, by constantly reminding attendees of the gravity 
of the Chatham House Rule and its origins, and by requesting that digital devices be put 
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away (a request that the facilitation team can reinforce by securing their own devices in an 
obvious fashion). Activities such as photographs and social media are prohibited (except 
for providing digital records of facilitation tools and products as an aid to later analysis). 
To reinforce these rules and create a common normative behavior set, facilitators require 
the attendees to exercise the highest level of their professional responsibilities. In almost 
all cases, they will respond favorably and collectively create and uphold shared trust both 
during the QED process and following it. 
The “Magic Box”
Communication styles vary among individuals. In general, alphas and gammas are more 
likely to speak out than are betas. Among betas, there are sub-categories, which generally 
include active (Bα), obligate (Bο), and passive (Bπ). Active betas are more likely to provide 
verbal input followed by written comments after adequate information/evidence has been 
heard from the group. Obligate betas generally will “go with the flow” and provide the bulk 
of their inputs via written comments once they have assessed the majority sentiments. 
Passive betas usually either feel inadequate in terms of domain expertise and/or occupy a 
social niche which is subjugated to other betas and alphas in the broader group network. 
This does not mean that passive Betas do not have opinions, expertise, or inputs, but rather 
that they are unlikely to express that knowledge verbally and are more likely to provide only 
written comments. Individuals of all personality types may consider written comments to 
be a more accurate or considered format as the act of writing allows time to reflect and 
analyze. Additionally, written comments also engage different cognitive processes than 
verbal exchange, potentially leading to ideas or concepts that would not be accessible 
in a discussion. For example, it is not uncommon for written comments to reflect on the 
nature of the QED workshop, challenge questions, or facilitation team, and this can lead to 
improvements of execution (or even of the method itself). A secure box (or secure boxes – 
with one in each quadrant) is provided in QED for all such comments with the understanding 
that every comment is considered, incorporated, and kept secure in the final written 
analysis. The safe space is further reinforced by ensuring participants that physical written 
comments will be destroyed once the information is transcribed by the QED team analysts. 
In the EARTh-X QED Workshop, a total of 412 comments were received in the Magic Box.  
Acknowledging Elephants
Among a targeted and carefully considered group of experts, there will be legacy challenges 
that create tension.53 Having these called out at the beginning of the meeting by a skilled 
group of facilitators will accomplish three things:
1. clarification of the scope and details of the problem;
2. gauging the severity of any disparity between participants’ views and the workshop 
objectives in impeding the QED process; and
3. acknowledging that there are multiple viewpoints which will need to be harmonized and 
that consensus may or may not be achieved.
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Acknowledging elephants is not done as a matter of regular practice and requires a high level 
of skill, knowledge of the issue-scape, and ability to rein-in discussions should they become 
heated. It should only be attempted when the QED team is pre-briefed on thresholds at 
which hard-stops dictate a transition to a new discussion phase and/or QED activity.
Story Telling
The types of experts that constitute the range of field operators to command center and 
support personnel bring with them a rich set of experiences, and hence stories. Telling 
these stories in a safe space is a critical piece of the QED method. In the EARTh-X QED 
Workshop, an initial story was offered by both Central Facilitators as a way to link the 
discussions and their content to a real-world experience. This assisted the group to further 
understand and relate, not only to each other, but also to the reasons behind the workshop 
and the information elicitation itself. The benefits of team building are well-documented 
in industry but have not been readily transferred to the homeland security enterprise 
where a “Unity of Effort” is overly generalized and difficult to tangibly construct.54 In our 
experience, storytelling has been a powerful unifying force that both humanizes attendees, 
decreases isolation, and builds empathy. In EARTh-X, the empathy and team-building that 
was generated by storytelling opened several lines of communication and identified key 
convergence and leveraging points between operators across DHS components involved in 
securing the Nation’s borders.55
Data Analysis and Cross Validation of 
Information 
Information solicited through QED is acquired in a systematic fashion, ensuring that each 
phase of the method is consistent, so that data from each phase are comparable with each 
other and with few deviations. A consistent method across QED workshops also ensures 
that data from diverse topics can be cross-compared further and evaluated for overlaps 
and/or divergences. Types of analysis can include:
1. Rank ordered lists of elicited information using numerical normalization techniques;
2. Iteratively refined inputs using normalized scores (i.e., taking a top-5 and doing a 
next round based on them);
3. Dimensional frameworks produced by plotting normalized, ranked scores on multiple 
dimensions (see figure 2); and
4. Qualitative summarization of the remainder of the data.
Analysts can produce quantitative textual analysis by feeding all inputs and comments into 
open-source software such as AIDA.56 It should be noted that there may not be enough data 
from a single workshop to produce statistical inference or analysis, but repeated workshops 
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using consistent methodologies can produce enough data to use chi-square or similar 
statistical methods to compare proportionate responses from workshop to workshop. 
Supporting an Operator-Driven Policy 
Process 
A key purpose of QED is to provide a way to solicit operator input more effectively, in concert 
with policy experts, for informing precise and effective ODP. In contrast to a conventional, 
top-down policy-making process (Figure 3a), an ODP leverages the QED methodology as 
a means for incorporating operator knowledge and opinion in the policy-making process 
(Figure 3b) – alongside those with policy experience. Where the need for new or updated 
policy via operator input (i.e., QED) is recognized, or the potential for a strategic initiative is 
identified, agency personnel with a strategic policy role (the policy champions) will designate 
a project lead or team who may in turn establish working groups. Where the potential need 
for a strategic initiative is identified, the process next requires a validation cycle. Traditionally, 
this validation step is a high-level overview of the topic, its risk environment, and potential 
partners, etc. As a basis for ODP, inserting a QED approach to provide input from field-level 
operators ensures that accurate information on the real-world environment is incorporated. 
The research cycle in strategy development is the primary mechanism for identifying 
and detailing the operational space and risk environment that the strategy is intended to 
address. It is an iterative process wherein the policy champions shape concise descriptions 
of the strategic environment using: open source and/or classified information; national, 
department or interagency policy statements; statutes/authorities/regulations; interagency 
consultation; and engagement with academia and/or think tanks. It informs the background, 
and guides strategic principles, partnership identification, and current efforts by partner’s 
sections of the strategy. Where QED is used, the background statements also form the basis 
of the QED workshop materials, affording an opportunity for the expert operators to inform 
the basic substance of the strategy by influencing what would normally be a headquarters 
staff-level assessment process – thus validating it or adding real-world input.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3. Diagrams of: (a) Traditional top-down policy-making process, and; (b) Policy-making 
process modified by the bottom-up Quadrant Enabled Delphi approach incorporating 
operator-driven input. 
It should be noted that the application of QED does not necessarily guarantee that the 
operational perspectives and voices elicited through the workshops are heeded by 
policymakers and subsequently translated into policy. Nonetheless, the formalization of an 
alternative policy process (Figure 3) with QED embedded in it may increase the likelihood of 
ODP being developed. The gap between knowing what to do and what policy actually can be 
adopted is not addressed here and is beyond the scope of this article.
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Conclusion
The process of policy development is optimized with timely and robust input from operators. 
Like any other complex system, the homeland security enterprise can be improved by 
addressing multiple scales of risk, needs, and practices. ODP allows field-scale challenges 
and opportunities to be meaningfully incorporated into strategy and planning in concert with 
the expertise of policy champions. This inclusion of a bottom-up policy perspective refines 
end-products by improving the applicability of the resultant policies as well as cooperation 
between components that improves Unity of Effort overall. The QED method was developed 
specifically to accomplish these goals in a manner that is unbiased, transparent, cost-
effective, and adaptive. The establishment of a federal QED cohort of facilitators will create 
the means to rapidly assess demand signals and quickly develop policies that seamlessly 
integrate with operations on the ground, while the QED needs assessment is a valuable 
tool for validating the need for strategic planning. Operator Driven Policy through the QED 
represents an innovation in policy-making and planning while also ensuring that the U.S. 
government is able to grow its own capacity to respond effectively to the ever-changing 
global dynamics with which it must contend on a daily basis. The cost-savings and precision 
of progressing to this approach will ultimately benefit the American people by ensuring that 
the front-line operators, those who serve to keep this Nation safe, are better able to execute 
their missions.
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Abstract
The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season challenged critical infrastructure and key resources 
across a wide area. Harvey, Irma, and Maria each exposed different aspects of how density, 
dependencies, and distance impact expression of risk. Each event was dramatically different 
in terms of context, inputs, and outputs.  But taken together this real-world stress-test of 
engineered systems, supply chains, and related networks offered helpful strategic insights. 
Survivor-facing lifelines are complex adaptive systems that tend to resist command-and-
control, but are often predisposed to resilience, and can be influenced by effectively targeted 
choices. The author outlines several key factors that decision-makers should monitor to 
inform their choices.
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Introduction
On August 26, 2017, Hurricane Harvey came ashore at Rockport, Texas.  The next week 
Irma was pounding the Caribbean and targeting Florida.  On September 20, Hurricane Maria 
barreled across Puerto Rico.  This quick succession of three hard-hitting storms exposed 
several aspects of Supply Chain Resilience1 (and non-resilience).  
Supply Chain Resilience assumes that in advanced economies, considerable robustness and 
adaptability exists in the depth and overlap of diverse networks of supply and demand, 
such as those that characterize the eastern third of North America.  Disruption – and even 
destruction – of network elements can be mitigated by additional resources being quickly 
attracted into the surviving network.2
There is, however, a risk of network fracturing and seriously delayed recovery if 1) multiple 
dependencies within the system fail, disrupting the preexisting supply and demand network, 
2) demand is separated from sources of supply by significant geographical distance3, and 
3) population density is beyond the capacity of “replacement” supply networks to match 
demand. 
The consequences of Harvey, Irma, and Maria offer provocative evidence for both systemic 
resilience and the risk of catastrophic failure. The lessons taught by H.I.M. extend from the 
tactical to the doctrinal.  This research highlights the following five structural issues that 
have potential strategic value for preparedness and response to future extreme events.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 7 (September 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Palin,  Learning From H.I.M.  3
• Force on Target 
• Critical Infrastructure as target
• “Super-Nodes” as target
• Population behavior (and ability to track population behavior)
• Availability of trucks, truckers, and fuel
This analysis pays particular attention  to outcomes in the Houston, Miami, and San Juan 
metropolitan areas.  Density of demand and multiple dependencies found in urban areas 
tend to amplify the risk of catastrophic cascades, but in all three hurricanes, non-urban areas 
were also seriously impacted.  In Puerto Rico, the non-urban impacts have been especially 
troublesome and long-lasting.  In many cases, rural areas are increasingly dependent on 
sourcing and distribution from urban areas.  As a result, the five structural issues outlined 
are fundamental to effective preparedness, response, and recovery in both urban and rural 
contexts.
Houston: Rapid Recovery
The Houston Metropolitan Statistical Area has a population of 6.5 million with a density 
of roughly 630 persons per square mile.  Houston is embedded within a very dense socio-
technical-economic web.  Proximity to the Dallas-Fort Worth Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(240 miles) and the San Antonio MSA (200 miles) creates a diverse, resource-rich matrix.  The 
so-called Texas Triangle is a mega-region of 18 million people encompassing over 70 percent 
of the state’s population and an even larger share of its economy.
Harvey made landfall roughly 190 miles southwest of Houston as a strong Category 4 
Hurricane.  While quickly downgraded to a tropical storm, Harvey stalled over Eastern Texas 
for most of four days inundating the region with up to 64 inches of rain.
Over 80 Texans died. One month after the event more than 60,000 were still in temporary 
housing.  Early estimates of financial loss ranged between $50 billion and $150 billion. 
However, there were also systems that showed remarkable resiliency. Below are three 
important examples of this resiliency in key systems. 
• The electrical grid and natural gas networks continued to operate at more than 90 
percent of capacity during the event. Only six of 230 electrical substations serving metro 
Houston were flooded.4
• Telecommunications services — including cellphone and internet connections — were 
widely available. Only 3.8 percent of wireless cell sites serving Houston were non-
operational on August 31.5
• The treatment and delivery of clean water to residents of metropolitan Houston 
continued without significant interruption, despite serious disruption of major facilities.6
Given the outsize character of this extreme event, the resilience of these critical 
infrastructures is worth better understanding. Failure of any of these systems would have 
amplified negative consequences. The failure of even one of these networks can often 
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initiate a catastrophic cascade.  Supply Chain Resilience especially examines  the interplay of 
densities, dependencies, and distance. Inside its urban loop, Houston’s population density 
exceeds 4700 persons per square mile. Roughly 25 percent of the nation’s refining capacity 
is in the Houston area. These sorts of concentrations create complex dependencies and 
interdependencies. The destruction and disruption in Houston caused by Harvey resonated 
across several national—and even international—networks.7From Saturday afternoon, 
August 26, to at least Wednesday afternoon, August 30, Houston’s surface transportation 
network was so seriously disrupted as to be essentially impassable. For most goods – 
including food, pharmaceuticals, medical goods, and fuel – the supply chain stopped on 
Friday evening, August 25 and did not resume until Thursday, August 31. Yet by Saturday, 
September 2 most grocery stores were re-stocked and hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies 
had what they needed. 
Consumer hoarding of gasoline complicated recovery of the fuel supply chain across East 
Texas.8 The production, transmission, and delivery of refined fuels continued to be seriously 
disrupted for weeks. But given the controlled shut-down of most refining in the region and 
the surge-in-demand associated with hoarding, even the fuel supply chain did better than 
might reasonably be expected. All in all, given how hard Harvey hit, it is an extraordinary 
demonstration of supply chain resilience. How did it happen? What can we learn? There 
were substantive – and continuing – problems, including the following.
• Close to fifty percent of regional refining — over 20 percent of national capacity — was 
shut down in advance of Harvey and was not yet fully operational when Maria hit Puerto 
Rico.
• In the days following Harvey, regional demand for refined fuels increased by multiples 
of 2 to 4 in many locations, presenting a significant challenge for fuel distribution and 
delivery.
• The loss of network integrity involving Colonial Pipeline connections west of Lake Charles 
seriously reduced the system’s capability to supply roughly 60 percent of the gasoline 
consumed between Atlanta and Baltimore.
• The failure of pumping at the Beaumont city water system—serving more than 120,000 
residents 80 miles east of Houston—demonstrated the potential of analogous system 
failures.
• Most distribution centers, fulfillment centers, and warehouses were not flooded.   But 
many of the most important supply nodes were surrounded by flood waters making 
distribution impossible for nearly one week.
• The surface transportation network in metropolitan Houston was under water in so 
many different places that the system came to a standstill. But once the water drained, 
most of the network was able to immediately return to full operations.
• Trucks and trailers were more available than drivers. More of each were needed.  Spot 
prices for trucking soared.  There was a lack of outbound loads to match inbound loads.
Despite this litany of disruption, the supply chain problems caused by Harvey had transitory 
or modest impacts on sources of supply; most supply nodes survived, and demand – while 
temporarily separated from supply and sometimes relocated – remained close to the same 
as before the event. In the case of oil refineries and the Beaumont water pumping stations, 
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there were serious disruptions of current supply capability, but capacity survived, pending 
repair and restart.
A simplified abstraction of the supply chain consists of demand nodes, supply nodes, and 
links. In Houston, Harvey had a dramatic—but temporary—impact on links. Other supply 
chain elements either remained functional or quickly restarted once the flooding drained. 
Even in the case of the links— pipelines and road networks—the most serious disruptions 
were limited to a matter of days, not weeks. Further, in contrast to many similar events, 
freight movement was allowed to utilize the surface transportation network as it became 
available, accelerating supply chain adaptability and recovery.9
Potential Strategic Implications of Harvey
1. Differentiating Capacity from Capability Matters. In assessing supply and demand networks, 
it is helpful to differentiate between short-term disruptions of capability and longer-term 
destruction of capacity. Capabilities can usually be replaced more quickly and flexibly 
than capacity. Where more capacity persists, less investment is needed for surge and/
or replacement.
2. Which Part of a Network is Impacted Matters. In assessing supply and demand networks, 
it is helpful to differentiate between effects to different elements of the supply chain, 
including sourcing, making/processing, distribution, delivery, and consumption. The 
farther “up” the chain the source of disruption or place of destruction, the more difficult 
to recover capacity. The higher up the impediment, the more surge and/or replacement 
investments are needed.
3. Highway Infrastructure Matters a Great Deal. Considering the consequences of Harvey 
for Houston, what if the disruption of the surface transportation network had involved 
much more destruction? What are the implications of Harvey-in-Houston for a major 
seismic event in California, the Pacific Northwest, or mid-Mississippi Valley?
Miami: Very Close Call
With over six million people, the Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-West Palm Beach Metropolitan 
Statistical Area is crowded into a roughly twenty-five-mile-wide strip between the ocean 
and the Everglades. In the urbanized core of the area, population densities exceed 4400 
persons per square mile. In Miami’s Brickell neighborhood, densities exceed 27,000 persons 
per square mile. In contrast with Houston, the Miami MSA is less part of a matrix and much 
more an appendage extending from sources of supply concentrated around Orlando (240 
miles) and Atlanta (660 miles).
On Sunday, September 10 after striking the Florida Keys as a Category 4 hurricane, Irma had 
a second landfall as a CAT-3 near Marco Island Florida, 100 miles west of Miami.
Over eighty people in Florida died of storm-related causes. One month after the storm, 
damage estimates were in the $60 billion dollar range. Millions of people were evacuated. In 
the Florida Keys, roughly 25 percent of homes were destroyed. 
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Irma was an enormous and powerful storm that threatened to encompass the entire Florida 
peninsula. Many meteorologists and insurance executives have commented that if Irma’s 
track had been even 20 miles farther east along the Gulf Coast, financial damages could 
easily have tripled.10 As it happened, metro-Miami was spared a direct hit. Tampa did not 
receive the catastrophic storm surge a slightly different track would have generated. Irma 
wobbled erratically from west to east to west.
She was bad, but Irma’s track spared the densest concentrations of population and 
infrastructure. Nonetheless destruction and disruption were widespread.
• On Monday night September 11, about 62 percent of Florida’s electric customers, over 
six million households, did not have electricity. This included every urban area in Florida 
except Pensacola, and even there residents were fascinated to watch Irma’s winds push 
the water out of Pensacola Bay.11
• On Tuesday morning September 12, 72 percent of cellular service in Collier County, home 
of Naples, was non-operational, while 42 percent of cell towers in Miami-Dade were non-
operational. 7.2 million landlines across Florida were not functioning.12
• In Monroe County—the Florida Keys—it is estimated that 90 percent of homes sustained 
serious damage; the electric distribution network needed to be rebuilt, while 89 of 108 
cell towers were non-operational on Tuesday morning.13
Given the forecast, operators of critical infrastructure were ready. An estimated 20,000 utility 
workers from across the nation were staged for the Florida rebuild. A nuclear power station 
was powered down. Fuel stocks were well above seasonal averages before the storm. 
Pre-event demand surge to support the evacuation and hurricane-hoarding seriously 
challenged fuel and food supply chains for the entire period September 4-9. Further analysis 
is needed, but on Labor Day Monday, September 4, consumers with the day-off seem to 
have been inspired by dramatic images from Hurricane Harvey’s impact on Houston and the 
foreboding forecast for Irma to begin a spike in demand earlier and larger than the supply 
network expected. 
Consumers arriving in stores on Tuesday found empty shelves and the hoarding response 
was fully ignited. On Wednesday, September 5, there were widespread retail shortages of 
food, fuel, batteries, and bottled water especially in metro-Miami and in Gulf Coast urban 
centers as well.
There is some evidence that a Wednesday forecast for Irma to shift east eased demand on 
the Gulf Coast and allowed supply chain operators – with significant effort and creativity – 
to maintain minimally sufficient flows of supply into metro-Miami. Actual events proved this 
forecast to be inaccurate. 
On Sunday and Monday (September 10-11), Irma slowly careened north. Given Saturday’s 
forecast map, many supply chain operators had moved their truck fleets around and north 
of Jacksonville, fully fueled and loaded to begin rolling south as early as Monday afternoon. 
Instead Irma spent much of Monday depositing an event-total of 11 to 15 inches of rain 
between Jacksonville and Fort Pierce. High winds also took out power all along the I-95 
corridor between Jacksonville and Miami. By Monday evening, supply chain operators were 
concerned they would only be able to make one massive delivery into metro-Miami late on 
Tuesday, but then – due to unavailability of fuel – would have to stop resupply until Thursday 
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or Friday depending on when power-to-pump and fuel-in-the-ground was available. 
Continuous resupply was considered crucial to preempt hoarding behavior, especially in 
metro-Miami.
On Monday night and Tuesday morning (September 11-12), power was restored to many 
truck stops and other locations along I-95. Key fuel supply nodes at Port of Tampa and 
Port Everglades were not seriously impacted by Irma. Both had significant reserves in their 
terminals and were able to re-start truck-rack operations by Tuesday morning. Both ports 
were re-opened by Tuesday afternoon and began off-loading new refined product into 
the system. By late Tuesday, the availability of power and fuel supported surge operations 
overnight and Wednesday. Most crucial supply chains were largely back to a semblance of 
normality by Thursday. By Friday, September 15, traffic congestion was the most often-
referenced impediment to supply chain resilience.
Potential Strategic Implications of Irma
1. Force-on-Target Matters. Irma was huge and very powerful, but her actual trajectory 
happened to avoid most key nodes for critical infrastructure and supplies. (Harvey was 
an extraordinary event. But if flooding is kept below a certain velocity, the impact of 
mass is not amplified by speed.)
2. Concentration of Supply Matters. If the fuel capacity at Port of Tampa and/or Port 
Everglades had experienced long-term disruption or destruction, the post-Irma story 
would be very different. Similar concentration of capacity exists in many supply 
chains. Attention to protection, risk mitigation, and resilience of this kind of key node is 
fundamental. Diversification and geographic distribution are very helpful. Identification 
and qualification of the risk before a crisis will enhance response.
3. Population Behavior Matters, Hoarding was the single largest experienced threat to the 
Florida supply chain. The surge in pull-signals nearly overwhelmed existing supply 
capabilities and seriously complicated what was already a difficult transportation 
environment. The largely successful evacuation of several metropolitan areas reduced 
population risk effectively. It is worth considering whether the evacuation would have 
been as successful if Harvey had not so recently demonstrated potential outcomes. Will 
the next evacuation order benefit from what Floridians have seen transpire in Puerto 
Rico?
San Juan: Very Hard Hit
The entire island of Puerto Rico is smaller than the Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-West Palm Beach 
Metropolitan Statistical Area. The population of the U.S. Commonwealth is 3.4 million, with 
about 2.3 million concentrated in the San Juan metropolitan area. The density of this urban 
expanse is roughly 5,100 persons per square mile. Most of Puerto Rico’s supplies arrive into 
the Port of San Juan from Port of Jacksonville, Florida (1,300 miles).
On September 20, Maria struck Puerto Rico as a high-end Category 5 hurricane. The storm 
encompassed the entire island with sustained winds above 60 miles per hour and gusts of 
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up to 118 miles per hour. In some areas, rainfall exceeded 35 inches in less than 48 hours. 
The death toll remains uncertain.14
The electrical grid of Puerto Rico was fragile before Maria hit. Financial problems at the 
electric power authority resulted in many years of delayed maintenance and other 
debilitating issues. The storm seriously damaged the transmission network connecting 
generation facilities in the south to the metro-San Juan area.15 In the three weeks following 
the storm, no more than 16 percent of electrical customers were reconnected to the grid 
and restoration one day could be followed by loss of power the next day. Lack of available 
funds and credit seriously constrained pre-deployment of response and recovery assets.
Given the long-time fragility and unreliability of the Puerto Rican electric grid, an extensive 
collection of private diesel and gasoline generators was in place. Many individual homes 
and commercial establishments were prepared to supply basic electrical needs (e.g. 
refrigeration, pumping, check-out) for several hours or up to a few days. Many hotels feature 
complete power plants. But this back-up capacity depends on a refueling capability that did 
not anticipate simultaneous island-wide demand. Even in early October 2017 it was widely 
acknowledged that substantive grid restoration would require at least 100 days and much 
longer for remote locations.16
In its September 21 Hurricane Maria Status Summary, the Federal Communications 
Commission reported, “Overall, 95.2% of cell sites are out of service. All counties in Puerto 
Rico have greater than 75% of their cell sites out of service. 48 out of the 78 counties in 
Puerto Rico have 100% of their cell sites out of service.” Three weeks later the FCC reported, 
“76.1% (down from 77.6% yesterday) of the cell sites are out of service. 14 (down from 15 
yesterday) out of the 78 counties in Puerto Rico have 100% of their cell sites down.” The FCC 
estimated that by October 12, roughly 60 percent of the Puerto Rican population had access 
to wireless communications.17 Recovery of the wireless network was complicated both by 
damage to towers and by the island-wide loss of the grid.18 
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Maria, the transportation network in Puerto 
Rico was seriously disrupted by debris in roadways, flooding, bridges lost, landslides, and 
other impediments. In most of metro-San Juan one week later, most debris had been 
cleared and the urban network was operational.19 But in mid-October the Commonwealth’s 
Department of Transportation identified 27 impassable primary or secondary roads and 
550 transportation impediments, including 17 damaged major bridges, needing quick repair. 
Outside the metro-San Juan area some of these impediments cut off neighborhoods and 
communities from any delivery of supplies. 
In late September, several tropical storms with heavy rains exacerbated damage to 
infrastructure that Maria had already hit hard. Especially in the mountainous interior of 
Puerto Rico, landslides and flooding undid road repairs and created new impediments to 
surface transportation networks.20
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Figure 1: Major Road Impediments as of September 28 (FEMA and the New York Times). Red 
line is the path of Hurricane Maria’s eye.
Significant disruption of these three key critical infrastructures – power, telecommunications, 
and the transportation network – seriously complicated the resilience of Puerto Rico’s supply 
and demand networks. The telecommunications network’s dependence on the grid made 
it almost impossible for consumers to express demand effectively using credit or debit or 
Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards. 
Ninety-six percent of Puerto Ricans depend on the public water utility. The Puerto Rico 
Aqueduct and Sewage Authority (PRASA) operates 246 wells and 126 water treatment 
facilities.21 In the first week following landfall, roughly 45 percent of customers had water 
service restored largely because of either gravity feeds or existing back-up generation for 
pumping. Boiling tap water for drinking purposes was sometimes needed but difficult given 
the lack of electricity. By October 6, 55.5 percent of customers had water services restored. 
This addition was facilitated by repairs and new backup generation. One month after the 
September 20 landfall, 69.5 percent of customers were receiving water from the system (90 
percent of San Juan-Metro area customers).
Because of the compromised quality of public water and the number of customers without 
access to the water system, demand for bottled water surged in the weeks after Maria’s 
impact. Prior to the storm, the bottled water market in Puerto Rico was mostly supplied by 
local producers, especially Coca-Cola, Pepsico, and Cristalia. These local suppliers indicated 
that demand had doubled.22 As of October 18, FEMA alone had delivered over 23.6 million 
liters (6.2 million gallons) of bottled and bulk water sourced both on and off the island.23
Prior to Hurricane Maria there were 471 supermarkets in Puerto Rico, about one for every 
7500 persons.24 In the first week after landfall, many grocery stores did not open. Lack of 
electricity and absent employees were the principal concerns. As those stores with back-up 
power reopened, lack of resupply became an increasing concern. Most food products arrive 
at the Port of San Juan via ocean-going barge, originating at the Port of Jacksonville, Florida.25 
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Crowley, Tote, and Trailer Bridge are the principal shippers. As with the rest of the island, 
dock operations depended on back-up power and several cranes sustained considerable 
damage. But there was not significant storm surge. Containers already landed survived with 
their products and dock operations restarted over the first weekend after the storm. 
Significant foodstocks were available on the docks and continued to be received at or above 
the typical flow. But during the first week after landfall, fewer trucks than usual arrived to 
pull containers off the dock and distribute food or other products into the retail sector. By 
the end of September, many grocery stores were severely low on food stocks and concerns 
were rising regarding how people would be fed. On September 29, the Governor of Puerto 
Rico announced, “[w]e have taken the initiative today to call all elements of the private sector 
to tell them that they must move the containers, or we are going to buy them and move 
them quickly and distribute them throughout Puerto Rico.” The government probably did 
not have the legal authority or the functional capability to do this, but this rhetoric suggests 
how even nine days after landfall, distribution/delivery capacity was not fully – or sufficiently 
– operating.26
It now seems that trucking operations were delayed by several actions, none of which were 
originally focused on truckers or trucking per se. All are in one way or another related to 
retail supplies of gasoline and diesel fuel.
The widespread use of generators created a demand surge for fuel that exceeded the 
capability of the fuel distribution network to deliver.27 Prior to Maria’s impact, the distribution 
network had never needed to supply the full set of private generators simultaneously. Post-
event demand for diesel has been about 5 times pre-event.28 Even if every pre-existing fuel 
tanker had been operating twenty-four hours a day, there was not sufficient capacity to 
meet this unprecedented demand. Transportation impediments and other complications 
also reduced existing delivery capabilities.
To better balance supply and demand of fuel, two measures were taken: 1) an official 
nighttime curfew was put in place that disallowed most retail operations but was meant to 
allow wholesale distribution29 and 2) many fuel retailers imposed an informal quota on the 
purchase of fuel. 
Unfortunately, the curfew was initially misunderstood as restricting all operations (and, in 
any case, nighttime deliveries were discouraged by lack of lights). The quota system was 
even more troublesome. These informal quotas were often set at $10-to-$15, which would 
not fill most trucks. The quotas resulted in consumers constantly returning to refill their 
cars and fuel containers for private generators, creating huge lines. Both the quotas and 
the resulting lines discouraged – and arguably, did not allow – many truckers to refuel. A 
significant number of truckers stayed home even after the ports had reopened and many 
roads had been cleared. Otherwise they risked being stranded out-of-fuel.
Once the sales quota on fuel for vehicles was made illegal30 and the curfew was curtailed 
and clarified, trucks began operating at levels comparable to before September 20. Between 
September 30 and October 15, port operations steadily improved and were quickly at 80 
percent of pre-event normal, as well as handling the increased through-put of arriving 
FEMA supplies.31 Once trucking operations substantively restarted – during the first week in 
October – most aspects of the grocery supply network in Puerto Rico restarted. One month 
after landfall 417 of 471 grocery outlets had reopened.
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But a full month after landfall a key element of the demand network continued to be disrupted. 
More than 40 percent of Puerto Ricans depend on an Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) 
card to purchase most of the food they consume. The EBT card requires telecommunication 
capabilities that in most cases were not available in the immediate aftermath of Maria. Before 
September 20 about 2500 retail locations processed the Nutritional Assistance Program EBT 
card (also known as the Family Card or PAN card for Programa de Asistencia Nutricional). 
On October 20, only 983 or 39 percent of these retailers were open and able to conduct 
transactions with the PAN card. Outside the San Juan metropolitan area, the percentage of 
retail outlets accepting the PAN card was even smaller.
Up to 1.3 million people had their ability to express demand for food reduced by sixty-
percent or more. Grocery stores that could not transact PAN payments lost that portion of 
their usual cash-flow. Over the same period costs increased, especially costs associated with 
maintaining generator power. Price freezes on several food products were legally imposed 
September 3 in anticipation of Hurricane Irma and were continued.32 This combination of 
reduced demand, increased costs, and the inability to increase prices put many grocery 
stores at risk of failure. 
Adding to this suppression of retail grocery resilience, the Commonwealth and Federal 
governments launched an ambitious effort to supply all Puerto Ricans with relief supplies 
of water and food. On October 19, FEMA indicated it had distributed “more than 600,000 
meals a day..., more than 10 million liters of bottled water, and more than 3.6 million gallons 
of potable bulk water.”33 Given the inability of many PAN card holders to purchase groceries, 
this is obviously life-saving work. But it also reflects a loss of cash-flow that otherwise would 
have sped the recovery of the grocery sector in Puerto Rico (and probably competes for 
shipping into Puerto Rico). By October 23, 93 percent of PAN beneficiaries were making 
transactions with their EBT card.34
Between September 20, 2018 and February 1, 2018, FEMA and its mass care partners 
distributed over 60 million meals in Puerto Rico. While an enormous and helpful gap-filling 
service, this represented roughly four to six percent of total calories consumed. Survivors 
of Maria continued to be fed – primarily – by the preexisting grocery supply chain operating 
under profound operational and financial duress.35
Potential Strategic Implications of Maria
1. Preexisting network dependencies and interdependencies matter. Prior to Maria, the Puerto 
Rican electrical grid was unreliable, as a result a large and widely-distributed set of private 
electrical generation capability was already in place. The preexisting water system was 
fragmented and inefficient; after the event, this negative arguably became a positive. 
The interface between the port and on-island distribution hubs was complicated and 
recovery was delayed by heretofore “hidden” network elements.
2. Distance and other impediments to the flow of re-supply matter. Perhaps the most 
serious and longest-lasting challenge to many supply chains was reestablishment of a 
predictable – and accurately demand-reflecting – flow of supply. The “pipeline” from 
Port of Jacksonville to Port of San Juan surged, but given the wide array of disruptions, 
this surge often reflected wild guesses related to actual demand causing a long-term 
bullwhip effect across many supply chains.
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3. Persistence of pre-existing supply and demand networks matters. The grid was down. 
Telecommunications was spotty or non-existent. It required several weeks for fuel 
distribution to reach an equilibrium with demand, but – somehow – within two weeks 
the grocery network was mostly operational. Especially important was the ability of 
consumers to express demand – using both cash and non-cash financial signals. If this 
had not happened, the crisis would have been significantly amplified.
Preliminary Impressions Related To 
Systemic Outcomes
The complexity of Harvey, Irma, and Maria cannot be captured in ten pages. But this outline 
may point to opportunities for more detailed study and analysis, especially related to the 
network effects of supply and demand in these three crises. When the focus of attention 
is narrowed to Houston, Miami, and San Juan, these were three very different events. But 
substantial coherence can be found in how supply and demand networks behaved. This 
analysis has produced three high-level – mostly unsurprising – take-aways. 
1. Where and when the grid persists, resilience tends to abide. The greater the scope of 
grid failure (both in terms of time and space), the greater the challenge to Supply Chain 
Resilience. 
2. Especially if there has been grid failure, the survival and continued operation of “super-
nodes” within supply networks becomes even more important (examples of super-nodes 
include: water treatment and pumping facilities, fuel storage and distribution facilities, 
docks and other especially large network junctions such as distribution centers).
3. Even when system capacity has survived an extreme event, the continued capability of 
the road network, fuel network, trucks and truckers become especially important for 
supply capacity to be meaningfully deployed into demand.
There are also some emerging lessons-learned related to how demand is expressed (or 
the implications when demand cannot be effectively expressed). These outcomes are 
more complicated than what can be captured in one or two sentences and are given more 
attention below.
In considering systemic outcomes, it is worth noting that preexisting systems in Texas, 
Florida, and Puerto Rico – all in densely populated areas featuring vast interdependencies 
– are mostly not the product of systematic planning and design. These complex realities 
emerge incrementally over-time, usually from the accumulation of individual decisions that 
are, from a systems perspective, random. The interdependent “structures” described below 
have, for the most part, not been carefully designed to achieve Supply Chain Resilience. 
Rather, they have emerged through trial, error, and learning specific to time, place, and 
thousands of sometimes contradictory purposes. Reflecting these preconditions, one set of 
structures is differentiated from others and more or less resilient to particular threats. But 
as a system this is much less the outcome of human intention than the flux of a complex 
adaptive system interacting with its environment.36
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Force on Target
The force that hit Houston was heavy but comparatively slow. Miami itself received a glancing 
blow. What hit San Juan was heavy and fast. In each case, targets included the electrical grid, 
telecommunications, road networks, and much more. Recognizing these force differentials 
can be crucial to framing an appropriate response strategy.
In classical physics, force is equal to mass multiplied by acceleration. Measuring hurricanes – 
and potentially other extreme events – by terajoules or by geographic scope (not quite mass, 
but indicative) and speed (wind, seismic waves, blast effects, etc.) can offer a helpful way to 
more clearly contrast events.37 When Harvey made landfall at Rockport it was measured 
at 28 terajoules, then dramatically lost speed, becoming almost stationery over Houston 
to Beaumont, and dropping 30 to 60 inches of rain. When Irma made landfall on the Gulf 
Coast of Florida, it was measured at 100 terajoules, quickly lost considerable speed over 
less populated central Florida, and kept moving north where it briefly dropped Harvey-like 
rainfall totals on Northeast Florida. When Maria made landfall at Yabucoa, it was the strongest 
hurricane to hit Puerto Rico since 1928. Sustained winds were measured at up to 155 miles 
per hour; wind gusts of more than 110 miles per hour encompassed the entire island for 
over thirty hours, and rain fell about one-inch per hour in many locations. Observations 
were not as precise for Maria (National Weather Service radar was lost in the hurricane), but 
a rough measure of up to 116 terajoules at landfall in Puerto Rico has been suggested.38
In each of these three extreme events, the force expended by the hurricane was very 
significant at specific points in time and space. But only in one case did the event’s full force 
encompass essentially the entire network supporting a population of 3.4 million people.  
For over three days, flooding in Houston largely eliminated the road network. Harvey’s force 
threatened similar disruption to the local water network, which just barely survived. But 
electrical and telecom networks continued to operate and the extended regional – even 
continental – networks for these critical infrastructures and most key supply chains were not 
seriously impacted by Harvey. Once the flood waters drained, these surrounding networks 
“flooded” Houston with resources, some desperately needed and others not so much.39
Miami may have been within 12-to-18 hours of not being resupplied in the aftermath of Irma. 
But the capability gaps opened by grid and fuel disruption were filled in time by resources 
comparatively close at hand. While Miami may be more a dense network appendage than 
a connecting node, there are robust connections to truly dense nodes at Orlando and 
Jacksonville and Atlanta.
The island of Puerto Rico is a very different target because it is a very different network. 
Where Houston is deeply embedded in a network of networks, San Juan is the dense node 
in a fairly thin and largely separate network. Miami is 236 miles by truck from Orlando; 
San Juan is 1300 miles by sea from Jacksonville. Harvey and Irma seriously disrupted pieces 
of very large interdependent networks. On Puerto Rico, Maria disrupted, and sometimes 
destroyed, much of an isolated network. The distance of San Juan’s network from similar 
networks, combined with the density of population depending on the network, significantly 
increased the risk of catastrophic consequences. Less than 50 miles separate the San Juan 
docks from survivors in the mountains, but access was often treacherous.
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Figure 2: Spatial comparison of the three events
If the force of Hurricane Maria had hit similar targets in Houston or Miami or Tampa, certainly 
the preconditions in each of these places would have produced different results. It is also true 
that Maria hit San Juan with roughly 4-times the energy as Harvey-at-Landfall. The differential 
was even greater by the time Harvey was over Houston. Regardless of preconditions, when 
this kind of force hits any dense urban area with its web of interdependencies, the outcomes 
will be ugly.
Critical Infrastructure as Target
The US Department of Homeland Security identifies sixteen critical infrastructures.40 In 
thinking about Supply Chain Resilience, it can be helpful to differentiate between “content-
agnostic” infrastructures and “content-committed” supply chains. Both can be understood 
as infrastructure – meaning underlying (sometimes hidden) structures on which achieving 
purposes depends – but some infrastructure is committed to specific purposes while other 
infrastructure facilitates multiple purposes. 
Given this framework, electrical power, telecommunications, and road systems are content-
agnostic, facilitating the movement of many kinds of content. Water and fuel systems 
are content-committed. The food network is content-committed but ecumenical. The 
same functionalities that move food may also move bottled water and cleaning supplies 
and, sometimes, bags of charcoal, paper products, baby diapers, and much more. The 
pharmaceutical supply chain, in contrast, is much more parochial even when it is delivering 
to a grocery store. Medical goods distributors are nearly as ecumenical as food supply chains. 
More attention is given below to trucking (is it content-committed or content-agnostic?).
In all three extreme events, these networks were threatened. In the case of Harvey-in-
Houston, while the grid and telecommunications largely persisted, actual movement of 
goods was temporarily halted by the road network being flooded. In Florida, power outages 
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meant truck stops could not pump fuel, threatening supplies of bottled water and groceries, 
but continued persistence of telecommunications allowed this problem to be identified, 
prioritized, and solved in the nick of time.41
The quick recovery of supply chains in Houston was allowed by sufficient robustness – 
resistance to change – embedded in the design and construction of the urban highway 
network. The effective response in Florida was enabled by significant investment in the 
robustness of the electrical transmission network.42 This prior investment in mitigation 
allowed for more timely attention to specific distribution problems, such as reconnecting 
power to truck-stops on I-95. In either case, would these networks have been as effective 
resisting four-times the force-on-target? What about eight-times force-on-target?
In Puerto Rico, the electrical grid was not robust.43 The long-term failure of the grid disrupted 
fuel distribution, delayed full recovery of telecommunications, and complicated use of EBT 
cards at grocery stores, among many more troubles. Without a reliable fuel network, pushing 
supplies became much more difficult. Without the ability to use EBT (and other) cards, 
demand-pull was seriously muted and thereby reduced. But despite long-term problems with 
content-agnostic infrastructures, even in Puerto Rico, content-committed infrastructures – 
especially supply chains – were able to demonstrate considerable resilience. For example, 
five weeks after Hurricane Maria’s hard-hit on all of Puerto Rico, less than 30 percent of 
the electrical grid had been restored and only 42 percent of cell sites were functional. But 
80 percent of water customers were being served; over 80 percent of gas stations were 
operating; 90 percent of grocery stores were open, and most were accepting EBT, debit and 
credit cards for transactions.44
Given the failure of the Puerto Rican electrical grid, the resilience of the Puerto Rican water 
system might surprise many water-system operators. But the design – perhaps more 
accurately, the non-design – of the Puerto Rican water system is key to this advantage. Unlike 
many urban systems, the Puerto Rican water network depends on many sources – 246 wells 
and 126 water treatment facilities – nearly half of which allow for gravity distribution and 
require sufficiently modest pumping operations that can be supplied by commercial off-
the-shelf back-up generation. The lack of a centralized source and the diversity of system 
components continued to operate in the way many contemporary (and more efficient) 
water-systems would not.
A tantalizing implication emerging from Harvey, Irma, and Maria is that content-agnostic 
infrastructures especially benefit from robust engineered systems that minimize the 
risk of disruption, while content-committed infrastructures benefit more from diversity, 
adaptability, and – in a word – resilience.  If this impression is confirmed with more rigorous 
analysis, it could have significant impacts on mitigation measures and response strategy.45
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“Super-Nodes” as target
Over time large networks tend to be characterized by increasing concentration or what is 
sometimes called network centrality. The greater a network’s centrality, typically the more 
efficient the network’s flow.  Li et al. note, 
[i]n modern society, lives depend more and more on infrastructure networks, such as the 
power grid, Internet, transportation networks and the financial networks, and so forth. 
The overall efficiency of these network systems is being increased, while the internal 
connections and the dynamical characteristics within the networks are becoming more 
close and complex. These behaviours make the networks more vulnerable and increase 
the possibility of system crash.46
In the case of Harvey, Irma, and Maria it was possible to observe this vulnerability playing 
out in real time and space. In both Houston and Miami, the risk of a cascading failure often 
seemed imminent, yet was mostly avoided. In the case of San Juan, a cascading failure 
was experienced. But even in San Juan – and in Miami and Houston – the persistence and 
resilience of key “super-nodes” kept the human consequences from being much worse. 
 Under Harvey’s sustained impact, at least three super-nodes in the Houston metropolitan 
region experienced considerable duress. Nearly forty percent of Gulf Coast refining 
capacity—or about twenty percent of national capacity—was shut-down in advance of the 
hurricane. Even three weeks later, as Irma threatened Florida, only about half of this capacity 
had been reclaimed.47  
The ability to distribute refined product was also diminished when Colonial Pipeline 
experienced a loss of network integrity because of the unprecedented flooding. According 
to the Energy Information Administration, 
Colonial connects 29 refineries and 267 distribution terminals and carries up to 2.5 
million b/d of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel from Houston to as far north as New York 
Harbor. Colonial typically operates at or near full capacity, but as a result of Hurricane 
Harvey and the decreased supply of petroleum products available to ship, Colonial 
Pipeline briefly curtailed operations and shipped products intermittently before 
resuming operations at reduced rates of flow on September 6.48
A 2012 study of Houston’s infrastructure by the American Society of Civil Engineers gave 
the water system a passing Grade of C for resilience. The ASCE authors noted, “[s]hould a 
natural disaster occur, the current systems have made provisions after Hurricane Ike to back 
up water facilities with generators to maintain water supply to residents.”49 Harvey, however, 
was a disaster that exceeded any design target. According to several reports, at least one 
of the principal water treatment facilities was “within hours” of shutting down and much of 
its equipment was operating under water.50 In nearby Beaumont, the water system serving 
120,000 persons lost both its primary and secondary pumping stations to flooding.51 After 
about 48, hours the system was partially restored with extraordinary measures.52
As Irma churned up Florida’s Gulf Coast, many eyes were on the Port of Tampa and 
especially the Kinder-Morgan Fuel Terminal and associated Central Florida Pipeline.53 This 
is, essentially, a single point of failure for the fuel network serving the Tampa-Clearwater-
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St. Petersburg and Orlando metropolitan areas. Early weather forecasts suggested the 
possibility of destructive storm surge. It did not happen. The Port of Tampa, including Kinder-
Morgan, experienced very little disruption. But some pointed out this was mostly just a 
random case of “meteorological luck.”54 It could easily have been much worse. In 2016 the 
risk assessment firm Core Logic estimated that storm surge comparable to that produced by 
Hurricane Katrina would flood over 450,000 homes and cause over $80 billion in damages 
in Tampa alone.55 Irma did not hit this target with its greatest force. The fuel terminals at 
Port Everglades north of Miami are as crucial to South Florida as Kinder-Morgan is to Central 
Florida. Similar risks apply to both super-nodes.
Puerto Rico sources the vast majority of groceries, pharmaceuticals, medical goods, and fuel 
products from off the island. Eighty-four percent of all in-bound shipments move through 
the Port of San Juan.56 Maria moved across the island on September 20-21. The Coast Guard 
reopened the Port of San Juan on Saturday, September 23.57 Supplies were being unloaded 
that same day. Despite early worries otherwise, there has always been sufficient water, food, 
and fuel in Puerto Rico to meet demand. It has not always been possible to distribute and 
deliver supplies when and where needed, but the resources have been available. The quick 
recovery of the Port of San Juan allowed for sustained replenishment of supplies. This is 
despite loss of electricity and other severe complications resulting from Hurricane Maria. A 
very tough story would have been even more difficult if the Port of San Juan had been lost. 
There are other super-nodes related to each of these extreme events. The previous are only 
a few examples of a suggested type, and in the case of H.I.M. are perceived as “near-misses.”
In each of these examples, loss of a super-node can have an amplified effect across several 
networks by reducing the fundamental capacity of the system. To a greater or lesser degree, 
recognizing a super-node acknowledges there are network junctions where otherwise distinct 
content-movements are deeply interconnected. Nine weeks after Harvey hit Houston, fuel 
prices in Puerto Rico were roughly 16 cents per gallon higher because of the slow recovery 
of Gulf Coast refineries.58 Sustained loss of the Port of San Juan or the Port of Tampa or the 
Port of Jacksonville would have had cascading effects across any supply chain depending 
on fuel for distribution or delivery, which is to say all of them. In the case of the Port of San 
Juan, the fundamental capacity to receive almost any product – food, pharmaceuticals, fuel 
– would have been seriously reduced without recovery of the port. Replacement of this huge 
share of capacity, at least for a system as densely populated as Puerto Rico, seems very 
unlikely. The super-node either survives or the population does not.
Ted Lewis has observed, 
[c]omplex networks evolve over time and tend to transform (re-wire) themselves, 
evolving from random interconnections to structured interconnections that increase 
the likelihood of cascade failures. In general, the transformation increases the overall 
number of links (percolation), the number of links connecting a favored node (hub), 
and the number of paths running through a favored node or link (betweeness). As a 
consequence, the number of nodes impacted by a failure in one node is magnified by 
percolation, hub size, and betweeness size. As these networks evolve, they increase 
the self-organized criticality of the network itself, which increases its overall risk of 
cascade failure – both the likelihood and size of the collapse in terms of affected 
nodes and links.59
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Harvey, Irma, and Maria each – in a different way – point to the value of pre-identifying these 
crucial nodes and links.
Population Behavior
Contemporary supply chains depend on receiving accurate – and reasonably coherent – 
expressions of demand. These are sometimes called “pull-signals” inasmuch as supply is 
pulled toward the sources of demand. For most major U.S. retailers and their distributors, 
demand is algorithmically monitored at the point-of-sale and orders reflect near real-time 
shifts in inventory.
The prospect of extreme events – such as blizzards and hurricanes – generates historically 
predictable permutations in pull-signals. In advance of hurricane season, extra stocks of 
bottled water, batteries and other emergency supplies are pre-deployed to distribution 
centers in anticipation of demand spikes. But as was seen in Houston, Miami, and San Juan, 
at certain volumes a demand surge will always “break” the supply chain. This happens most 
often when distribution capabilities are not able to match an initial wave of demand. When 
consumers see empty shelves or other signals that suggest supply is uncertain, this often 
prompts a category-bursting feeding frenzy. Actual shortage of supply is a much rarer event. 
In the aftermath of Harvey, there was considerable gasoline hoarding in a wide area of East 
Texas. Given the uncertainty associated with refineries coming back online, the behavior was 
predictable. It was nonetheless troublesome and it deepened what was a slight diminution 
of actual supply. Writing in Forbes, Michael Lynch explains, 
[c]onsumers fearing gasoline shortages rush to fill up their tanks. That, in turn, creates 
gasoline lines and removes millions of barrels of gasoline from retail storage (gas 
stations) to consumer storage (vehicle tanks). This can overwhelm the retail sector’s 
ability to replenish inventories as well as cope with the surge in customers.60
There are only so many fuel tankers and the miles between tank farms and gas stations 
remain the same. A refueling route entirely sufficient for 1x demand will never be sufficient 
for 2x or more. A huge spike in demand will cause individual retail locations to run-out 
between deliveries and reinforce the sense of uncertainty that motivates the hoarding.61
The dramatic events of Harvey-in-Houston clearly influenced the behavior of Floridians 
when two weeks later Irma was forecast to hit even harder. The entire week prior to Irma’s 
landfall was a battle of distributors trying (and mostly failing) to meet sharp increases in 
demand for almost everything on a grocery shelf. Because of Labor Day Monday, demand 
may have peaked earlier than usual, putting the supply chain behind from the beginning. 
But the tsunami of demand was also the result of Irma’s size and projected power. Only two 
days before landfall there were entirely credible forecasts62 that suggested an impending 
statewide catastrophe. Some grocery distributors told their retail clients to “turn off 
your computers,” otherwise inventory algorithms would anticipate the continuation of 
indiscriminate hoarding behavior and overwhelm the network. Stores were told to place 
manual orders for essentials.63
The increased demand for fuel in Florida was less a matter of uncertainty and hoarding than 
the result of millions of Floridians simultaneously driving north to escape Irma. Similarly, in 
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Puerto Rico there was a fundamental uptick in demand for diesel fuel. As noted above, the 
fuel needed to energize the sudden and simultaneous use of private back-up generators 
was probably 500 percent of pre-hurricane demand. This sort of sustained spike in demand 
would overwhelm most supply chains, and certainly an isolated network serving an island. 
Puerto Rico’s seeming demand-shift for food was less dramatic, yet if anything, more 
treacherous. Need for food did not decline. But forty percent of the population could not 
express demand when they could not use their PAN EBT cards. These pull-signals suddenly 
disappeared along with dial tones and cell sites. What could the algorithms or store managers 
(or emergency managers) do with this silence?
The contemporary supply chain has been organized to reflect population behavior. Sudden 
changes in population behavior can complicate – even confuse – supply chains.  In the case 
of Harvey, Irma, and Maria, however, the dramatic shifts in pull-signals were all “predictable 
surprises.”64 
We know when, where, and how demand is expressed. We know how these expressions 
pull supply. We know how demand is influenced by uncertainty. We can know (even if we 
do not always know) how extreme events physically disrupt supply and demand networks. 
We have an increasing understanding of how these disruptions influence population 
perceptions. Depending on the operational context, we have several options for mitigating 
the perception of uncertainty and overcoming the physical challenges to effective operation 
of post-disaster supply and demand networks. In Harvey, Irma, and Maria, supply chain 
owners and operators and others interested in supply chain resilience were often surprised 
by population behavior. It is possible to be less surprised.
Availability of Trucks, Truckers, and Fuel
In each of these extreme events, the delivery of groceries, pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, 
fuel, bottled water, and much more usually depended on someone driving a truck. This is 
often referenced as the last-mile problem. 
For Houston it was the problem of trucks from San Antonio (200 miles) and Dallas (240 miles) 
being able to deliver. In the crucial 48 hours after Irma’s passing, the 350 miles between 
Jacksonville and Miami was where lack of fuel almost stopped the Northern Fleet from 
delivering into Southern Florida. For nearly a week after Maria, many were complaining that 
truckers had not returned to work in Puerto Rico. But what some seemed to suggest was a 
character problem, has since seemed more likely a problem with fuel,  demand expression, 
storage capacity,  port-accessibility, and other impediments that could have been more 
effectively addressed if recognized earlier in the process.
Resilience is often the outcome of self-organization and adaptability.65 Truckers and trucks 
depend on engineered systems. Highways must survive and be passable. Re-fueling must be 
possible. The operational requirements of these engineered systems require considerable 
robustness – resistance to change. In earthquake country, highways should sway a bit. Fuel 
pipelines should feature some flexible joints. But mostly, we want these infrastructures to 
be conserved to facilitate the creativity of truck-drivers to find what has survived, where 
there is (potentially unexpressed) demand, and how to get stuff from where it is to where it 
is needed.66
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If Houston, Miami, and San Juan are good case studies, truckers are premier agents of 
resilience.
The closer a piece in the network gets to trucks and truckers, the more resilient it needs 
to be to optimize their resilience. Truck stops – preexisting or post-hoc – are key to “re-
fueling” both trucks and truckers. In Florida the feeding and other biological requirements of 
truckers were seriously complicated by over-crowding of truck-stops during the evacuation 
and loss of power in the aftermath.
It is, however, possible to over-estimate the flexibility of truckers and trucks. This retrieves 
the issue raised above related to content-agnostic or content-committed infrastructures. To 
those outside looking in, trucks can seem content-agnostic (like the grid), the same trailer 
can carry groceries or many pharmaceuticals or medical goods or waste paper or a wide 
range of products. 
But most trucks and trailers and their drivers spend most of their time content-committed. It 
might be a different trailer, but the same truck and usually the same driver makes the same 
recurring run to a certain set of delivery locations. This commitment enhances creativity in 
case of disaster. Truckers know their local context well-enough to adapt to sudden changes. 
But a freezer unit is bad for fresh produce. A flatbed is non-optimal for fresh seafood. A 53-
foot trailer is not well-suited for the narrow streets of Old San Juan. Not every truck has a 
contract or security clearance to pick-up at the port. A dry van will never deliver bulk fuel. In 
desperation, some in Puerto Rico were trying to convert trucks that vacuum out septic tanks 
to deliver diesel fuel. This unlikely attempt at re-use may demonstrate both the adaptability 
and the content-commitment of trucking. There is a predisposition to resilience, but trucking 
is much more content-committed (like a water system) than content agnostic (like the grid).
The potential capacity for post-disaster response would be significantly enhanced if there 
were a way for trucks to become more content-agnostic. There were lots of trucks available 
in Puerto Rico the first week after Maria. But most of them do not  call regularly at the Port 
of San Juan, and most are not usually involved in delivering groceries or water and certainly 
not relief goods. In any case, most of them could not get the fuel they needed to deliver 
anything.
Given the essential role of trucks, truckers, and fuel to serving survivors of a catastrophic 
event, how well are these network-players understood? Can some of these predictable 
issues be engaged in advance? How can the resilience – adaptability and self-organization – 
of these diverse agents-of-resilience best be enhanced?
Slouching toward Catastrophe?
Texas is not Florida, and neither of them are Puerto Rico. Harvey, Irma, and Maria were each 
very different beasts. Yet all three were hurricanes. All impacted dense urban areas and 
much less populated exurban stretches. There were several entirely comparable network 
effects.
The Monday, August 28 front page of USA Today declared Harvey-in-Houston a catastrophe. 
The same designation has been used for the Florida Keys and most – if not all – of Puerto 
Rico. In each place the consequences continued to unfold weeks after the precipitating event.
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Is it meaningful to label each a catastrophe? 
In Houston, local language tends toward “back to business.” In the Keys, “resilience” may 
be a bit more common. In Puerto Rico, there are many references to “nueva normalidad” 
(new normal). Do these point to meaningful distinctions? If so, do the comparable network 
effects help explain the language differences? Which network connections, dependencies, 
and interdependencies held? Which ones failed? Which network elements persisted despite 
failures all around the and why? 
When things fall apart, can we show how? When darkness drops again, can we better 
understand how to reclaim the light? Can we help the center hold? And if the center implodes, 
is there a better way to pick up the pieces?
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of storefronts remained closed for two to three days as electricity was restored. But those locations that were 
operating – often on generator power — were fully stocked and effectively re-supplied.  By design or accident 
this “re-sizing” of the retail network allowed distribution/delivery assets to meet demand, avoid sending 
signals of uncertainty, and prevent hoarding behavior.
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64  Michael Watkins and Max Bazerman, “Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen 
Coming,” Harvard Business Review, 2003.
65  Philip J. Palin, “Supply Chain Resilience: Diversity+Self-organization =Adaptation,” Homeland Security Affairs 
9, No. 14, (August 2013).
66  Given the creativity, adaptability, and self-organization required in extreme events, I worry about the – 
now apparently inevitable – development of autonomous vehicles as the core of mid-century trucking fleets. 
This sounds like another optimization setting-up catastrophic cascades.
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Abstract
Measuring things that do not occur, such as “deterred” or “prevented” terrorist attacks, 
can be difficult. Efforts to establish meaningful risk-based performance metrics and 
performance evaluation frameworks based on such metrics, for government agencies with 
counterterrorism missions, are arguably in a nascent state. However, by studying program 
theory, logic models, and performance evaluation theory, as well as studying how risk, 
deterrence, and resilience concepts may be leveraged to support antiterrorism efforts, one 
may propose a framework for a logic model or other performance evaluation approach. 
Such a framework may integrate these concepts to help proxy performance measurement 
for agencies with prevention and/or deterrence missions. This effort would not be without 
challenges.
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Introduction
Performance measurement is critical to effective government, as it is intended to help improve 
public management and program outcomes.1 Performance measurement, when properly 
done, operationalizes abstract goals, specifies policies, and informs management decisions. 
However, certain government functions and missions are difficult to measure.2 Specifically, 
adversarial missions such as antiterrorism and law enforcement which center on prevention 
and/or deterrence may make useful performance evaluation challenging. Therefore, this 
essay will examine considerations for performance evaluation frameworks that may be 
useful for assessing agency prevention or deterrence missions. Intended audiences of 
this research include program managers, performance analysts, policy evaluators, budget 
analysts, and Congressional budget oversight committees. 
Context
Risk management is a critical aspect of CIKR (critical infrastructure/key resources) protection 
efforts for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Risk management may encompass 
efforts to deter attacks thus reducing threat, protect CIKR thus reducing vulnerability, and 
increase CIKR resilience thereby reducing consequence. It may also entail simultaneous 
execution of such efforts. Threat is the likelihood that an attack occurs, and that likelihood 
includes attacker intent and attacker capability, estimated as probabilities.3 Vulnerability is 
the likelihood an attack is successful given that it is attempted.4 Consequence is the effects 
of an attack.5 
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Together, these three elements—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—can be combined 
to form a quantitative approximation of terrorist attack risk. Since performance metrics are 
also critical to effective government,6 the status of efforts to create meaningful performance 
evaluation systems for antiterrorism programs that specifically leverage risk metrics 
warrants review.
Importance
The New Public Management (NPM) framework of public administration focuses on 
outcomes instead of inputs and processes.7 This focus has been reaffirmed in the context of 
exploration of homeland security performance metrics. For example, some analysts claim 
that outcome-oriented performance management has increasingly supplanted output and 
process management.8 
If we believe that the outcome-oriented focus of NPM is still relevant today, despite the 
alternative theoretical framework of New Public Service (NPS) which prioritizes citizen 
engagement and inclusiveness (c.f. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015, p. 32), we must explore 
how to measure homeland security enterprise outcomes. However, as budgets continue to 
be constrained, efficiency is just as important as effectiveness. Therefore, a more holistic 
approach to agency performance evaluation should adopt measures that include resource 
inputs, activities, and accomplishments (outputs). 
Evaluating public agency resource inputs and activities helps with budgeting control and 
accountability. As agencies make “resource input” decisions in proposed budgets, those 
agencies can exercise some form of control over their programs. Control is one purpose of 
budgeting; it ensures tax dollars are used to accomplish budgeted objectives.9  Historically, 
“object budgeting”, or the itemization of expenditures on specific objects, served a control 
purpose.10 Therefore, the budgeting objective was to control line item expenditures.
Also, budgeting serves a management/efficiency approach.11 After strategic priorities and 
objectives are determined, budgeting helps achieve efficiencies in attaining those priorities 
by allocating limited financial resources. Thus, understanding the outputs that certain 
resource inputs and activities support helps agencies manage efforts to achieve their strategic 
objectives more efficiently. Since budgeting also serves a planning purpose,12 agencies 
must look at outcome trends to help justify out-year budgets, in support of long- term 
effectiveness. Existing “planning, programming, budgeting and execution” (PPBE) guidance 
may help agencies connect the dots between strategic agency priorities, resource needs, 
and resource constraints. For example, DHS’ FY2006 Congressional Budget Justification 
includes an overview of the goals of PPBE, which acknowledge fiscal constraints.13
Therefore, good fiscal management in public agency antiterrorism program administration 
warrants consideration of resource inputs, activities, accomplishments, and outcomes, 
with appropriate supporting metrics. Developing a theoretical framework integrating such 
considerations could be useful for agencies with prevention or deterrence-oriented missions. 
In that spirit, exploration of considerations for an appropriate risk-based performance 
measurement framework seems appropriate, so public agencies with CIKR protection 
responsibilities can continuously refine program execution and budgeting efforts.
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Research Goals
The following research questions can be posed to help shape and inform the research in 
support of such a framework.
1. What is the current state of literature that might inform performance evaluation 
frameworks for agencies with antiterrorism mandates, specifically including protecting 
CIKR? 
2. What are potential challenges to advancing performance evaluation frameworks, 
specifically with respect to incorporating risk terminology and risk theory? 
Such a research effort might explore areas of the literature including risk theory, performance 
measurement theory, program evaluation theory, and law enforcement metrics. Additionally, 
such effort may benefit from a review of ideas on how to integrate concepts from risk 
management, particularly deterrence, risk analysis, and resilience theory, into performance 
evaluation frameworks. We propose ideas on how to integrate these concepts at the end of 
the essay, in an appendix.
Expected Research Benefits
If we believe public agencies with CIKR protection responsibilities should continuously strive 
to improve program execution and budgeting efforts, such agencies could benefit from 
conceptual frameworks to develop and refine risk-based performance metrics to help defend 
their budgets. Research shows that motivation for using performance metrics includes 
assessing effectiveness and tracking expenditure allocation.14 Additionally, academics 
continue to explore ways to use quantitative data to promote better agency effectiveness 
and contain costs.15 
Literature Review
Existing Literature
Performance Measurement & Logic Model Theory. 
McLaughlin and Jordan identify two purposes for measuring program performance: 
communicating value to others/accountability, and program improvement.16 However, what 
are specific ways to facilitate these purposes? Greenfield et al. discuss the theory of logic 
models. Logic models are conceptual frameworks to communicate visually a simplified 
representation of a program’s activities, outputs, customers, and outcomes to internal 
and external audiences, and serve as planning tools.17 Therefore, logic models are one 
framework for managing communications and program improvement as advocated by 
McLaughlin and Jordan. Moreover, both McLaughlin and Jordan and Greenfield et al. offer 
detailed guidance to help logic model developers ensure those models are valuable. For 
instance, they recommend ensuring that if intermediate agency outcomes are achieved, 
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the end-state outcomes will reasonably follow.18 This speaks to establishing causation or 
correlation between elements of the logic model.
Risk & CIKR Protection – Theory. 
There is much research in the theoretical and applied aspects of risk management for 
homeland security missions. More specifically, there is a genre of literature that deals with 
risk theory as applied to CIKR protection. Taquechel and colleagues summarize some of the 
notable work in this literature in addition to offering their own insights.19 
Taquechel and colleagues offer that the intent probability component of threat can 
be influenced by agency activities that deter attacks by reducing vulnerability and/or 
consequence to attack, and such deterrence efforts can be quantified. Furthermore, they 
argue that CIKR vulnerabilities to exploitation by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or 
illicit materiel/personnel transfer can be modeled as logic networks, with implications for 
how analysts assess vulnerability or more specifically “exploitation susceptibility” of such 
networks. Additionally, Taquechel and colleagues propose that grants might be administered 
to help CIKR rebuild after an attack, but distributed as a pre-attack mitigation measure, 
based on network analysis of supply chain resilience. Other work in the areas of deterrence 
theory, risk analysis, and resilience includes that of Alderson et al., Cox, Dighe et al., Kahan 
et al., Jenelius et al., Lebow and Stein, Lewis, Morral and Jackson, and Vugrin et al.20 
Incorporating risk theory into performance evaluation poses an opportunity to discuss 
deterrence theory and adaptive adversary considerations as possible “moderator variables” 
influencing the nexus between intermediate and end-state agency outcomes.  Deterrence 
theory is multifaceted, but it can succinctly be described as the principle of “when an actor 
discourages aggression towards another actor, with the intended outcome that the former 
never has to respond to aggressive action by the latter.21” Furthermore, adaptive adversaries 
are those that can change their behavior or characteristics in response to prevention, 
protection, response, or recovery efforts.22 Adaptive adversary considerations and 
deterrence quantification are important for CIKR risk analysis,23 and Savitz et al. reinforce the 
idea of considering reactions of “other parties” in performance measurement.24 Therefore, 
the perceived effect of changes in adversary intent upon threat reduction metrics could be a 
valuable component of a logic model framework to integrate risk metrics with antiterrorism 
program performance evaluation. 
Anderson et al. claim that logic models help program managers map out “competing 
definitions of the determinants of a problem.”25 Since there are different theories about the 
underlying determinants of risk, in particular the ongoing debate over “static”, probabilistic-
based risk analysis vs the “dynamic” game theoretical/adaptive adversary approach espoused 
by the operations research community (c.f. Taquechel and Lewis, 2012, Taquechel, 2013), logic 
models may help visually conceptualize how both static and dynamic probabilities of attack 
could influence risk reduction effectiveness metrics for various antiterrorism activities.
Program theory and “complicated interventions”. 
Showing causality or even correlation between prevention/deterrence-oriented homeland 
security activities and ultimate risk reduction outcomes may be challenging. Rogers 
discusses the idea of complicated vs. complex/emergent programs. Complicated programs 
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are those with multiple components, whereas “complex” programs represent programs 
with “recursive causality” and tipping points.26 Therefore, logic models to describe complex 
programs may have inherent nonlinearities. Furthermore, Rogers mentions that the 
external environment, characteristics of clients, and overlapping programs could cause 
overconfidence in correlation estimates.27
In risk parlance, resilience is the “ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare 
for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption.”28 The definition of resilience also 
includes system recovery. Systems imply networks, and networks often display emergent 
phenomena.29 Therefore, if DHS must defend networks of CIKR, and not just individual 
infrastructures, performance metrics that incorporate resilience or consequence reduction 
may need to account for network emergent phenomena such as “self-organizing criticality”, 
wherein systems optimize for efficiency but possibly to the detriment of resilience. This 
speaks to Rogers’ claim of external influence on program performance, although network 
emergent phenomena often result from internal, “self-organizing” aspects of network 
evolution. Nonetheless, this is a “complexity” consideration for program evaluation. Self-
organized criticality may create a tipping point.
Applying performance measurement to programs that reduce consequence and increase 
resilience may be difficult. Specifically, Henstra claims that “one of the most formidable 
challenges facing local communities today is learning to apply the concepts and methods 
of performance measurement to disaster preparedness.”30 Cutter et al. add to the debate 
over this difficulty; they claim it is difficult to measure resilience in absolute terms and proxy 
variables may be needed.31 
Another consideration in the literature is that there are different types of logic models used 
in program theory. For example, “pipeline” logic models show a linear progression from 
inputs to activities to outputs, whereas “outcome chain” logic models may demonstrate 
outcomes where initial activities were not considered, and “realist matrix” logic models 
may model how interventions work differently for different groups in different situations.32 
If antiterrorism missions have inherent nonlinearities, especially when it comes to risk 
modeling, performance evaluators may benefit from different types of logic models.
Performance metrics in law enforcement and 
antiterrorism. 
Law enforcement metrics may inform development of counterterrorism metrics given 
the common “adversarial nature” of the two missions. Similarly, metric evaluation in law 
enforcement agencies can be challenging. For example, Braga and Bond discuss efforts to 
assess correlation between “hot-spot” policing activities and crime levels.33  Deterrence is 
another influence upon risk metrics in law enforcement, as it is in antiterrorism. In theory, 
policing preemptively may deter criminal or terrorist activity. However, from a logic model 
perspective, Brousselle and Champagne advise that logic analysis, the evaluation of a 
program’s underlying theory using available scientific knowledge, needs to establish that 
the means correlate to the desired ends.34 With deterrence theory, the notion that certain 
enforcement activities influenced the adversary’s “intent” can be a theoretical exercise, 
without direct evidence of causation. This can make logic model validation difficult.
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Another takeaway from Braga and Bond’s work is the importance of identifying special 
causal factors in a program with multiple dimensions.35 Since risk reduction is theoretically 
achieved by threat reduction activities, vulnerability reduction activities, consequence 
reduction activities, or a combination of the above, a performance evaluation framework 
should allow “individual activity” effect isolation, as well as “simultaneously executed activity” 
effect analysis. Nicholson-Crotty et al. caution against excessive information aggregation; 
they claim multiple detailed measures of the same concept are often preferable to one 
aggregate measure.36
However, aggregation might be valuable for different aspects of risk metrics. For instance, 
Ayyub claims the primary basis for evaluating resilience should include both aggregate 
measures of systems resilience as well as “segregated performance” of individual system 
components.37 If program managers want to model the effects of consequence-reducing 
activities upon residual risk (risk remaining after those activities are performed), they might 
consider both segregated consequence to individual CIKR, as well as aggregate network 
effects-based consequences to a CIKR system such as cascading failures. Keeney and Von 
Winterfeldt also advocate for metric aggregatibility, particularly with respect to whether 
program objectives are additive or multiplicative.38 For instance, the availability of a 
radiological detection device is one metric, and the device detection accuracy is another. 
The two detection program objectives in this case are multiplicative rather than additive.39 
Since risk analysis may be quantitative, determining whether metrics should be additive or 
multiplicative may be crucial.
Additional work with logic models and risk metrics in the antiterrorism world includes 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), a 
federal program to minimize radiological and nuclear terrorism risk to the U.S. This work 
evaluated GDNA program goals, objectives, and activities, the goals here being to minimize 
individual components of the risk equation: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Each 
goal had subordinate objectives.40 This study also evaluated results exclusive of costs to 
lower these risk equation components, instead saving those costs for cost-effectiveness 
analysis.41 
Previous work on analyzing risk reduction metrics vs cost effectiveness also separated costs 
from the “utility functions” or what outcomes prospective attackers would stand to gain 
from successful attacks. However, like Hilliard et al., those costs were used for return on 
investment analysis of different government strategies to deter prospective attackers (c.f. 
Taquechel and Lewis, 2012; Taquechel, Hollan, and Lewis, 2015; Taquechel and Lewis, 2016). 
This also speaks to the concept of “metric aggregatibility” emphasized in other work; here 
it made sense to segregate cost from performance effectiveness metrics, but this may not 
always be true.
Art of the Possible?
It may be possible to address the “problem” of developing a framework for risk-based 
performance evaluation in antiterrorism missions that specifically involve CIKR protection. 
Creating a logic model that incorporates activities, accomplishments and outcomes of 
such missions, and supporting those logic model elements with a variety of quantitative 
risk metrics, might advance solutions. Furthermore, it may be possible to evaluate the 
appropriate use of risk metrics based on their value in helping budget for an antiterrorism 
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program, based on principles of line item/cost center accountability, efficiency, and/or 
overall program effectiveness. Moreover, such a logic model may be able to capture the 
effects of quantifiable deterrence and network effects upon risk metrics, as well as other 
considerations from this literature review.
Literature Gaps
In light of the two identified research goals, and given this snapshot of “art of the possible”, 
a review of the literature identifies the following gaps. With respect to the first research 
goal, to our knowledge the literature does not explicitly discuss a theory or model of how 
antiterrorism activities, outputs, and outcomes might be organized within a performance 
evaluation framework, with supporting quantitative risk metrics, perhaps broken down 
by each component of the risk equation (threat, vulnerability, consequence). Hilliard et al. 
(2015) specifically discussed nuclear weapon risk in what might be termed a “logic model” 
framework, but future work might be generalized to all CIKR risk.
With respect to the second research goal, the literature has gaps in several areas. First, 
despite the claims of Anderson and Savitz et al.  that external influences must be accounted 
for and problems may have competing interpretations, to our knowledge the literature does 
not specifically explore how a performance evaluation framework might reconcile multiple 
interpretations of the threat component of the risk equation, specifically the ongoing debate 
over probabilistic risk analysis vs. operations research/game theory (c.f. Taquechel & Lewis, 
2012). 
Second, the literature does not specifically discuss the challenge of how measurable 
adaptive adversary influences on risk, possibly as a recursive mechanism of action, could be 
incorporated into a performance evaluation framework. Furthermore, Taquechel and Lewis 
showed how deterrence effects of certain activities could be quantified and proposed how 
the effects of such activities were double-counted in revised risk equations.42 Specifically, 
vulnerability reduction activities at CIKR both deter, thus reducing threat, and reduce 
vulnerability, therefore “doubly” reducing risk. However, to our knowledge no literature has 
proposed how such accounting for risk reduction might inform a performance evaluation 
framework. 
Third, despite Henstra’s and Cutter’s efforts to explore performance metrics in the area 
of resilience, the literature does not specifically discuss how quantifiable network effects 
on system resilience could be incorporated into a performance evaluation framework for 
agencies with CIKR protection responsibilities. Fourth, despite the ongoing debate in the 
literature regarding metric aggregatibility (c.f. Ayyub, Nicholson-Crotty, Braga & Bond, Keeney 
& Von Winterfeldt), to our knowledge the literature does not examine  how vulnerability 
and exploitation potential of CIKR and networks comprised thereof, both in terms of 
individual and aggregate vulnerability or exploitation potential, might be incorporated into 
performance evaluation frameworks.
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Recommendations and Implications –  
Logic Model Framework Development
Recommendations
We recommend developing a logic model framework that maps antiterrorism activities 
to outputs to outcomes. Outputs may include attacks prevented/deterred, compliance 
achieved, and damage minimized. Outcomes may entail residual risk, or risk remaining after 
activities are executed and outputs (risk that was reduced) are tabulated. Furthermore, the 
quantitative metrics for outputs might reflect different budgeting theories, for example as 
discussed in Hou (2006). Additionally, such a logic model might incorporate activities and 
metrics that account for the nonlinear and recursive effects of adaptive adversary influence 
on CIKR risk, as well as the complexity of network effects upon vulnerability and consequence.
For instance, output metrics fashioned after the “responsibility center” or “line-item 
budgeting” approach might explore threat reduced by attacks deterred. Alternatively, metrics 
fashioned after the efficiency or performance-based budgeting approach might explore risk 
reduced, solely as a function of those threat-reducing activities, divided by time or cost spent 
executing those activities. As a third option, output metrics fashioned after “effectiveness-
based” or “rational-comprehensive” based budgeting may explore risk reduced, as a function 
only of threat-reducing activities, but omitting a cost/time denominator. 
Our speculation is that activity metrics should reflect number of activities performed, and 
that output metrics should reflect quantified risk reduced. Furthermore, we speculate that 
outcome metrics should be quantified residual risk after activities are performed. Greenfield 
et al. claim in a notional logic model for a government injury prevention program that the 
reduction in the incidence of sexual violence is considered an “end outcome” metric.43 The 
end goal in this work seems to be minimized “residual violence.” More generally, they claim 
metrics associated with annual goals typically serve as indicators of a program’s efforts 
(our emphasis), whereas the intermediate and strategic goals (equivalent to outcomes) and 
their associated metrics are indicative of a program’s effect (our emphasis).44 By that logic, 
antiterrorism activities might be considered efforts, whereas risk reduced and residual risk 
to CIKR might be the effects.
Implications and Constraints
Such a logic model framework would assume that antiterrorism activities can be estimated 
to reduce quantitatively elements of risk. In other words, certain activities might be 
estimated to reduce threat through deterrence; other activities might be assumed to reduce 
vulnerability through increasing target security and law enforcement response capabilities; 
and yet other activities might be assumed to reduce consequence through response and 
recovery efforts. 
The multiplicative effects of specific activities on multiple elements of the risk equation 
might be accounted for in a theoretical fashion, but this could make line item budgeting 
difficult. However, activities that reduce multiple aspects of risk, e.g. through both deterring 
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(reducing threat) and protecting CIKR (e.g., reducing vulnerability), might be thought as of 
“robust activities.” Furthermore, agency capabilities leveraged to execute those activities 
might be thought of as “robust capabilities,” something that certain agencies may value 
even if it made activity-based or line-item budgeting difficult. One theory is that goals, 
requirements, and metrics should be conceived more in terms of “capability envelopes” 
rather than particular scenarios.45 However, in agencies where budgeting is closely linked to 
capabilities (e.g. aircraft, boats, specialized tactical units), especially capabilities that perform 
multiple missions, a logic model approach based on activity performance and linkage to 
outcomes may be challenging if one objective is to inform budget development.
Fiscal Constraints
Allocation of performance requires outcome measures; whereas budgeting decisions require 
efficiency measures.46 If an agency with antiterrorism mission execution responsibilities is 
resource-constrained, it may prefer only activity-based budgeting, here meaning budgeting 
for costs of executing a certain number of antiterrorism activities, without regard to output 
or outcome. Conversely, if an agency focuses more on performance-based budgeting, it 
may prefer to adjust activity execution to reduce a certain amount of risk, or leave a certain 
amount of estimated residual risk. A modeled optimization solution could maximize risk 
reduction given an upper bound constraint on resources. 
Political Constraints
Some claim that outcome-based metrics are so general as to be meaningless for budgeting 
and accounting purposes.47 Based on the approach proposed here, if residual risk outcome 
metrics are perceived as inefficacious for supporting line item or efficiency-based budgeting, 
the literature would suggest that not even an antiterrorism program’s effectiveness-based 
budgeting effort could realistically be supported by residual risk metrics. 
As agencies develop and propose budgets in an environment where elected officials scrutinize 
agency performance metrics, it may be difficult to justify funding based on a program logic 
model that advocates risk reduction, even if elected officials like the principle of programs 
targeting quantitative risk reduction. Accountability for performance is sometime perceived 
as secondary compared to accountability for finances and for procedural fairness.48 
Therefore, even if a rigorous model linking activities to risk reduction metrics is developed, 
expenditures on capability packages or activity execution may receive more scrutiny than 
expenditures incurred in aggregate to achieve stated risk reduction goals.
Another consideration is that performance standards can be derived from past performance 
or performance of similar agencies.49 If politicians are not familiar with the evolving technical 
aspects of quantitative risk analysis and management, they may benchmark agency 
performance off previous performance or that of similar agencies, possibly to the detriment 
of what an agency is truly trying to achieve.
Technological Constraints
Models that optimize performance are subject to tradeoffs between rigor and simplicity. 
Any modeling effort that maps specific activity execution to quantitative risk reduction 
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metrics, slicing and dicing amongst the theoretical elements of risk (threat, vulnerability, 
consequence) may increase in cost as complexity increases. Greenfield et al. encourage 
determining correlation or causality in logic models50; but Savitz et al. claim that some 
metrics for one federal agency’s antiterrorism mission might be inherently unreliable given 
the paucity of real-world terrorist attacks.51
Time constraints
Some agencies require models that support certain decisions to undergo a formal Verification, 
Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) process. Such a process could require lots of analyst 
effort and financial support. Fortunately, model accreditation processes in some agencies 
may be tailored subject to resource constraints. Furthermore, the wicked problem approach 
may limit model effectiveness, absent sufficient time to develop such a model. Caudle (2005) 
argues that:
[t]he program logic model has one major drawback for homeland security in that 
it clearly targets programs, normally within an organization’s control, as the unit of 
analysis…complex program logic models would be necessary for homeland security 
to reflect the interdependencies of many organizations and programs.52 
With this in mind, modeling the effects of Rogers’ (2008) program “overlap” upon logic model 
activities and metrics might increase the time needed to construct a valuable risk metric-
based logic model for CIKR protection missions.
Conclusions
The research here suggests that efforts to establish meaningful risk-based performance 
evaluation models with risk metrics for use by agencies with counterterrorism missions 
are in a somewhat nascent state. However, we are optimistic that by continuing to study 
program theory, logic models, and performance evaluation theory, as well as continuing to 
study how risk, deterrence, and resilience concepts are leveraged to support antiterrorism 
efforts, academics and practitioners might flesh out a framework for a logic model or 
other performance evaluation approach that integrates these concepts to help evaluate 
performance for agencies with a terrorism prevention/deterrence mission.
One might conjecture that an effort to build a performance evaluation framework based 
on quantitative risk metrics might get at the historical differentiation between performance 
budgeting and program budgeting. The former, derived from scientific management 
principles, was considered a different budgeting system from the latter, influenced by 
economic and systems analysis.53 If program objectives are to reduce risk and minimize 
residual risk, and quantitative risk reduction is a metric, perhaps both performance and 
program-based budgeting are simultaneously attainable by one agency. One might also 
speculate that such a framework could integrate both the input accountability concerns and 
the outcome-based performance concerns that Heinrich proposes:
“[a]n important question that arises for public managers and researchers is, are 
outcome-based performance management systems more effective than traditional 
approaches to bureaucratic control?”54
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In addition to the constraints identified earlier, Caudle claims establishing cause and effect 
relationships to guide measurement techniques for homeland security programs is still 
nascent.55 With the knowledge that perfectly quantifiable metrics may not be realistic, 
an agency can still move forward with studying correlation between activities and risk 
reduction/residual risk metrics for antiterrorism programs. Collins advocates that the public 
sector should not focus exclusively on “perfectly quantifiable metrics,” but should at least 
gather evidence of progress.56 
Risk reduction is a quantifiable metric, but correlating costs of assets to execute risk 
reduction activities may get at the challenge that Lewis posed in his seminal work on public 
budgeting. If we subscribe to the theory of evaluating budgets based on marginal utility, 
maximum gain for expenditures can only be obtained if those expenditures are distributed 
amongst different purposes such that the last dollar spent for each purpose yields the 
same return.57 The concept of marginal utility entails analysis of how alternative uses of 
the same increment of available resources would yield different returns on investment, and 
prioritizing those alternative uses.58
 Some agencies with antiterrorism missions may focus on control-based budgeting and track 
expenditures for assets, such as boats and aircraft. If the outcomes to be achieved are risk 
reduction measures that can be sliced/diced in different ways, marginal utility theory may 
mean those agencies can link expenditures to risk reduced through threat reduction alone, 
through vulnerability reduction,  through consequence reduction, or permutations of the 
above. This portfolio of options may have implications for how such agencies defend their 
budgets, per marginal utility theory, in an incremental budgetary environment. 
Proposed Way Ahead
The next steps to continue this framework development effort might entail the following.
1. Flesh out a notional logic model that links agency antiterrorism activities, such as port 
patrols and vessel escorts, to agency accomplishments (possibly reduced risk), to agency 
outcomes (possibly residual risk). 
2. Hypothesize appropriate metrics for each activity, accomplishment, and outcome. 
Consider direct and indirect or “proxy” metrics.
3. Assess whether those metrics might be modified to accommodate different budgeting 
theories (line item/responsibility center, efficiency, effectiveness).
4. Assess whether metrics can accommodate quantifiable deterrence/adaptive adversary 
considerations, network exploitation susceptibility and other network effects on 
vulnerability, and/or network effects on consequence and resilience.
5. Assess the “aggregatibility” and “severability” of various metrics. For example, with 
respect to adaptive adversary factors, assess whether metrics derived from the concept 
of attacker and defender “utility” should segregate from those metrics, or aggregate 
therein, costs and other agency resource inputs to execute antiterrorism activities.
6. Assess the effects of other organizations with similar missions upon the efficacy of 
certain metrics in evaluating logic model elements.
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7. Assess whether a linear “pipeline” model, “outcome-chain”, recursive loop model, “realist” 
model, or other variety of logic model is most preferable.
8. Socialize various logic model formats/details with program sponsors, budget analysts, 
and agency overseers and revise models as appropriate.
9. Determine whether the preferred model would meet the threshold for formal agency 
verification, validation, and accreditation efforts, and estimate needed resources if that 
determination is in the affirmative.
Ongoing efforts to develop agency performance evaluation frameworks should be assessed 
as part of this way ahead.
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Appendix
Here, we show some basic logic models that broach the recommended steps in the Proposed 
Way Ahead.  These are not intended to be exhaustive, but instead are intended to illustrate, 




First, we show a notional activity-accomplishment-outcome logic model for deterrence 
activities (threat reduction). We show notional metrics, partitioned by the three budgeting 










Stationary Target  “Zone Defense” # Activities / time or $ expended
Moving Target   “Point Defense”







Line Item Efficiency Effectiveness
Accomplishment Metric
Attacks Deterred
Line Item Efficiency Effectiveness
Outcome Metric
Residual Threat
Figure 1. Logic model, deterrence activities (threat reduction)
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Key:












= risk reduced given threat reduced, irrespective of resource inputs






= residual risk given threat reduced, divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)
↓Tres
R
 = residual risk given threat reduced, irrespective of resource inputs
In Figure 1, activities such as stationary and moving target defenses can be measured by 
number of activities performed, per resource input such as time or money, or both. The 
accomplishment of this effort is attacks deterred, with possible metrics of threat reduced 
(line item – tie to specific activity or asset performing activity), risk reduced as a function of 
threat per resource input (efficiency), or risk reduced as a function of threat (effectiveness). 
The outcome is residual risk, or what risk remains to the infrastructure after deterrence 
activities are executed.
Analysis
Here, if risk reduction is used as an efficiency or effectiveness metric, it could be isolated to 
the risk reduced solely as a function of threat-reducing or “deterrence” activities noted. The 
classic risk equation also incorporates vulnerability (V) and consequence (C) terms.
),,( CVTfR =  
Eq. 1. Basic Risk Equation
In reality, do security activities simultaneously reduce more than one element of the risk 
equation? This gets into aggregatibility/severability challenges, but specific to threat reduction 
efforts, the double counting effects of quantifiable deterrence discussed in Taquechel and 
Lewis (2012) may be a consideration in performance measurement.
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Double Counting Threat Reduction
One can argue that change in threat, or attacker capability and intent to attack, is a function 
of changes in target vulnerability and/or consequence. 
),( CVfT =  
Eq. 2. Threat as function of vulnerability, consequence
We also know that threat is derived from intent and capability:
),( CapIntentfT =  
Eq. 3. Threat as function of intent, capability
Previous work59 has proposed that intent is a function of a ratio of attacker expected utility 
(UeA), or benefit from a successful attack, to the aggregate of all expected utilities from 








Eq. 4. Intent as function of attacker expected utility
We also can surmise that attacker expected utility is a function of target vulnerability and 
consequence. What a target’s defender stands to lose, an attacker stands to gain:
),( CVfAUe =  
Eq. 5. Attacker expected utility as function of vulnerability, consequence
How does this lead to double counting? If target V or C decreases due to the target defender’s 
actions, expected utility of an attack would decrease, thus decreasing intent and attacker 
threat. This ultimately suggests risk reduction. 
↓↓→↓→↓→↓→↓ RTIntentAUCV e,
However, the effect of vulnerability and/or consequence reduction itself should be sufficient 
to argue risk is reduced:
↓↓→↓ RCV ,
Therefore, isolating the effects of threat reduction due to deterrence-oriented activities 
upon risk reduction becomes theoretically challenging. Did the risk reduce because an 
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adversary noticed the point or zone defense activities and therefore had less intent to act? 
If so, by that logic, risk would be mathematically reduced twice: by the lowering of threat 
(per Equation 3), and the lowering of vulnerability or consequence (per Equation 1). While 
we can argue on a theoretical level that this double-counting effect of deterrence activities 
seems logical, from a performance metrics standpoint, one challenge may be arguing how 
much risk reduction is directly attributable to activities intended to deter, or reduce threat. 
Zone defense security activities seem more susceptible to this challenge, if they do not focus 
security coverage on individual targets, but instead cast a wide net over a group of targets. 
The effort to reduce target vulnerability with a randomized, “zone defense” presence may 
be less effective than the effort to reduce attacker intent to attack, and thus reduce threat. 
The relationship between specific tactical activities and metrics must be explored further.
Tracking Expenditures
The nexus between agency expenditure of time and/or money obligated to execute these 
deterrence-oriented activities, and the execution of the activities themselves, must be 
clear in order to have defensible efficiency metrics. For instance, if the funding for assets 
executing deterrence activities is earmarked specifically for those activities, but then the 
asset is diverted to perform a different task, the actual expenditure of those funds may 
trace to multiple activities in the accounting. This may make budget planning challenging if 
we link strategic mission budgeting, mission operational planning, and mission execution 
activities. 
Instead, budgeting to line item capabilities (such as aircraft or boats) that perform multiple 
missions within an agency’s portfolio may be easier, at least from a cost center/line-item 
budgeting perspective. Assets are constrained by engineering-driven costs such as fuel 
consumption and repair cycles, which may mean mission execution is constrained by 
available logistical support funding. This may reflect realities of budgetary and logistical 
constraints, and whether outcome-based budgeting is feasible, especially in a prevention 
or deterrence-oriented mission, is subject to debate. This issue is particularly relevant to 
deterrence-focused activities in a logic model as they may be perceived as “generalist” in 
nature, not protecting any specific target nor responding to specific events or actionable 
intelligence.
Vulnerability Reduction
Next, we show a notional activity-accomplishment-outcome logic model for Prevention/
Protection-oriented activities (vulnerability reduction), with notional metrics.
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Purpose: Prevent & Protect
Activity Metric
Stationary Target  “Zone Defense” # Activities / time or $ expended
Moving Target   “Point Defense”












Line Item Efficiency Effectiveness
Outcome Metric
Residual Vulnerability
Figure 2. Logic model, prevention/protection activities (vulnerability reduction)
Key:













= risk reduced given vulnerability reduced, irrespective of resource inputs






= residual risk given vulnerability reduced, divided by resource inputs (time and/or money)
↓Vres
R  = residual risk given vulnerability reduced, irrespective of resource inputs
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Logic Model Explanation
The first change from Figure 1 is that a new activity is introduced: compliance inspections. 
These inspections may be conducted armed or unarmed, depending on the purpose, but 
arguably armed inspections might prevent or protect against an imminent attack more 
effectively. 
That notwithstanding, the next change is that one accomplishment is “attacks prevented” 
rather than “attacks deterred.” We introduce a second objective, “compliance achieved.” 
Whether this is synonymous with “attacks prevented” for logic model analysis purposes 
may require additional examination.
Then, we see the outcome is “residual vulnerability,” or the probability of a successful attack 
given preventive/protective activities have been executed. The metrics for all activities, 
accomplishments and outcomes in this logic model have the same structure as those in 
Figure 1, but are modified replacing Threat with Vulnerability.
Analysis
Aggregatibility/Severability
Since we are not focusing on the “double-counting” phenomenon here, aggregatibility and 
severability takes on a different meaning. Previous work has explored network effects in 
defending critical infrastructure.
Network Effects- V Reduction
We now lay the foundation for a modification to the Figure 2 logic model. This incorporates 
ideas from network analysis, with specific reference to the type of threat addressed. Are we 
protecting individual CIKR from direct attack, or from exploitation (moving illicit material 
through enroute to a different destination)? This analysis will assume the latter. 
First, we discuss some basis concepts underpinning the “exploitation susceptibility” lens 
through which we will view network effects on vulnerability and performance metrics.
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EDIT PORT 1
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 0.0%,  A = $0.0






V = 50.0%,  E = $100
p = 0%,  A = $0
C = $100,  R = $0
EDIT PORT 2
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 0.0%,  A = $0.0
C = $100.0,  R = $0.0
EDIT TARGET 2
ROI ~ 0.47%/$
V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 0%,  A = $0
C = $100.0,  R = $0
V = organic vulnerability of each node
p = likelihood that fault would propagate through a node
E = $ that would have to be spent to reduce a node’s organic vulnerability to 5%
A = $ actually invested to defend a node
ROI = return on investment 
Figure 3. Logic graph rendering of a transfer network – two ports and two vessels (Taquechel, 
2010, p. 31) 
A transfer network is a representation of how the terrorist transfer threat, or movement 
of terrorists or illicit material, can propagate throughout transportation nodes.60 If ports 
include CIKR that we prevent or protect against attacks, this network logic could be useful 
in exploring appropriate vulnerability reduction metrics for the transfer threat. Shown in 
expanded form, we have a notional network where an adversary might exploit foreign ports 
(embark), vessels, and domestic U.S. ports (debark), with the option to choose from multiple 
targets of attack:
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EDIT DEBARK 1
ROI ~ 0.28%/$
V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 37.5%,  A = $0.0







V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 37.5%,  A = $0.0





V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 50.0%,  A = $0.0






V = 50.0%,  E = $100
p = 37.91%,  A = $0
C = $100,  R = $37.91
EDIT DEBARK 2
ROI ~ 0.28%/$
V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 30.46%,  A = $0.0
C = $0.0,  R = $0.0
EDIT TARGET 2
ROI ~ 0.47%/$
V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 50%,  A = $0
C = $100.0,  R = $50
EDIT EMBARK 2
ROI ~ 0.47%/$
V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 50.0%,  A = $0.0
C = $0.0,  R = $0.0
EDIT VESSEL 2
ROI ~ 0.35%/$
V = 50.0%,  E = 100.0
p = 37.5%,  A = $0.0





Figure 4. Logic graph rendering of an expanded transfer network (Taquechel, 2010, p. 32) 
If our objective is to reduce “exploitation susceptibility,” or a specific type of vulnerability that 
estimates a port facility’s likelihood of exploitation due to an adversary moving illicit goods 
through undetected (rather than a direct attack against that facility), then our V metrics may 
take a different form for logic models. Previous work allows us to propose such a functional 
form of exploitation susceptibility:
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( )( )21 111 DDnetwork VVV −−−=  
Eq. 6. Network vulnerability (exploitation susceptibility), transfer network as shown in Fig 4.
Here, this network exploitation susceptibility reflects the choices the attacker can make 
for target selection, and the VD1 / VD2  terms reflect a “nestled” vulnerability component 
that accounts for the ease with which attackers can move materiel or people through this 
network. 
This equation may yield a different value for the network’s aggregate vulnerability, or 
aggregate exploitation susceptibility, than if we only consider the vulnerability of individual 
CIKR. We can protect infrastructure in the two “ports of debarkation,” but if our objective is 
to defend against network exploitation, our logic model metrics now take a different form:
Purpose: Prevent & Protect - Network Exploitation
Activity Metric
Stationary Target  “Zone Defense” # Activities / time or $ expended
Moving Target   “Point Defense”
Stationary Target  “Point Defense”
Compliance Inspections















Line Item Efficiency Effectiveness
Accomplishment Metric
Exploitation Prevented











Figure 5.Logic model, prevention/protection activities (network exploitation)
Key:
↓networkV = network exploitation susceptibility reduced (as per prevent/protect activities)
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= network risk reduced given network exploitation susceptibility reduced, 





= network risk reduced given network exploitation susceptibility reduced, 
irrespective of resource inputs
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= residual network risk given network exploitation susceptibility reduced, 








= residual network risk given network exploitation susceptibility reduced, 
irrespective of resource inputs
How is residual network exploitation susceptibility expressed? We add exponential terms 

















































Eq. 7. Network vulnerability (exploitation susceptibility), residual after investment
Importantly – the focus of the prevention/protection activities in this logic model remains the 
same CIKR targets as in Figure 3 –US port infrastructure. But, there are additional influences 
on the vulnerability that those executing these activities “inherit” from upstream defensive 
efforts, such as overseas compliance inspections. These influences may be outside the 
scope of the logic model under consideration. 
Furthermore, the compliance inspection activity holds yet another vulnerability reduction 
purpose when the objective is specifically to prevent or protect against exploitation via 
nuclear weapons shipments. This may entail inspection of weapon detection equipment 
and SOP compliance efforts. See Taquechel, Hollan and Lewis (2015) for more discussion. 
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Tracking Expenditures – Issues Specific to V-reducing 
Activities
One consideration for the efficiency metric denominator here is how realistic the influence 
of protective activities in U.S. ports is, when the issue at hand is exploitation susceptibility. 
The vulnerability reduction effects of overseas compliance inspections and at-sea actions 
may influence exploitation susceptibility, and protection activities in U.S. ports may only 
contribute marginally to overall network exploitation susceptibility reduction. This may be 
a return on investment consideration if the prevailing preference for performance metrics 
is driven by efficiency, or accomplishment per expenditure. This gets back to the theoretical 
consideration of external influences upon performance metrics as discussed in Rogers 
(2008).
Consequence Reduction
Next, we show a notional activity-accomplishment-outcome logic model for resilience-
oriented activities (consequence reduction), with notional metrics.
Purpose: Resilience
Activity Metric
Port Security Grants -
Resilience Investment
Grants approved per input effort/
(Time to process, $)
















Line Item Efficiency Effectiveness
Accomplishment Metric
Economic Loss Reduced









Figure 6. Logic model, resilience activities (consequence reduction)
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Key:









= CIKR lost productivity avoided given resilience activities, accounting for probability 






= CIKR lost productivity avoided, irrespective of resource inputs









= residual CIKR productivity, accounting for probability of attack, divided by resource 





= residual CIKR productivity, irrespective of resource inputs
Logic Model Explanation
Here, the activity is port security grants, which per previous work were proposed to take a 
resilience-focused approach, providing to CIKR money specifically earmarked for capability 
to rebuild to facilitate some level of productivity after an incident. See Taquechel (2013) for 
more details.
The accomplishment is economic loss theoretically reduced or avoided by these resilience 
activities, as lost economic productivity can be considered a consequence.  Metrics entail 
quantified economic loss (line item), or risk as a function of that economic consequence 
(network lost productivity that accounts for probability of attack), either per effort expended 
to administer grants (efficiency), or disregarding effort (effectiveness).
The outcome is residual economic productivity, measured by dollars (line item), or by residual 




Here, aggregatibility/severability of metrics also gets into network effects, but in terms 
of “cascading economic effects” on networks of infrastructure, as explored in Taquechel 
(2013). In other words, the aggregatibility focuses on the network effects of consequence 
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rather than the network effects of vulnerability or exploitation susceptibility. We can call this 
“failure susceptibility” in consequence terms.
Network Effects- C Reduction (Resilience)
We now show a modification to the Figure 6 logic model. This incorporates ideas from 
network theory, with a consequence focus. Taquechel (2013) introduced the term “inherited 
failure susceptibility,” proxied by CIKR network node degree, meaning the number of 
upstream suppliers a CIKR has in a supply chain. When considered in tandem with a CIKR’s 
organic failure susceptibility, e.g. lack of reserve raw product onsite to resume production 
after a disruption, inherited failure susceptibility may exacerbate overall network failure 
susceptibility.


































Eq. 8. Expected consequence of lth supply chain network with i nodes
This term accounts for the organic failure susceptibility of all nodes in a supply chain network. 
The organic failure susceptibility is modeled as an exponential relationship between 
resilience effort actually invested and investment needed to minimize failure susceptibility. 
This susceptibility probabilistically modifies the maximum possible economic loss to an ith 
node Coni
(max). The expected consequence to each node sums to the total expected network 
consequence.
If resilience activities covered in the logic model only improve resilience at some of the 
network nodes, they may reduce overall network failure susceptibility and economic 
loss, but the interdependencies between network nodes, proxied by node degree g, may 
increase potential loss. That said, we want to expand our depiction of network expected 
consequence, as a function of resilience investments at the supplier nodes, here with 
maximum consequence Cons
(max).
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Eq. 9. Expected consequence to lth supply chain network, expanded to show supplier node 
failure probabilities
If we invest to increase the probability of rebuilding after a disruption, the As
reb term will 
increase, thus increasing economic productivity. 






cond ConVCapR =  
Eq. 10. Conditional risk to lth supply chain network
The risk to a supply chain network is thus a function of network expected consequence, 
but also of an attacker’s capability to attack supplier node s, and that node’s vulnerability 
to attack. Therefore, an efficiency metric would be conditional network risk reduced or 
avoided, as a function of possible economic loss reduced, per effort to ensure such loss 
reduction. This term can capture the expanded form of expected consequence shown in 
Equation 9, to allow simulation of resilience investments that would lower conditional risk, 
retaining economic productivity. This retained economic productivity can be expressed as 
a resilience term, the difference between maximum pre-disruption economic output, and 
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Eq. 11. Resilience of lth supply chain, given efforts to reduce expected economic loss
Therefore, we can now show our modification to Figure 6:
Purpose: Resilience - Network
Activity Metric
Port Security Grants -
Resilience Investment
Grants approved per input effort/
(Time to process, $)




















Line Item Efficiency Effectiveness
Accomplishment Metric













Figure 7. Logic model, resilience activities (consequence reduction) - NETWORK EFFECTS
Key:










= supply chain lost productivity avoided given resilience activities, accounting 




condR  = supply chain lost productivity avoided, irrespective of resource inputs
(exp)1Con  = residual supply chain economic productivity (after resilience activities executed)
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= residual supply chain productivity, accounting for probability of 






condRCon  = residual supply chain productivity, irrespective of resource inputs
Tracking Expenditures – Issues Specific to C-reducing 
Activities
As with vulnerability reduction efforts, the inputs to achieve consequence reduction, 
if applied only at certain infrastructure in a network, must be considered relative to the 
proportional effect of those reduction efforts. More specifically, if port security grants 
increase resilience by lowering expected economic loss at supplier nodes (for example, in 
a port), but the supply chain network is composed of downstream nodes with high organic 
failure susceptibility, the efforts to increase port facility resilience may have a minimal effect 
on overall supply chain resilience. If much effort is expended to administer port security 
grants, that may not be an ideal return on investment. However, efficiency metrics may not 
be the prevailing budgetary theory preference.
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Abstract
The frequency of suicide terrorist attacks has increased dramatically since the year 2000, 
creating a renewed interest in this area of study, as well as an increase in the importance 
of understanding individual and organizational motivations behind engagement in suicide 
terrorism. The following is a systematic review of current research in the field of causes 
and explanations of suicide terrorism, limited to research articles in peer-reviewed journals 
and grey literature, excluding published books by single authors. This essay provides a 
brief background into the issues surrounding suicide terrorism and the evidence currently 
available concerning causes and motivations. It describes the strengths and limitations of 
currently available academic research and the conclusions that this literature presents both 
in terms of policy and future research efforts.
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Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were not the first time a terrorist organization 
used suicide terrorism to achieve their objectives. Instances of suicide tactics are evident 
throughout history. As early as 400 B.C.E., Greek sailors set ships on fire and steered them 
into enemy forces, a tactic that has become so common throughout history that it inspired 
the coining of the term ‘fireship.’1 Another example includes suicide attacks executed by the 
Islamic Order of Assassins during the early Christian Crusades.2 Modern history has been 
no less influenced by the use of suicide tactics, the most well-known example being the 
Japanese Kamikaze pilots of World War II. Despite the wide variety of tactics each individual 
suicide attacker employed, one notable similarity can be discerned: suicide tactics tend to 
be used when a weaker force believes that less drastic measures will be ineffective against 
a materialistically superior opponent.3 The origins of modern suicide terrorism can also be 
linked to this asymmetry between opposing forces. It was not until the 1980s that the world 
experienced suicide terrorism in its modern form. The first major contemporary suicide 
terrorist attacks were the 1981 bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, and Hezbollah’s 
attack on the American Marine barracks in Lebanon.4 The apparent success of suicide 
tactics, especially against a force of significantly superior numbers, provides the basis 
for the strategic argument as explanation of suicide terrorism’s evolution. The strategic 
approach, however, is only one of the many proposed causal explanations that researchers 
have considered.
This article explores research on the various explanations and causes for suicide terrorism 
that have been proposed in recent academic literature. Although modern suicide terrorism 
has been a threat since the 1980s, there was limited research conducted prior to 2000 that 
differentiated suicide terrorism from terrorism in general.5 The study of suicide terrorism 
specifically has been concentrated primarily in the years following 2000.
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The purpose of this study is to conduct a comprehensive systematic review of current research 
on the causes and explanations of suicide terrorism. This systematic review will contribute 
to the progression of future research and the development of effective policy. The adoption 
of counterterrorism policy based on perceived causes can have limited impact if research 
has not substantiated those perceptions. Understanding the intricate interactions between 
different causal factors and determining promising research directions will prompt renewed 
focus in areas that can have the greatest impact on policy development and identification 
of potential courses of action to limit the risk of future attacks. This review will contribute 
to the field of suicide terrorism research by providing a comprehensive overview of current 
literature and the way ahead.
Background
Terrorist violence is employed to convey a message to whichever target audience has been 
identified by the organization responsible. The violence and randomness of the act instills 
fear even in those not directly affected and directs attention to the cause.6 Often perpetrated 
against unarmed civilians, suicide terrorism creates a sense of horror and fragility throughout 
the affected society. The dawn of contemporary suicide terrorism was not that long ago. 
However, the prevalence, tactics, and perceptions of terrorists and terrorism have changed 
and evolved continually. Since the beginning of modern suicide terrorism in the 1980s, 
counterterrorism analysts have anticipated gradual adaptation and an increase in events as 
terrorists become more familiar and more comfortable with these tactics. Contrary to this 
expectation, suicide terrorism has not undergone a gradual increase in popularity among 
terrorist strategists. There were more suicide attacks worldwide from 2003 to 2005 than 
there were in the entire preceding quarter century.7 Both researchers and policy makers 
alike have noticed this spike in the use of suicide attacks by terrorists worldwide. The Chicago 
Project’s Suicide Attack Database has shown this striking observation, demonstrating the 
astounding shift in frequency of attacks beginning after 2001.
The systematic analysis of attacks from 2001 to 2014 illuminates the continued increase in 
the use of suicide attacks throughout the world. The progressive increase emphasizes the 
importance of understanding motivations behind suicide tactics. The slight decrease after 
2007 could potentially be interpreted as progress in counterterrorism, but it is important to 
note that even in 2011, the low point in the last ten years, there were 254 attacks in one year, 
more than the 220 attacks over the 20 year stretch from 1982-2001.
History and Examples
The birth of the modern age of suicide terrorism in the 1980s marked a turning point from a 
fairly steady rate of suicide attacks as military tactics throughout history. Prior to the 1980s, 
suicide tactics had been integrated into military operations to create an advantage over 
an enemy of superior material strength. Whether through crashing a vessel into another 
ship to counter a rival’s greater numbers or using suicide pilots in a surprise attack on 
enemy forces, some sacrifices create advantages for other allied combatants. Beginning 
in the 1980s, adaptive use of suicide-terrorist tactics and strategies allowed small, non-
state and pseudo-state actors to achieve their objectives against larger, more formidable 
opponents, thus creating a perceived strategic advantage for suicide terrorism. The 1983 
Marine Barracks Bombing in Beirut demonstrates the effect that a few willing to give their 
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lives can have against many. In this case only two truck bombs killed almost 300 American 
and French servicemen and injured many more; the sacrifice of only a few lives enabled 
the attackers to ensure the death of hundreds of their targets. In the next decades leading 
up to the turn of the century, suicide tactics were adopted and adapted by nationalist and 
extremist groups around the world.
The Chicago Project8 identifies more than 40 organizations that conducted suicide attacks 
between 1982 and 2013 as part of 25 separate campaigns.9 Between 1982 and 2000, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were responsible for more suicide attacks than any 
other individual organization. They conducted 72 suicide terror attacks in their separatist 
campaign against Sri Lanka and India, resulting in more than 1000 deaths and 2500 injuries.10 
Although members of the LTTE were among the most prolific suicide attackers of the time, 
they were not the only group to use the tactic. The Chicago Project identifies 174 suicide 
attacks and 2702 deaths that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s.11 The majority of attacks 
were directed at security targets with only 17.2% of targets being civilian and 14.9% political. 
Often cited as the first terrorist organization to use suicide terrorism, Hezbollah launched 
a campaign against Israeli forces in Lebanon that is second only to the LTTE in terms of 
the number of suicide attacks initiated. Other Palestinian, Chechen, and Islamic militant 
groups also engaged in suicide terror as part of 10 separate campaigns during this time. 
The car bomb, first used by Hezbollah in the 1981 Iraqi Embassy bombing in Beirut, and the 
belt bomb, invented and perfected by the LTTE, monopolized suicide terror tactics as the 
weapon of choice until 2001.12
The turn of the century saw an even greater increase than that observed in the 1980s and 
the use of suicide terrorist attacks spiked. There were more suicide attacks between 2001 
and 2005 than in the thirty years prior. Analysts have largely attributed this spike to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the de-Baathification of the Iraqi government in conjunction 
with the disbanding of the Iraqi security forces in 2003. Between 2000 and 2014, Iraq was 
first in the number of suicide attacks by location, with Israel coming in fifth.13 Sissons and 
Al-Saiedi noted that de-Baathification largely contributed to the creation of the insurgency 
and the increase in violence that resulted. The disbanding of the Iraqi military left more than 
700,000 armed and trained Iraqi security force members unemployed, disenfranchised and 
hostile towards the United States, now seen as occupiers in Iraq.14 Consequently, there was 
an increase in suicide-terror attacks beginning in Iraq in 2003. Although seven of the 35 
attacks in 2003 occurred from February to April of that year, 80 percent occurred after the 
official de-Baathification orders were issued.15 Despite the fact that United States military 
leadership had intended to employ the Iraqi security forces to help restore security and 
order in post-war Iraq, the reality of the de-Baathification orders left disbanded security 
forces with the perception of broken promises and betrayal by the U.S. forces.16 Given these 
sentiments, it was not surprising to see increased hostilities and the development of the 
insurgency within Iraq.
The phrase ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ epitomizes many 
of the explanations for this spike in suicide terror. Several explanations for suicide tactics 
that focus on the fact that a suicide attack can be an effective asymmetrical tactic against 
hardened targets provide some insight into why those who see themselves as freedom 
fighters may engage in these activities. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon in 2001 demonstrated the potential effectiveness of these tactics to prospective 
future attackers.
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The attacks of September 11, 2001 prompted not only an increase in the use of suicide 
attacks as a terrorist tactic but also a greater international impact for this approach. In the 
aftermath of September 11, the NATO Alliance invoked, for the first time, Article Five of the 
Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one of its members is an 
attack against them all.17 Not only is the international response more elaborate now than in 
the 20th century, but travel, media, and technology have changed the attacks themselves, 
beginning a new phenomenon that some researchers call the “globalization of martyrdom.”18 
Islamic extremist suicide attacks have reached countries all over the world, establishing 
the perception that suicide terror is a predominantly Islamic activity, and giving many the 
impression that religion is a causal factor in the activity itself. Even in Muslim countries, 
this perception seems to be verified. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan there was an 
average of one suicide attack per day.19 Although Western governments will argue justifiably 
that Islamic militant groups are a principal threat in today’s security environment, it is 
important to recognize that it is only recently that Islamic militant groups have surpassed 
other terrorist organizations as the leading perpetrator of suicide terror and that they are 
not the only terrorists to engage in suicide attacks.
Between 2001 to 2014, 3,802 attacks occurred resulting in 37,562 deaths and 96,644 
injuries.20 The largest number of attacks in a single year occurred in 2007 and while the 
majority of targets remain security-oriented, a greater percentage of civilian targets have 
been selected.21 As was the case during the previous 20 years, car-bombs and belt-bombs 
monopolize the weapon selection. However, September 11, 2001 established the hijacked 
airplane as the deadliest suicide-attack weapon. Although these statistics are somewhat 
staggering and the various definitions used by individual researchers show slight variations 
in reported numbers, the trends remain the same and the notable spike in attacks after 
2001 is universally acknowledged among subject matter-experts.22 It is also important to 
recognize that, although suicide attacks make up a small percentage of terrorist attacks 
around the world, the importance of understanding their impact cannot be underestimated. 
Suicide attacks make up only three percent of terrorist attacks, but are responsible for 48 
percent of the fatalities as a result of terrorism.23 This statistic proves that although suicide 
terrorist attacks account for only a small percentage of all terrorism, this tactic has some 
of the most detrimental and fatal effects. Therefore the influence and power of suicide 
terrorism need to be considered in order to better understand terrorist motivations and to 
progress toward effective preventative programs.
This essay provides a systematic review of academic peer- reviewed research in the area 
of causes of suicide terrorism. Several researchers have conducted literature reviews in 
the area of suicide terrorism. Martha Crenshaw analyzed 13 different books on the subject 
written by current leading experts in the field, comparing theories, perspectives, and policy 
suggestions.24 Grimland, Apter, and Kerkhof conducted a review of currently available research 
to build on our understanding of psychological perspectives and their importance.25 For the 
most part, previous reviews, critiques, and studies have focused on a single causal theory, a 
single work, or on validating a model of interconnectivity among theories.26 This paper uses 
a systematic review to compile existing research in a comprehensive and straightforward 
manner to demonstrate where modern research stands and the potential for developing 
more effective counter-terrorism approaches.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 9 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Harmon, Mujkic, Kaukinen & Weir,  Causes & Explanations of Suicide Terrorism: A Systematic Review  6
Method
Progress is made continually in a variety of disciplines of academic research. More than 
two million articles are published in academic journals every year.27 Even with an extremely 
narrow focus, it is difficult to stay apprised of all the developments in the literature over 
time. A systematic review is designed to help organize and assess current research in a 
specific area in order to address limitations associated with current literature. It is an in-
depth literature review that locates, appraises and synthesizes available research relating 
to an explicit research area.28 A systematic review should provide evidence-based answers 
that help to change practices or improve policies. By following a systematic methodological 
process and by explicitly explaining this process, the review can provide a comprehensive 
examination of research associated with the topic area and be reproducible by others in the 
future, providing the greatest advantage to the field of research.29 Systematic reviews cover 
both published academic journal articles and ‘grey literature’. Grey literature encompasses 
unpublished studies or studies with limited distribution including research reports from 
government agencies, reports from scientific research groups, working papers, doctoral 
dissertations, and conference proceedings, to help avoid publication bias.30 Articles and 
research were collected from a variety of sources in order to amass the most representative 
sample of current literature available. Research was drawn from search engines such as 
Google Scholar, Air University Library’s Index to Military Periodicals, Bielefeld Academic 
Search Engine, Directory of Open Access Journals, JSTOR, and PubPsych. This essay is 
supported by credible sources in combination with varied perspectives and media, through 
which information was gathered to develop an objective, well-researched systematic review.
Key words in research included: “causes of suicide terrorism,” “religion and suicide terrorism,” 
“social influence in suicide terrorism,” “psychology and suicide terrorism,” “suicide terror,” 
“logic of suicide terrorism,” and “strategy and suicide terrorism.” Accommodating for 
different terminology, similar keywords were researched replacing “suicide terror” with 
“martyrdom.” Articles were found through the previously-mentioned search engines as well 
as the reference sections of applicable articles, and were reviewed to ensure that the greatest 
amount of applicable information was analyzed. It should be noted that only articles written 
in English were considered for this systematic review.
Selection Criteria
To be included, research was required to differentiate between suicide and non-suicide 
terrorism. It was required to address root causes of suicide terrorism and/or explanations of 
suicide-terrorist activities. This may have been done through a description of preventative 
or responsive programs on the condition that they address a specific element believed 
by the author(s) to contribute to suicide terrorism. Research was limited to peer-reviewed 
articles and grey literature. Books written by subject-matter experts were also considered 
for information that was presented throughout the paper, but not in the analysis tables.
Resources Excluded
The research included peer-reviewed journal articles and grey literature (there is a 
dissertation included for example). It does not include reviews of published books on 
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the causes of suicide terrorism. An exception to this is made for chapters of edited books 
written by multiple authors. There are several experts in this field who have published 
books on the topic, and further investigation into this material would benefit future reviews 
of this nature. Many researchers also included newspaper and magazine articles written 
by subject-matter experts among their sources. This research excluded these articles due 
to the type of publication. However, given the popularity of the subject matter in recent 
years, a significant number of articles fall in to this category. Because of the subject-matter 
expertise of their authors, these articles, although not peer-reviewed, can provide more 
information on the state of research in this field and potentially significant details that could 
be useful in subsequent research.
Throughout the course of research, several books by subject-matter experts were found 
that went into great detail about the potential causes of suicide terrorism. As this systematic 
review focused on peer-reviewed articles, these books were excluded from the systematic 
review. We also found some articles that critiqued and compared the aforementioned 
books. Some of these articles were also excluded from the systematic review as they did 
not present a potential cause for suicide terrorism, but instead discussed the strengths and 
weaknesses of previous research. The arguments of these articles are extremely useful to 
the development of future research but were outside the scope of this review. Finally, any 
articles that did not distinguish in their research between suicide terrorism and terrorism in 
general were excluded. It remains a topic of debate as to whether suicide terrorism should 
be considered a separate form of terrorism, but for the purposes of this review, suicide 
terrorism was assumed to be a unique form of terrorism deserving of independent research.
The authors compiled the list of articles that were included in this systematic review. 
The table is organized by year to highlight the growing interest that researchers took in 
determining the causes of suicide terrorism after 2000. This may have been a direct result 
of increased interest and visibility of the new threat of suicide bombers after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 or a reflection of the financial support provided to research in this field 
following a realization of the vulnerability of powerful governments to the tactic. A total 
of 47 articles were found that analyzed the causes and motivations of suicide terrorism 
and ranged in focus from individual-level motivations to social forces to organizational 
strategies. The table that describes research articles that were found during the course of 
the data collection process but were excluded from the review is included in this essay as 
Appendix A. It explains briefly the purpose of each article and why it was not applicable to 
this systematic review. For reasons outlined above, books written by a single author are not 
described.
Results
After noting the spike in suicide terrorism incidents, it is not difficult to explain the 
corresponding increase in the interest that researchers have paid to suicide terrorism 
research. Much of the research available concerning modern day suicide terrorism has been 
published since 2001 with a significant amount of focus on Islamic Jihadists and religious 
extremism. This may be a result of the world’s current perception of Islamic terrorist groups 
as a significant threat to Western societies and subsequent funding increases or it may 
simply be due to the recent increase in Islamic extremist violence, providing significantly 
more data to be analyzed in this area. Many researchers recognize this as a limiting factor to 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 9 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Harmon, Mujkic, Kaukinen & Weir,  Causes & Explanations of Suicide Terrorism: A Systematic Review  8
the understanding of suicide terrorism. Some researchers continue to focus on the rise of 
Islamism as a contributory factor behind the increase in incidents. In contrast, others take 
varying approaches to determine the root causes of suicide terrorism in order to explain the 
use of suicide tactics by Jihadist and non-Jihadist movements alike. Studies in this area are 
difficult as suicide terrorism represents a relatively small portion of global terrorist attacks, 
an estimated 2.16%, and therefore most research does not differentiate between causes of 
non-suicide and suicide terrorism.31 Despite restrictions, researchers have made continual 
efforts towards understanding terrorism in general, and furthermore, understanding suicide 
terrorism as a distinct practice.
Theorized Causes of Suicide Terrorism
One cannot deny that suicide terrorism is often perceived as successful in achieving the 
immediate objectives of the terrorist organization. Following the Marine Barracks Bombing 
in Lebanon in 1983, President Reagan ordered the withdrawal of American troops within 
four months.32 This is one of many examples of the perceived success of suicide attacks that 
support the strategic argument for suicide terrorism. Considering the ratio of terrorists killed 
to their enemy victims often associated with suicide terrorism, the justification for this tactic 
against a superior combatant force is clear. Pape notes a correlation in his research between 
foreign military occupation and an increase in suicide terrorist activity that lends itself to this 
school of thought.33 This approach is closely related to the theory that organizational and 
institutional motivations are the most contributory elements to suicide terrorism. Where the 
former approach argues that the strategic effects of suicide terrorism justify these actions, 
the latter relies on the views of those within the organization or institution to agree with this 
argument. Atran goes so far as to suggest that changing the institutionally-held morals and 
values of terrorist cells is essential to changing the prevalence of the practice itself.34
Propaganda that draws people to the group begins with the morals and values of the 
individual citizens within a society. Convincing the population of the moral logic of 
martyrdom is the first step to recruiting new members and justifying the actions of the 
group to their civilian supporters. Conversely, changing this perception could very well be 
the first and most important step away from suicide terrorism and terrorism in general.35 
The influence of society is, therefore, essential to not only the success of a suicide attack, 
but also to the initial perpetration of that attack. One popular theory suggests that the 
government regime will influence whether a nation falls victim to perpetrators of a suicide 
attack; however, several researchers have found that government type is irrelevant in this 
scenario.36 Additionally, Piazza does suggest that regime type was related to the perpetration 
of suicide attacks.37 Other societal elements such as economy, education, religion and 
culture have also been included in theories about the causes of suicide terrorism.38 While 
environmental and societal influences would provide a more manageable explanation in 
terms of preventative and responsive programs, there is also the possibility that individual 
factors are more important to suicide terrorism than these more convenient elements. 
Even if they are not among the most significant causal factors, understanding psychological 
aspects of those who perpetrate suicide attacks can help society to counter them. Post, Ali, 
Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff, and Weine suggest that psychological aspects of individual 
terrorists will make them more or less likely to engage in suicide terrorism with emphasis on 
collective identity and social psychology.39 This perspective, even if it concerns an individual, 
once again relates back to societal influences.
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It is important to note this interconnectivity of causes. As is the case in the study of the 
causes of crime, there are many potentially influential causal factors related to suicide 
terrorism. A better understanding of all contributing factors, as well as the relationships 
among the factors, governments, and law enforcement, will enable the global community to 
address properly the rising phenomenon of suicidal terrorism.
The articles analyzed are used to identify the root causes of suicide terrorism specified in the 
literature. The data are grouped by the theorized cause that an individual author proposes. 
Although each theory varies slightly from others in the same group, theorized causes can 
be broadly limited to four categories: individual-level motivations, organizational-level 
motivations, theories of societal influence, and some combination of those three approaches. 
Tables that contain summaries of reviewed articles by theory are provided in Appendices B, 
C, and D of this essay.
Individual-Level Motivations
The desire to understand why and how individuals can decide to sacrifice themselves to 
kill others is natural. For many this mentality is unfathomable. Whether one has been 
personally influenced by an attack or one has witnessed the effects of suicide terrorism 
from afar, it is difficult for observers to comprehend how someone can be so dedicated to 
violence against others that they are willing to make that ultimate sacrifice. Individual-level 
theories stem from an effort to understand the individuals that engage in suicide missions. 
Many of the early theories employed to explain the motivations of suicide terrorists focused 
on the individual level, including nine of the articles analyzed in this systematic review. It is 
now generally acknowledged that there is not necessarily a psychological profile of those 
who are willing to commit what many people, cultures and religions consider to be a grave 
sin. The Committee of the Psychological Roots of Terrorism for the Madrid Summit on 
Terrorism, Security and Democracy in 2005 explicitly stated that individual-level theories 
that suggest a psychological abnormality of the attacker are incapable of explaining the 
phenomenon.40 This perception has not hindered research in the area of individual-level 
motivations, although many theories now incorporate various levels, as will be discussed in 
a later section.
A common question among researchers is whether suicide terrorists can be categorized 
as suicidal.41 Pedahzur, Perliger, and Weinberg acknowledge what others have noticed as 
well, that suicide terrorists do not exhibit common characteristics of individuals bent on 
suicide.42 They suggest instead that suicide terrorists fall into a new category of suicide 
typology, that of fatalistic-altruistic suicides and define this typology as individuals who fit 
into both Durkheim’s altruistic and fatalistic typologies of suicide behavior. In this case the 
individual sees their suicide as a duty to the group (altruistic) and has suffered from long-
term political and economic oppression and has no hope for their future (fatalistic). Kimhi 
and Even take a slightly different approach, arguing that there is not one single profile, but 
that suicide bombers can be grouped into four typologies: religious, exploited, retribution 
for suffering, and social/nationalist, where each is attributed different prerequisite and 
supporting factors.43 This theory suggests that every case of suicide terrorism required a 
motivated individual, the technical system to carry out the attack, and a condoning political 
leader. Beyond these similarities, the different prerequisite factors and supporting factors 
associated with each typology range from religious interpretations encouraging terror to 
political awareness and belief that armed struggle and suicide missions are vital to national 
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liberation. Similarly, Orbach refers to prerequisite and supporting factors as ‘facilitators of 
suicide’ and suggests that these facilitators, combined with a sociological typology of the 
altruistic suicide, are at the root of suicide terrorism.44
One thing is obvious: suicide terrorists do not exist in a vacuum but are consistently impacted 
by the world around them. Each of the individual-level theories acknowledge that events 
within society, family, and an individual’s life contribute to the ultimate decision to engage 
in suicide missions. The debate concerning what is the most influential factor remains 
undecided. Whether suicide terrorists are completely altruistic, sacrificing themselves for 
the benefit of future generations, whether they experienced some trauma earlier in life that 
led them on this course, or they are making a rational, tactical choice under a belief that they 
will succeed against a hardened target for the benefit of their organization, understanding 
each individual’s motivation is difficult. When one simply considers cultural and religious 
differences, it is easy to see where determining a single profile for the suicide terrorist may 
be impossible.45 Jacques and Taylor examined suicide-terror attacks perpetrated by groups 
in the Middle East and Chechnya as well as Al Qaeda and the LTTE in an effort to determine 
common factors concerning suicide terror in general and found differences in motivations 
between men and women.46 For women, motivations were often based on personal events, 
and recruitment was done through peer influence, exploitation and self-promotion. For 
men, motivations were based on religious and nationalistic ideologies and recruitment was 
done through peer influence, exploitation, self-promotion and religious persuasion.
The difficulty in determining a single individual profile brings us to theories that focus on 
organizational-level motivations.
Organizational-Level Motivations
Theories focusing solely on organizational-level motivations are far more rare than other 
level theories encompassing only five of the articles analyzed in this paper. The obvious 
influence that society and the individual’s organization have on the decisions of the individual 
lends credence to theories that stress combinations of influential factors. The idea that 
suicide terrorism is used as a tactic against a militarily-superior enemy has been discussed 
previously in various sections of this review and is an integral part of combination theories 
discussed in the next sections, but it has an especially important place in organizational-
level theories. In her 1987 article, “Theories of Terrorism,” Crenshaw proposed that terrorism 
could be analyzed on two different levels, both of which are centered on the organizational 
level and remain applicable to theories of suicide terror. From one perspective, violence is 
employed by an organization to affect political change, and from the other, the purpose of 
the organization’s actions is simply to sustain the organization. Ayers suggests that suicide 
terrorism is used strategically by an organization to gain tactical advantage over the enemy 
and to aid in recruitment efforts.47 Although both these strategic and promotional goals 
coincide with Crenshaw’s framework, the concept that suicide terrorism is nothing more 
than a rational, strategic weapon and cannot be attributed to any irrational influence is 
a difficult one to accept.48 If emotion and personal choice play no part in the decision to 
engage in suicide missions, then efforts to create policy to counter suicide attacks become 
inconsequential. As long as there is strategic benefit to the attacks, this theory suggests 
that they will continue to be used. Pape agrees, suggesting that terrorism is employed for 
one of two reasons: to force government to change policy and/or to mobilize additional 
recruits and financial aid for the organization.49 Suicide terrorism is the coercive instrument 
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of choice for terrorist groups simply because it is perceived that it works. Ergil conducted a 
study focusing on The Worker’s Party of Kurdistan (PKK) and determined a somewhat more 
palatable organizational theory.50 He suggests that group dynamics and the influence of an 
‘omnipotent’ leader contribute to the use of suicide tactics by an organization and require 
a significant amount of coercion and force from leadership. This suggests at least that the 
removal of a fanatical leader can help to eliminate the possibility of suicide attacks from a 
particular organization.
Societal-Level Theories
In addition to organizational-level forces influencing the engagement of a particular group 
in suicide missions, many scholars have noted that while some groups are willing to use 
suicide tactics, other groups with similar ideologies and characteristics will refrain. Many 
analysts attribute this in large part to societal-level factors, and six of the articles analyzed 
below examine these societal influences. From conditioning and education to community 
support, theorists have been drawn to societal influences to explain both individual and 
group actions with respect to suicide terrorism. Upon analyzing the education system for 
Palestinian children between 1980 and 2000, Burdman found that literature, media, and 
educational faculty contributed to a conditioning campaign that infused children with the 
idea of becoming martyrs.51 An authoritarian society, religious and nationalist learning, 
educational techniques, group processes, programming and conditioning, indoctrination, 
and emotion all had significant and negative effects on the individual mental health of 
the children exposed to these influences. Learning from the earliest ages to see suicide 
terrorism as an honorable endeavor solidifies the notion for the rest of one’s life, making it a 
cultural mentality and especially difficult to change. Although Burdman’s study was limited 
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this trend in societal and cultural marketing and belief 
can be seen in other areas as well.52 Post suggests that even second and third generation 
emigrants that are now joining the global Salafi jihad experience the feelings of loss and 
deprivation commonly attributed to causal theories of suicide terrorism.53 In the case of 
the LTTE, suicide terrorism was framed in a light such that it was marketed as heroism. 
Ramasubramanian suggests that the fear of death, on a societal level, can motivate people 
to heroism.54 With cultural beliefs that adhere to the martyrdom-equals-heroism concept, 
it is easier to understand how individuals would be influenced to engage in suicide-terror 
attacks.
The LTTE’s fear of death, as Ramasubramanian refers to it, can be related to a cultural 
frustration that is noted by several researchers within the Palestinian population.55 Khashan 
suggests that a combination of Palestinian collective frustration, Political Islam, and extreme 
poverty leads to the use of suicide terror as a tactic.56 Although poverty has been disqualified 
as a causal factor in the number of suicide terror attacks, researchers have not disqualified 
the influence of poverty on individual and community stressors.57 Benmelech, Berrebi, and 
Klor suggest that poor economic conditions, especially high unemployment, allow terrorist 
organizations to recruit better educated, more mature suicide terrorists to their cause and 
improve the quality of potential targets.58
The current targeting of Western democratic countries by terrorist organizations, often 
originating from non-democratic nations, has led some researchers to analyze the question 
of whether regime type effects the likelihood of being targeted for suicide terrorism as well 
as the likelihood of producing suicide terrorists. Jackson, Wade and Reiter hypothesized 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 9 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Harmon, Mujkic, Kaukinen & Weir,  Causes & Explanations of Suicide Terrorism: A Systematic Review  12
that democracies and especially mixed regimes would be more likely to experience suicide 
terrorism.59 This hypothesis was not supported by their research. However, they did find 
nation size, Islam, and national and global experience with suicide terrorism to be correlated 
to suicide terrorism. The study found that regime type is uncorrelated with suicide terrorism 
but was marginally correlated to the number of religious minorities at risk within the 
nation. The society we live in and the culture that we grow up a part of have an astounding 
impact on our lives and how we interact with the rest of the world. These societal-level 
theories consider these impacts to be the root causes of suicide terrorism, however even 
more theories have emerged that consider them to be a significant part of the cause while 
maintaining the importance of individual and organizational influences to the process as 
well.
Combination Theories
The vast majority of theories in the last decade, along with some of the earliest studies, 
have suggested a combination of factors at the individual, organizational, and societal 
levels. In fact, 25 of the 45 articles take this combination approach. Often listed as one of 
the three pre-eminent studies of suicide terrorism causal theories, Merari’s “The Readiness 
to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East” posits that four distinct groups of 
factors influence an individual’s decision to participate in a suicide terror attack: “cultural 
factors, indoctrination, situational factors, and personality factors.”60 He suggests that if the 
person is suicidal, the organization simply provides the excuse necessary to commit suicide. 
Although the idea that suicide terrorists are suicidal has been refuted by more recent 
research, the combination of individual, organizational, and societal-level forces to explain 
suicide terrorism is a lasting concept.61 Atran suggested that suicide terrorism was used 
as a weapon of psychological warfare against the greater population while putting strong 
emphasis on organizational and institutional roles in motivations.62 At the individual level, 
a combination of psychological and cultural elements makes individuals more susceptible 
to recruitment. Atran later argued that analyzing the individual terrorists and attempting 
to develop a profile of the suicide terrorist is inconsequential.63 The focus should be placed 
on society’s perception of global Jihad and the organizational and group dynamics of the 
greater terrorist networks but specifically of the cells involved in suicide terrorism. Similarly, 
Pape argues that a combination of strategic, social, and individual logic supports suicide 
terrorism as an effective form of terrorism; however, the strategic element unifies the others 
and ultimately enables the terrorists’ agenda.64
Berman and Laitin’s theory of hardened targets coincides with the idea that strategic 
advantage is at the forefront of the motivation.65 They argue that suicide terrorism is a 
rational decision; it incorporates an assessment that a successful attack on a hard, well-
protected target that could withstand a conventional insurgency attack outweighs the cost 
of losing one member. Moghadam also agrees, arguing that a combination of individual 
and organizational-level motivations contributes to the use of suicide terror as a tactic.66 At 
the individual level, several factors influence the potential suicide bomber, but they are not 
always the same combination of factors. At the organizational level, organizational goals 
and strategies are integrated in recruitment, training, and indoctrination to support the use 
of suicide terror as a tactic.
While some researchers place the greatest part of the motivation squarely with organizational 
strategy, others consider it to be only one element of the motivation behind a suicide attack. 
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Brym and Araj argue that often revenge and retaliation are among the most important 
elements at both an individual level and an organizational level.67 Gill places emphasis on 
political and social psychology and group dynamics as the root causes of suicide terror.68 Post, 
Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff, and Weine argue that from a psychological perspective, 
collective identity and normality have the greatest bearing, but that economics, history, 
politics and anthropology contribute as well.69 Pedahzur considers the organizational-level 
motivations and individual-level motivations to be of equal importance and developed a 
three-stage model for explaining suicide terrorism involving organizational leadership 
decision-making, individual motivations, and organizational recruitment, socialization, and 
employment.70
Regardless of which level of motivation is considered most important to a specific researcher, 
the number of articles that follow this combination model demonstrates a new trend towards 
acknowledging the complicated and unique motivations for suicide terror.
Research Methods
Current research focused on explaining suicide terrorism has been largely conducted using 
three distinct methods: review and critique of other theories and research; psychological 
autopsies using interviews and open source data; and empirical analysis of data compiled on 
various suicide attacks. Table 1, located below, shows how many of the documents analyzed 
as part of this systematic review used each method. Most of the articles on the topic fall 
into the first category and take on a narrative form discussing the merits or limitations of 
other research.71 Commonly included in these narratives are models presented by Robert 
Pape, Mia Bloom, and David Laitin and Eli Berman.72 The second method, although far less 
common than the first, has significantly more potential to be able to analyze individual-level 
motivations. Psychological autopsies are interviews conducted with close family and friends 
and, for perpetrators of successful suicide missions, they are the closest thing to first-hand 
accounts that are available to researchers.73 Although not without limitations, this method 
provides a unique approach to data collection. Some researchers took a different approach 
to the psychological autopsy, collecting their data from literature published about various 
attacks, attackers and the groups to which they belong.74
The third method is characterized by researchers using various databases of suicide attacks 
to conduct empirical analysis on different aspects of each attack.75 The variety of databases 
included Lexis Nexis’ online database of world news media, Freedom House and Polity data, 
Israeli Security Agency’s reports on Palestinian suicide terrorists that attacked or attempted 
to attack in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the online database of the 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ITC) in Herzliya, Israel, among others.
In a few cases, the methods used did not fit neatly into any of the three aforementioned 
categories of methods. For instance, Azam uses literature on economics in conflict and 
economics of terrorism as well as other microeconomic theories in order to show changes to 
individual investment in suicide bombing as it relates to increased wealth and education.76 
Moghadam created a framework of analysis that examined the process of the suicide attack 
from initial motivation to execution at both the individual and organizational level and 
applied it to various theories of motivation for the bomber and aspects of the organization.77 
Gill used examples of various suicide attacks and the actions of suicide bombers to describe 
a common progression through the life of a suicide bomber in an effort to establish the 
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contributions of individual, group and societal factors to suicide terrorism.78 Burdman 
reviewed 31 educational textbooks published prior to 2000 and used by the Palestinian 
Authority’s Ministry of Education as well as various media programs and publications in 
order to analyze the conditioning of children in Palestine.79 Each of these studies helped to 
improve the quality of research and the understanding that we have of the field of suicide 
terrorism in their own way.
Table 1: Types of Research Methods Used
Research Method Number of Articles 
Using this Method
Review and Critique of other theories and research 21
Psychological Autopsies 2
Empirical analysis 14
Other (Including combinations of the above methods) 8
Limitations
Suicide terrorism is not a topic that is easily studied. Fortunately, suicide attacks constitute 
a very small percentage of terror attacks and insurgency efforts worldwide. The nature of 
suicide terrorism elicits limitations, especially concerning the current preoccupation with 
Islamic Jihadists and in developing adequate research methods.
Religious Extremist Focus
The focus on Islamic Jihadists in today’s media and Western defense structure is a result 
of not only the recent increase in the use of suicide tactics by these groups but also the 
sheer magnitude of destruction resulting from the attacks of 9/11. Unfortunately, this 
preoccupation has been reflected unavoidably in academic research. Some would argue that 
this pre-occupation with Islamic Jihadist attacks is justified by the prevalence of such attacks 
in current statistics. In addition to Islamic jihadist attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan, individual 
articles also focus on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the LTTE and Chechen terrorists, as well 
as attacks that take place within oppressive regimes throughout the world.80 Several articles 
focus specifically on Islamic militant groups and Middle Eastern suicide terrorism.81 The 
majority of research considers all suicide attacks in one dataset. While this seems the most 
effective way to diminish any potential bias towards the influence of religious extremism, the 
statistical difference between the number of attacks perpetrated by groups with no religious 
motivation and those with extreme religious views skews the available data. Researchers 
that have used global suicide terrorism within their dataset unfortunately have significantly 
more data for these groups. Interestingly, this may be a limitation, but few have indicated 
that religion is a cause for suicide terrorism. Many suggest that religion is helpful to an 
organization to recruit suicide terrorists and to justify their involvement in suicide attacks, 
but that religion is not significant as a causal factor.
The very nature of suicide terrorism does not lend itself to academic research. Researchers 
are limited in their potential methods by the success of a suicide attack. Some authors attempt 
to overcome this by conducting psychological autopsies as their primary data collection 
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method. However, the psychological autopsy is dependent on the memories, opinions 
and openness of the families and friends of the bombers. Others rely on statistical data 
surrounding the suicide attacks themselves, but this approach has the potential to ignore 
important individual-level elements. Interviewing failed bombers discounts the differences 
between these individuals and those that succeeded in carrying out their attack. Every 
individual research method has its limitations, but in the case of suicide terrorism, these 
limitations have so far hindered the academic community from establishing an accepted 
causal theory. The recent trend towards theories that suggest a combination of individual, 
organizational and societal influences has begun to incorporate the evidence presented by 
prior research suggesting that combining several different research methods may be a way 
to diminish the limitations of a single method and incorporate the combined evidence of the 
past.
Discussion
Academic research to explain the foundation of suicide terrorism has, in recent years, 
greatly expanded. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, suicide terrorism has been at 
the forefront of both media attention and security concern all around the world. During 
development of any security policy, defense and government officials understand the need 
to address the root causes of the issue in order to develop effective and lasting response 
programs. Unfortunately, in the early days of modern suicide terrorism when causal research 
was limited, without accurate research, policy was developed based on perceived elements 
that have since proven to be less impactful than originally anticipated. Recent research has 
begun to improve our understanding of the root causes of suicide terrorism, but with the 
growing popularity of suicide terrorism as a terrorist-organizational tactic, there remains a 
need to continue expanding our knowledge in the area.
This systematic review revealed several important characteristics of current research. First, 
the vast majority of research in this subject consists of literature reviews and theories based 
on previous research, either research on suicide terrorism or research on related subjects 
such as suicide or terrorism in general. Causes of suicide terrorism are difficult to study by 
their very nature. The success of a mission requires the death of the attacker and leaves 
researchers with limited options for collecting data. They are restricted to after-the-fact data 
collection by the target state or interviews with attackers who failed or abandoned their 
mission, would be attackers, or family and friends, all of which may limit the applicability of 
their findings when applying them to successful attackers. Despite the difficulty that arises 
from the lack of available primary sources, there have been empirical studies conducted that 
make use of the data available. This type of research demonstrates the ability to conduct 
more robust and verifiable studies, which could benefit greatly our knowledge of causal 
factors.
Secondly, although earlier research considered individual elements of suicide terrorism 
as main contributing factors, more recent research has acknowledged the need for a 
multidimensional approach to both research and policy development. Both academics 
and policy makers have begun to see suicide terror as resulting from interacting factors 
at the individual, organizational, and societal levels. There may be one factor that has the 
greatest impact for an individual or an organization to engage in suicide terrorism, however, 
it is unlikely that this factor is the same in every situation. The most effective reactive and 
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preventative policies will address suicide terrorism from multiple directions in order to 
ensure the greatest level of applicability to the situation. This does not limit the value of 
understanding individual aspects of specific groups and societies. For instance, policies that 
attempt to address poverty, collective humiliation, religious fanaticism, and community 
support may be an effective combination of efforts within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 
comparison, those that address exploitation, coerced participation and reciprocal violence 
may be more effective in situations similar to the LTTE’s struggle against the Sri Lankan 
government.
Finally, several researchers have focused not on root causes but on the spread of suicide 
terrorism.82 This new global phenomenon has significantly increased the number of attacks 
as well as the number of states directly affected, whether as targets or as perpetrators. 
Developing effective policy will depend on addressing the root causes of suicide terrorism 
using a multidimensional approach, the spread of suicide terrorism on a national and 
international level, and the influence of the media in both of these areas. The power of media 
and propaganda in today’s society is overwhelming and highly prominent in both of these 
areas. Without effective policy that addresses the media, other efforts have the potential 
to be significantly less effectual. Cooperative efforts to acquire a stronger understanding of 
the causes and characteristics of suicide-terrorist practices, as well as researchers’ increased 
willingness to respond to progressive research using a multidimensional approach, will help 
develop further preventative programs to limit the risk of future attacks.
Limitations of Current Research
Given the inherent difficulty in studying suicide terrorism, it is not surprising to see the 
limitations of current research. However, researchers have been making progress in 
minimizing these limitations. Although suicide attacks constitute a very small percentage 
of terror attacks and insurgency efforts worldwide, their increasing frequency and their 
lethality are generating greater interest among academics, governments, and the civilian 
population. It is important not to let the current preoccupation with Islamic Jihadists create 
tunnel vision and a subsequent void in research that is generalizable to other groups. It 
is also essential to remember that current evidence suggests that while religion may be 
helpful to an organization to recruit suicide terrorists and justify their involvement in suicide 
attacks, it is not significant as a causal factor and we should keep that in mind. Researchers 
have also begun to counter the limitations that have arisen from the difficulty in developing 
research methods that can account for the death of the attacker. By diversifying the research 
methods used and beginning to move away from narrative critiques of older works, we 
begin to get a bigger, more complete picture that has led us to see the importance of several 
different levels of motivation.
Future Research
This field can continue to be enriched by further empirical research. Diversifying the 
research methods will help to counter unavoidable limitations of other studies, as those 
studies will help to fill in gaps in future efforts. Areas that require greater consideration 
range from the difference between individual motivations of men and women, as well as 
organizational differences in employing men and women, to comparing suicide tactics to 
non-suicide tactics.83 In our current age of technology and global media, the influence of 
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information sharing cannot be ignored, Although some authors have acknowledged its 
importance, this is a concept that has largely been left out of causal research. The role of 
media as an amplifier of global and individual reactions should be examined in far greater 
detail.84 Strong research methods and frameworks need to be employed to take into account 
interactions among people, groups, and society as a whole while considering individual, 
social, and organizational factors.85
Finally, Crenshaw notes that greater distinction should be made between types of suicide 
attacks and between the expected outcomes of the attack.86 The difficulty with fulfilling 
this improvement to future research is that suicide attacks are, relatively speaking, few 
in number. Although a distinction should be made, this may create further limitations by 
diminishing the sample size.
Policy Implications
The attacks of September 11, 2001 launched renewed interest in counterterrorism around 
the world. The limited research that had been performed concerning the subject of causes 
for suicide terrorism unfortunately restricted new policies to address either identified causes 
of terrorism and insurgency in general or speculated causes of suicide terrorism. Research 
in the field has progressed substantially, and we now acknowledge the complex relationship 
of factors that lead to suicide-terror attacks. Although there is not a single agreed-upon 
cause, several elements have repeatedly been shown to have an effect and policy can now 
address these issues more effectively.
Societal influences have been acknowledged by many of the leading experts in this field 
and it is, therefore, not surprising that many suggest policy reforms that act at a societal 
and community level. Intelligent aid services are emphasized as the first step to combating 
suicide terrorism.87 Improving and strengthening local organizations to be able to provide 
better social services and education will give the people somewhere to look for aid other 
than terrorist groups, reducing their importance to the community.88 Creating alternative 
options for potential suicide terrorists can help to reduce their participation and allegiance 
to extremist religious terror organizations.89 Additionally, addressing religious and gender 
inequality in areas of frequent terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks is important to both 
human rights efforts and counterterrorism.90 Although some research has disqualified the 
impact of the economy on the quantity of suicide terrorism, ‘the war on poverty’ approach 
to counterterrorism can be effective provided that it follows an evidence-based approach to 
the actual impact of the economy on terrorism and societies that produce terrorists.91
Individually-targeted counterterrorism efforts are much more difficult to identify than those 
on the societal level, however, policies that prevent individuals from beginning down a 
pathway to suicide terrorism are essential in the long run. In the short term, focusing on the 
organizational level has the potential for more immediate results but also for subsequent 
impact at the individual level later on.92 Organizationally-targeted policy that focuses on 
dissension within the group, facilitated exit from the group, and delegitimizing the leaders 
will help to reduce suicide terrorism.93 Policy responses need to incorporate and address 
interactions among people, groups, and society as a whole, taking into account the individual, 
social, and organizational factors that contribute to the phenomenon.94
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 9 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Harmon, Mujkic, Kaukinen & Weir,  Causes & Explanations of Suicide Terrorism: A Systematic Review  18
About the Authors
Vanessa Harmon has been a member of the Canadian Armed Forces since 2003. She has a 
BSc in physics and space sciences from the Royal Military College of Canada and a Master’s of 
Criminal Justice from the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs. She is currently working 
in Ottawa as an Aerospace Engineer in the Royal Canadian Air Force holding the rank of 
Major. She may be reached at vanessa.harmon@forces.gc.ca .
Edin Mujkic, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of 
Colorado, Colorado Springs. His work is focused on professional military education, national 
security and U.S. foreign policy, homeland security and emergency management, as well as 
the general field of public administration. His research has appeared in Public Administration 
Quarterly, Public Integrity, and Democracy & Security, among other outlets. He may be reached 
at emujkic@uccs.edu .
Catherine Kaukinen, Ph.D., is a Professor and Chair in the Department of Criminal Justice 
at the University of Central Florida. Kaukinen’s research interests include intimate partner 
violence, risk and protective factors for violent victimization, the history of Title IX and Federal 
initiatives to address violence against college women, and the evaluation of campus-based 
violence against women prevention and intervention programs. Her research has appeared 
in Criminology, Journal of Marriage and Family, Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 
Journal of Interpersonal Violence, and Trauma, Violence, and Abuse, among other outlets. She 
may be reached at Catherine.Kaukinen@ucf.edu .
Henriikka Weir, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in the School of Public Affairs at the 
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs. Dr. Weir is also a former police officer. Her research 
interests revolve mainly around the intersection of childhood maltreatment, intimate 
partner violence, trauma, substance abuse, violence, and delinquency / adult offending. She 
also studies the causes, correlates, and effects of trauma among police officers. Dr. Weir’s 
research has been published in Journal of Criminal Justice and Behavior, Journal of Criminal 
Justice, Journal of Criminal Justice Education, Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, Criminal Justice 
Studies, and Violence and Crime in the Family among others. She may be reached at Hweir@
uccs.edu . 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 9 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Harmon, Mujkic, Kaukinen & Weir,  Causes & Explanations of Suicide Terrorism: A Systematic Review  19
Appendix A
Articles Excluded from the Review
Karin Andriolo, “Murder by Suicide: Episodes from Muslim History,” 
American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002): 736-742.
Reason for Exclusion: This article analyzes three different cases of ‘murder by suicide’ from 
history to determine historical symbolic strategies to reconcile the potential killer with his or 
her death, not to explain the cause or motivation to engage in suicide terrorism.
Scott Ashworth, Joshua D. Clinton, Adam Meirowitz and Kristopher 
Ramsay, “Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” 
The American Political Science Review 102, no. 2 (2008): 269-273.
Reason for Exclusion: This article focuses on critiquing Robert Pape’s 2003 book “The 
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” The authors suggest that Pape’s research design 
cannot be used adequately to reveal “relevant statistical associations between the use of 
suicide terror and its possible correlates.” (p. 269) Although critiques of research design 
are important for improving knowledge of a specific field, the article will not be used in the 
review .
Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi, “Human Capital and the 
Productivity of Suicide Bombers,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 
no. 3 (2007): 223-238.
Reason for Exclusion: This article analyzes the relationship between human capital 
(education, experience) and suicide bombing, finding that older, more experienced attackers 
are assigned to more important targets and are less likely to fail.
Clara Beyler, “Messengers of Death: Female Suicide Bombers,” Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism, 2003. 
Accessed September 3, 2014. http://www.ict.org.il/Article/854/Messengers%20of%20
Death%20-%20Female%20Suicide%20Bombers.
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Reason for Exclusion: Although this article alludes to some of the motivations of female 
suicide bombers around the world, the focus is on describing the history and impact of 
women in this role, especially the differences in use and exploitation by different groups.
Matthew B. Capell and Emile Sahliyeh, “Suicide Terrorism: Is Religion the 
Critical Factor?” Security Journal 20 (2007): 267-283.
Reason for Exclusion: Rather than discuss explanations of suicide terrorism specifically, this 
article focuses on religion and suicide terrorism as explanations for the increased lethality of 
modern terrorism in general. It is interesting and helpful to consider suicide terrorism as a 
cause and not just an outcome; however, this is outside the scope of this essay.
D. Suba Chandran, “Suicide Terrorism in South Asia: From Promised 
Land to Presumed Land,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, (2003). 
Accessed September 4 2014. http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/suicide-terrorism-in-south-asia-
from-promised-land-to-presumed-1085.html .
Reason for Exclusion: The focus of this article is to highlight the dissimilarities between 
suicide attacks perpetrated in Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. Although the author briefly 
touches on nationalistic motivations versus religious motivations, the purpose is not to 
discuss causes of suicide terrorism.
Martha Crenshaw, “Suicide Terrorism in Comparative Perspective,” 
in Countering Suicide Terrorism, by Boaz Ganor, (Herzliya, Israel: The 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002).
Reason for Exclusion: In this article, although the author briefly outlines theorized causes of 
suicide terrorism at the individual, organizational and cultural levels, the focus is on relating 
suicide terrorism to terrorism in general, as well as outlining similarities to self-immolation 
and hunger strikes.
Stephen F. Dale, “Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia: Anticolonial Terrorism 
in India, Indonesia and the Philippines,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, 
no. 1 (1988): 37-59.
Reason for Exclusion: This article stresses the importance of understanding the historical 
use of suicide attacks throughout the history of Middle Eastern religious conflict in order 
to better comprehend modern suicide terror. The author alludes to this historical use as an 
influence in creating a culture that supports suicide attacks, but does not specifically discuss 
causes of suicide terrorism.
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Adam Dolnik, “Die and Let Die: Exploring Links Between Suicide 
Terrorism and Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear Weapons,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 1 (2003): 17-35.
Reason for Exclusion: This article considers the nuances of contemporary suicide terrorism 
and how they are not indicative of an increased likeliness to use mass-casualty attacks with 
WMDs.
Linda Butler, “Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope: 
An Interview with Eyad El Sarraj,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 4 
(2002): 71-76.
Reason for Exclusion: Although this article goes into some detail about the psychological-
level motivations of Palestinian suicide bombers, the article is not included in the review 
because it does not include reproducible research. The dialogue between Butler and El 
Sarraj is included in the discussion.
Roxanne L. Euben, “Killing (for) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political 
Action,” Political Theory 30, no. 1 (2002): 4-35.
Reason for Exclusion: The focus of this article is on defining and clarifying Jihad and explaining 
the role of Jihad in the political sense. It does not detail a theory of suicide terrorism causes.
Jeremy Ginges, Ian Hansen, and Ara Norenzayan, “Religion and Support 
for Suicide Attacks,” Psychological Science 20, no. 2 (2009): 224-230.
Reason for Exclusion: The authors focus on relating religion to popular support for suicide 
terrorism. Although there is evidence within their study showing that religion influences the 
willingness to participate in martyrdom, overall popular support is the intended dependent 
variable.
Harvey Gordon, “The ‘Suicide’ Bomber: Is it a Psychiatric Phenomenon?” 
Psychiatric Bulletin 26, no. 8 (2002): 285-287.
Reason for Exclusion: The author discusses whether suicide bombing can be described in 
psychiatric terms similar to those of ‘suicide’. Although he comes to the conclusion that suicide 
bombings are mostly political and there is not currently sufficient psychiatric understanding 
of the phenomenon, he does not get into the deeper causes of suicide terrorism.
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Rohan Gunaratna, “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda,” The Washington 
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2004): 91-100.
Reason for Exclusion: This article focuses on the changes to terrorist ideologies after 2001 
and the effects that Al Qaeda, Iraq, and Afghanistan have had on terrorism as a security 
threat in recent years. The author looks at the changing security environment and how 
counterterrorism needs to adapt to this environment.
Simon Haddad, “A Comparative Study of Lebanese and Palestinian 
Perceptions of Suicide Bombings: The Role of Militant Islam and Socio-
Economic Status,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 45, 
(2004): 337-363.
Reason for Exclusion: This article examines the difference between Palestinian and 
Lebanese support for suicide attacks as a tactic. The author found that political Islam was 
the most important determinant of support and more prevalent among Palestinians than 
Lebanese even though approval was stronger among Lebanese.
Mohammed M. Hafez, “Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of 
Suicide Bombers,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of 
Martyrdom, by Ami Pedahzur, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).
Reason for Exclusion: The author considers the individual- level motivations for suicide 
tactics and suggests that the symbolism surrounding ‘martyrdom’, largely framed by the 
organization and society, gives individuals the justification for their own personal motivation. 
The focus of this narrative is not to present a theory of individual motivations but rather to 
present a test that can help to evaluate rational models of explaining suicide terrorism at the 
individual level and to show the way ahead for researchers to understand the symbolism 
and social meaning of the acts themselves to the bombers (p. 56).
Mohammed M. Hafez, “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists 
Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 19, no. 1 (2007): 95-115.
Reason for Exclusion: As the author explicitly states, the focus of the article is to show how 
specific groups frame their actions to achieve communication goals by manipulating their 
narratives. The study does not address the motivations of individual suicide attackers and is 
not included in the Systematic Review.
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Michael C. Horowitz, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: 
The Case of Suicide Terrorism,” International Organization 64, no. 1 (2010): 
33-64.
Reason for Exclusion: The author focuses on the spread of suicide terrorism between 
groups and the potential to be able to identify which groups may be open to adopting suicide 
terrorism as a tactic. As the focus is not on identifying the root cause of suicide terrorism, 
the article is not included in the Systematic Review.
Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religion as a Cause of Terrorism,” in The Roots of 
Terrorism (Democracy and Terrorism), by Louise Richardson (New York, NY: 
Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2006).
Reason for Exclusion: Although this article relies heavily on studies of suicide terrorism, 
specifically Robert Pape’s 2005 book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, the 
focus is on discussing religious violence and religion as a cause for terrorism generally.
Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah,” in Origins of Terrorism: 
Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, by Walter Reich, 
(Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990).
Reason for Exclusion: Although other researchers in the field (Piazza, 2008; Pape, 2003) 
have cited this article as one of the few pre-2000 research documents on the subject of 
suicide terrorism, the article describes the moral justification that Hizballah used to sanction 
suicide terrorism as a tactic after the fact as opposed to the root causes of the act itself. The 
article was used within this research but was excluded from the comparison table.
Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: 
Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 
(2003): 119-144.
Reason for Exclusion: Although the authors present a brief description of the economic 
conditions of various suicide bombers (pp. 135-137) in order to dispel the idea that poverty 
and education are driving factors in many forms of terrorism, the focus of the article is on 
terrorism in general. For this reason, the article was not included in the systematic review.
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Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 
International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 49-80.
Reason for Exclusion: This article discusses motivations for terrorism in general and not 
motivations for suicide tactics specifically.
Assaf Moghadam, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal 
Approach,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of 
Martyrdom, by Ami Pedahzur, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).
Reason for Exclusion: The purpose of this article is not to describe or debate causes, 
but to build a framework of analysis that can be used for future research. In addition, it 
highlights the importance of studying suicide terrorism on multiple levels acknowledging 
the interactions between them.
Assaf Moghadam, “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation and the Globalization of 
Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
29, no. 8 (2006): 707-729.
Reason for Exclusion: The article does not present a suggested cause but argues that Pape’s 
conclusions in his 2001 book Dying to Win may have been wrongly made due to several 
shortcomings of the research design. Due to the focus of the article, it was not included in 
the review below.
Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the 
Spread of Suicide Attacks,” International Security 33, no. 3 (2008): 46-78.
Reason for Exclusion: The author focuses on the spread of suicide terrorism as a result of 
the increasing appeal of Taqfiri Salafism (the guiding ideology of al-Qaeda and its associates) 
and the evolution of al-Qaeda as a global network.
Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product 
of Psychological Forces,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, 
Theologies, States of Mind, by Walter Reich, (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
Reason for Exclusion: Although other researchers in the field (Piazza, 2008; Pape, 2003) 
have cited this article as one of the few pre-2000 research documents on the subject of 
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suicide terrorism, the article refers to terrorism in general and does not specifically address 
causes of suicide terrorism, but does suggest a psychological cause for the extreme actions 
of terrorism as a tactic. The article was used within this essay, but was excluded from the 
comparison tables.
Joseph Pugliese, “Biotypologies of Terrorism,” Cultural Studies Review 14, 
no. 2 (2008): 49-66.
Reason for Exclusion: In this article, the author strives to impress upon the reader the 
potential negative impacts of using biometrics within the military and law enforcement to 
target individuals by corporeal features. Individuals who embody certain biotypologies are 
subjected to the fear and mistrust of the population as a result of this corporeal targeting. 
Although this is an important issue in terms of limiting panic and developing accurate ways 
of identifying terrorists, this is outside the scope of this article.
Allison G. Smith, “The Implicit Motives of Terrorist Groups: How the 
Needs for Affiliation and Power Translate into Death and Destruction,” 
Political Psychology 29, no. 1 (2008): 55-75.
Reason for Exclusion: In this article, the author shows that group dynamics, specifically 
affiliation and power motives, were especially significant to terrorist organizations. In-group 
and out-group affiliation was shown to be more impactful than power motives in a group’s 
tendency towards terrorism. This research is focused on terrorism in general and does 
not specifically analyze suicide tactics. Although many of the groups that were considered 
engaged in suicide tactics, due to the focus of the article it is not included in the systematic 
review.
Domenico Tosini, “Al-Qaeda’s Strategic Gamble: The Sociology of Suicide 
Bombings in Iraq,” Canadian Journal of Sociology 35, no. 2 (2010): 271-308.
Reason for Exclusion: The author focuses not on causes of suicide terrorism but on why 
some organizations targeted Iraqi Shi’ite civilians instead of targeting occupying military 
forces.
Ellen Townsend, “Suicide Terrorists: Are They Suicidal?” Suicide and Life 
Threatening Behavior 37, no. 1 (2007): 35-49.
Reason for Exclusion: This article describes how empirical studies show that suicide 
terrorists are not suicidal but suggests that psychological autopsies will help improve our 
understanding of suicide terror.
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Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of 
Psychological Approaches,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 
3-42.
This article considers various theories of crime and personality to describe the psychology 
of the terrorist, but does not specifically address suicide terrorism and was, therefore, 
excluded from the systematic review. 
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Appendix B
Summary of Reviewed Articles that Discuss Individual-
level Motivations for Suicide Bombers
 
Pedahzur, Ami, Arie Perliger and Leonard Weinberg. “Altruism and 
Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists.” Deviant 
Behavior 24, no. 4 (2003): 405-423.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Palestinian suicide terrorists from 1993-2002.
Research Method: Using a database that includes both suicide and non-suicide Palestinian 
terrorist attacks against Israel from 1993 to 2002, the authors identified suicide (or attempted 
suicide) terrorists and compiled characteristics of each in order to compare them to non-
suicide terrorists in the same area in an effort to determine the root cause of their suicide 
activities. The authors built their research framework similarly to relative-deprivation 
theories of collective political violence.
Supporting Arguments: Altruistic suicide occurs when an individual is entrenched in an 
organization and feels a duty to commit suicide. The individual sees himself or herself as 
secondary to the whole. Acute altruistic suicide specifically relates to martyrdom. The acute 
altruistic suicide perpetrator believes in a fantastic life after death but sees life as worthless.
Fatalistic suicide is a product of hopelessness that is often the result of continued and 
persistent political and economic oppression.
Conclusions: At an individual level, suicide terrorists fall into a new category of suicide 
typology, that of fatalistic altruistic suicides. 
The authors’ research showed that a combination of altruistic and fatalistic characteristics 
define the Palestinian suicide bombers. The altruistic characteristics were prominent at the 
organizational level and the fatalistic characteristics were prevalent at the individual level, 
thus addressing both levels will be key to policy development.
 
Lester, David, Bijou Yang and Mark Lindsay. “Suicide Bombers: Are 
Psychological Profiles Possible?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 4 
(2004): 283-295.
Terrorist Organization Focus: All (for review of previous research) but the authors used 
Michel and Herbeck (2001) specifically for an in-depth biography of Timothy McVeigh as a 
case study.
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Research Method: Review of existing literature to determine current data and speculation 
about the profile of a suicide bomber, followed by the examination of cases that are similar 
to suicide bombers (but are not).
Supporting Arguments: In the case of Timothy McVeigh, the in-depth biography allowed 
scholars to profile him and categorize his behaviors into a specific type. Although McVeigh 
was not a suicide bomber, his plan included the possibility that he would be required to 
die in order to be successful. This suggests that other suicide bombers may be able to be 
profiled in a similar way.
Conclusions: The authors suggest a psychological cause, particularly a combination of 
individual-level factors such as conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian 
aggression, power, toughness, anti-intraception, and projection (pp. 290-291).
Profiles of suicide bombers could potentially be developed should researchers conduct in- 
depth analyses of individual bomber’s personal histories. They do not suggest that a single 
profile is possible but that there may be a selection of profiles that can be applied.
 
Kimhi, Shaul and Shemuel Even. “Who are the Palestinian Suicide 
Bombers?” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (2004): 815-840.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Palestinian Suicide Bombers
Research Method: Content analysis focuses on identifying patterns in the history of each 
bomber. The authors used a convenient sample using “details that have been published in the 
literature describing suicide terrorists.” (p. 815) They analyzed 60 cases that they categorized 
into four groups: religious, exploited, retribution for suffering, and social/nationalist.
Supporting Arguments: The authors suggested that every case of suicide terrorism required 
a motivated individual, the technical system to carry out the attack, and a condoning political 
leader. Beyond these similarities, each typology had different prerequisite factors (PF) and 
supporting factors (SF).
Religious: PF: religious interpretations encouraging terror and a charismatic leader; SF: 
sympathetic community, groupthink, and family support for the bomber after the attack.
Exploited: PF: individuals that cannot refuse the organization and personal or family problems 
resulting in depression; SF: Sympathetic community and the redemption of sins upon death.
Retribution for Suffering: PF: death or serious injury to someone close, trauma related to the 
Israeli occupation, and continuous difficulty related to the Israeli occupation; SF: sympathetic 
community, and family support for the bomber after the attack.
Social/Nationalist: PF: political awareness and belief that armed struggle and suicide missions 
are vital to liberation; SF: organizational participation in suicide missions, sympathetic 
community, and international media attention.
Conclusions: The authors present four typologies of suicide bombers and attribute different 
prerequisite factors and supporting factors for each typology.
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In addition to the four typologies of the Palestinian suicide terrorist that emerged from the 
authors’ research, they also noticed some overlap and suggested that suicide terrorism is 
the result of both multiple factors and multiple trajectories of the terrorist. They indicate 
that this research examines personal psychological motivations of the suicide bomber and 
it is important that political and social approaches be integrated into the solution.
 
Orbach, Israel. “Terror Suicide: How is it Possible?” Archives of Suicide 
Research 8, no. 1 (2004): 115-130.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Although the author does not indicate a specific group focus, 
he maintains concentration on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Research Method: Analysis of research and open-source media information on various 
suicide attacks.
Supporting Arguments: The author argues that cultural values contribute to the willingness 
of suicide attackers to act but only in conjunction with certain facilitators, including an 
“enthusiastic determination to achieve a goal, ideological rage, glorification of the post-self, 
heavenly rewards, materialistic benefits for families, induced dissociative processes, and 
linguistic mediation.” (p. 115) Through his observation of the preparation phase of a suicide 
bomber’s training, many of the elements he describes are made evident.
Conclusions: A combination of what the author refers to as ‘facilitators of suicide’ and a 
sociological typology of altruistic suicide is suggested as the root cause of suicide terrorism.
The author suggests a preliminary profile of the suicide bomber as possessing several 
characteristics: religiosity, tendency for identification, self-collectivistic perception, 
suggestibility, imagination, naiveté, magical thinking, and aspirations for personal fame.
 
Azam, Jean-Paul. “Suicide Bombing as Inter-Generational Investment.” 
Public Choice 122, no. 1-2 (2005): 177-198.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Hezbollah
Research Method: The author uses literature on economics in conflict and economics of 
terrorism as well as other microeconomic theories in order to show changes to individual 
investment in suicide bombing as it relates to increased wealth and education.
Supporting Arguments: The author builds an economic model that analyzes the relationship 
between the belief of individual bombers that their actions will benefit future generations 
by providing some public good and the bombers’ intergenerational altruism. He argues that 
education and wealth provide a better understanding of the importance of investment in 
the future and subsequently increase intergenerational altruism.
Conclusions: The author proposes a theory similar to those in economics suggesting that 
the act of suicide bombing benefits, not the current generation, but future generations 
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within the family, especially when applied to wealthy and well- educated suicide bombers in 
Lebanon.
The author suggests that in order to reduce suicide bombings either the average income 
in at-risk populations should be reduced (although he acknowledges that this is not an 
acceptable form of aid), or the cost of performing the attacks must increase (although this is 
difficult to influence p. 193), and further suggests that an intelligent aid policy can influence 
the incidence of suicide terrorism.
 
Speckhard, Anne and Khapta Ahkmedova. “The Making of a Martyr: 
Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 5 
(2006): 429-492
Terrorist Organization Focus: Chechen nationalist groups targeting Russian interests
Research Method: Semi-structured empirical psychological autopsies (interviews with close 
family and friends) of 34 (of a possible 112) suicide terrorists who participated in Chechen 
suicide attacks from 2000-2005 augmented by interviews with surviving hostages of the 
Dubrovka Theatre takeover. The research distinguishes between gender, types of attacks, 
targets, and type of target. It also includes suicide attacks where the attacker survived and 
notes the changing trend in target type from Russian military bases in Chechnya to civilian 
targets in Russia.
Supporting Arguments: Throughout the course of their interviews, the authors noted that 
each of the perpetrators of suicide terrorist attacks had experienced a significant trauma. All 
in the sample had experienced the death or torture of a close family member or friend and 
seen societal-wide trauma. The only two exceptions were those who did not carry out their 
suicide mission. Following this trauma, interviewees noticed a significant change in behavior, 
especially with regard to religion and the justification of martyrdom.
Conclusions: In this research sample, trauma “appears to be the strongest catalyst to deep 
psychological and behavioral changes that ultimately led to the choice of suicide terrorism.” 
(p. 455)
Similar to other research, the authors found that a combination of organizational, societal, 
and individual factors influenced suicide terrorists towards martyrdom. However the 
overarching and strongest element was the presence of a significant trauma. This potential 
cause should be examined in other organizations to determine if it is common to suicide 
terrorism in general, nationalist groups in general, or solely Chechen suicide terrorists.
 
Berman, Eli and David D. Laitin. “Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: 
Testing the Club Model.” Journal of Public Economics 92 (2008): 1942-1967.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah were the primary focus of 
the discussion although some other Palestinian organizations were included in the analysis.
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Research Method: The authors analyzed radical religious rebel groups in order to explain 
why these groups are more likely to use suicide terror than other insurgency organizations. 
They used a club-good model to relate the provision of public goods and the associated self-
sacrifice of members to the effective recruitment and dispatch of suicide bombers.
Supporting Arguments: Upon analyzing several radical religious rebel groups, the authors 
noted a variety of elements that supported their hypothesis: the organizations often provided 
public services to their communities, enforced prohibitions, and required sacrifices of their 
members. The authors also compared the tactical-level decisions of insurgency and suicide 
attacks.
Conclusions: The authors suggest a tactical, rational, motivation by individual terrorists to 
be used against hardened targets as a root cause.
The findings of the study suggest that policy changes in counterterrorism that address 
constructive incentives can combat suicide terror. Creating alternative options for potential 
suicide terrorists can help to reduce their participation and allegiance to extremist religious 
terror organizations.
 
Jacques, Karen and Paul J. Taylor. “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: 
Different Sexes, Different Reasons?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 
4 (2008): 304-326.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Terrorist groups from the Middle East, Chechnya, Al Qaeda, 
and the LTTE were examined for a broad analysis of suicide terrorists in general.
Research Method: A log-linear analysis of 30 female and 30 male suicide terrorists 
differentiating between method of recruitment, motivation for attack, and outcome of 
attack (p. 304).
Supporting Arguments: The authors deconstruct current literature concerning the 
motivations and recruitment of women to extremist terrorism organizations as compared 
to this thesis, developing individual hypotheses for variation between men and women in 
each aspect.
After testing their hypotheses, the only hypothesis not supported by their data showed that 
women were more motivated by revenge and women were equally likely to be proactive in 
their recruitment.
Conclusions: The authors found slight differences in motivations for men and women.
For women: motivations are based on personal events and recruitment through peer 
influence, exploitation, and self-promotion.
For men: motivations are based on religious and nationalistic ideologies and recruitment 
through peer influence, exploitation, self-promotion, and religious persuasion.
The authors suggest that this research brought to light previously unexplored theories of 
female involvement in suicide terrorism. Further exploration and analysis is vital to future 
explanatory models and typologies of suicide terror.
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Kruglanski, Arie, Xiaoyan Chen, Mark Dechesne, Shira Fishman and 
Edward Orehek. “Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the 
Quest for Personal Significance.” Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 331-
357.
Terrorist Organization Focus: All, however the media clips that they analyzed focused on the 
Palestinian bombers and other Islamic extremist and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations.
Research Method: The authors base their theory on established psychological research both 
in the area of suicide terrorism and general human behavior. They analyzed interviews and 
media clips of successful suicide attackers’ statements to determine individual motivations.
Supporting Arguments: “The quest for personal significance has been hailed by psychological 
theorists as a major motivational force in human behavior.” (p. 335)
The reminder of personal mortality enforces commitment and ideology of the group. This 
commitment may help to diminish the fear of death for individual bombers, especially if 
there is a belief in immortality in the afterlife.
The possibility of loss of significance can have a similar effect to the quest for significance.
Conclusions: The combination of personal trauma, frustration, ideology and social pressure 
has been determined to contribute to a decision to engage in suicide terrorism. The authors 
suggest that a quest for personal significance can tie these individual motivations together 
into one overarching framework.
They suggest that policies should address the significance that is attributed to the act of 
suicide terrorism as well as the sense of significance-loss that volunteers feel (p. 353).
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Appendix C
Summary of Reviewed Articles that Discuss 
Organizational-Level Causes of Suicide Terrorism
 
Ergil, Doğu. “Suicide Terrorism in Turkey.” Civil War 3, no. 1 (2000): 37-54.
Terrorist Organization Focus: The Worker’s Party of Kurdistan (PKK)
Research Method: The author examined Turkish-language accounts about the PKK’s suicide 
attacks as well as the culture of the organization itself.
Supporting Arguments: Examination of the suicide attacks conducted by the PKK 
demonstrated that the organization expressly ordered each individual attack. The 
hierarchical, leader-oriented group employed charismatic leaders in a culture that allows for 
suicide attacks in the service of a higher cause. This enabled the organization to justify the 
attacks and influence its members. The author argues that situational factors in the years 
leading up to 1995, including the arrest of the leader, influenced the organization to progress 
into suicide attacks.
Conclusions: The author suggests group dynamics and the influence of an ‘omnipotent’ 
leader in addition to a significant amount of coercion and force from leadership as causal 
factors. The importance of ethnic “difference” to the development of armed rebellion in 
the area provides a focus for future policy development. Addressing religious and gender 
inequality in areas of frequent terrorist and suicide-terrorist attacks could be an effective 
counterterrorism measure.
 
Pape, Robert. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” American 
Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (2003): 28-39.
Terrorist Organization Focus: The study considers 188 suicide attacks from around the 
world from 1980-2001 conducted by various terrorist groups from around the world.
Research Method: Using the Lexis Nexis online database of world news media, Pape 
identified all suicide attacks from 1980-2001 and analyzed each incident for similarities, 
differences, level of success, motivations, and target properties.
Supporting Arguments: The author suggests that every group that uses suicide-terror 
tactics began with less drastic methods and progressed to suicide tactics when their efforts 
failed to get them what they wanted (p. 350). Data analysis found three consistent properties 
between the attacks: timing, nationalist goals, and target selection (p. 347).
Conclusions: Pape suggests that terrorism is perpetrated for one of two reasons: to force 
government to change policy and/or to mobilize additional recruits and financial aid for the 
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organization. Suicide terrorism is simply the coercive instrument of choice for terrorist groups 
because it works. The author suggests that counterterrorism should focus on homeland 
security rather than offensive military action in order to be the most effective. Pape came 
to five conclusions: suicide terrorism is strategic in nature, is specifically designed to coerce 
modern democracies into concessions, has been increasing in frequency because terrorists 
have found it to be an effective tool, produces diminishing returns, and can most effectively 
be countered by reducing terrorists’ confidence in their ability to succeed in their attack.
 
Gambetta, Diego. Can We Make Sense of Suicide Missions? (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).
Terrorist Organization Focus: All groups, organizations, and governments that have used 
suicide missions of any kind in recent history.
Research Method: This narrative discusses similarities on an organizational level between 
groups who engage in suicide missions.
Supporting Arguments: Gambetta identified several generalizations about suicide missions 
(SMs):
1. All suicide missions are organized and supported by an organization.
2. Various types of armed organizations use SMs including legitimate governments.
3. All organizations that use SMs also use conventional tactics.
4. All organizations that use SMs are either not rooted in a community or they have the 
support of their constituency.
5. The weaker side in a conflict carries out all SMs.
Conclusions: The author suggests that at the individual level, there are too many differences 
and unique characteristics to be able to identify a single individual- level motivation but that 
the generalizations at the organizational level help to characterize and identify those who 
may engage in SMs. He highlights the similarities between how governments and people will 
treat their war heroes and how these organizations treat martyrs, emphasizing the idea that 
one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.
 
Gupta, Dipak and Kusum Mundra. “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic 
Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (2005): 573-598.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Hamas and Islamic Jihad within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Research Method: The authors perform empirical analysis of twice-yearly data collected 
on suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad between 1991 and 2003. They determined 
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significant coefficients using a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Ratio and checked their results 
using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression.
Supporting Arguments: The results of the empirical analysis demonstrate a reciprocal 
relationship between suicide bombing and Israeli operations. A reciprocal relationship 
between suicide bombings and violence against Palestinians by Israeli forces demonstrates 
the strategic, political, and physical provocation of both sides. The actions themselves and 
the fallout from both the suicide attacks and the Israeli operations eliminate the possibility 
of compromise for ether side. Further analysis explained that the decision to use suicide 
bombing over any other method was dependent on the perceived success and the magnitude 
of destruction that would result (p. 589).
Conclusions: The reciprocal actions between Israelis and Palestinians further mistrust, 
hatred, and denial of potential compromise by either side (p. 509). Rational-choice theories 
and analysis based on game theory are not applicable to suicide terrorism due to the 
complexity of motivations and the presence of multiple goals. In- depth case studies and 
the regression that the authors conducted are better able to capture these intricacies.
 
Ayers, Nick. “Ghost Martyrs in Iraq: An Assessment of the Applicability of 
Rationalist Models to Explain Suicide Attacks in Iraq.” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 31, no. 9 (2008): 856-882.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Although there is no single organizational focus, the author 
restricts his analysis to attacks that occurred in Iraq.
Research Method: The author considers four different rationalist models that hypothesize 
potential strategic causes of suicide terrorism: “(1) Robert Pape’s model of strategic signaling 
and coercive bargaining, (2) Mia Bloom’s model of organizational outbidding, (3) a model of 
internal recruiting, and (4) David Laitin and Eli Berman’s model of hardened targets.” (pp. 
857-858) Dividing the research conducted on the 4 models into three categories (group 
characteristics and goals, group claims, and characteristics of the targets) the author 
analyzes the applicability of the findings for Iraq specifically.
Supporting Arguments: Ayers’ research shows support for the final two theories but not 
the first two. For strategic signaling, the percentage of attacks against military vs. non-
military targets counters the theory that the end-goal is for the withdrawal of foreign 
occupiers. In terms of the organizational outbidding model, the percentage of unclaimed 
attacks suggests that the support of the local population is not garnered by suicide terror. In 
terms of recruitment, the number of Iraqi nationals engaged in suicide attacks suggest some 
small amount of support for global jihad. The study showed the most support, however, for 
the tactical tool theory.
Conclusions: Suicide Terrorism is used strategically by an organization to gain tactical 
advantage over the enemy and aid in recruitment efforts (p. 856). The author suggests that 
suicide attacks can generally fit into any overall terrorist strategy. It is, therefore, essential 
to understand the tactical-level motivations and implications for these attacks in order for 
military strategists to accurately determine terrorist strategies and develop effective policies 
and procedures.
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Appendix D
Summary of Reviewed Articles that Discuss Societal-
Level Causes of Suicide Terrorism
 
Burdman, Daphne.“Education, Indoctrination and Incitement: Palestinian 
Children on Their Way to Martyrdom.” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, 
no. 1 (2003): 96-123.
Terrorist Organization Focus: A study based on Palestinian educational culture.
Research Method: Review of 31 educational textbooks published prior to 2000 and used 
by the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Education as well as various media programs and 
publications (p. 98).
Supporting Arguments: The author notes several instances of incitement to martyrdom 
from educational texts for Palestinian children in grades 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 as well as in 
Contemporary History of the Arabs and the World (p. 101). Teachers’ guides and television 
campaigns also showed instances of incitement. The authors evaluated the success of this 
educational campaign by highlighting the suicide attacks and martyrdom resulting from 
insurgency actions by children under the age of 18 (pp. 105-106).
Conclusions: The author summarized the influences of this educational campaign by 
outlining the effects that authoritarian society, religious and nationalist learning, educational 
techniques, group processes, programming and conditioning, indoctrination, and emotion 
have on individual mental health. Correcting the effects of this educational campaign will 
require “termination of incitement, re-education and de-conditioning” (p. 118) and is the 
responsibility of both the international community and the Palestinian people.
 
Khashan, Hilal.“Collective Palestinian Frustrations and Suicide 
Bombings.” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 6 (2003): 1049-1067.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Palestinian refugees of the Palestine-Israel conflict.
Research Method: Using a simple random sample of 342 Palestinian refugees in southern 
Lebanon, interviews were conducted to perform an empirical analysis to answer whether 
suicide terrorists can be profiled in terms of education, economics, and personality; whether 
militant Islamist ideology is pervasive in their philosophy; and whether they make up a 
significant percentage of the refugees.
Supporting Arguments: The author found that the majority of the interviewees believed 
that suicide missions would successfully force Israel to submit to the demands of the 
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Palestinian people (p. 1061). There was also a significant proportion of the respondents that 
were willing to act as suicide bombers against Israeli civilians (p. 1061).
Conclusions: The author suggests that a combination of Palestinian collective frustration, 
Political Islam, and extreme poverty lead to the use of suicide terror as a tactic. The author 
found that the Palestinian refugee camps were essentially a breeding ground for potential 
suicide bombers. The closed society, extreme poverty, and collective societal humiliation 
allowed for pervasive militant religious extremism to justify and promote both support to 
the suicide attacks of others and for the willingness to participate.
 
Ramasubramanian,R. “Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka.” (Institute of Peace 
and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India, 2004).
Terrorist Organization Focus: Terrorist groups in Sri Lanka, specifically the LTTE and their 
suicide contingent, the Black Tigers.
Research Method: Descriptive, research- based article that describes the state of suicide 
terrorism in Sri Lanka (differentiating between suicide and suicidal terrorism). The author 
describes the threat scenario, suicide terrorism in Sri Lanka, the LTTE, the motivations of the 
Black Tigers, the role of women in the suicide cadre, and the psychological and nationalistic 
framework of suicide terrorism.
Supporting Arguments: The author cites societal and community activities that paint the 
Black Tigers as heroic martyrs for the Tamil people to demonstrate the motivation that some 
will have in the face of death. He describes the support to families of suicide bombers after 
their missions, the commemoration of the martyrs’ deaths (not the celebration of their lives) 
and the upbringing of individuals to believe that they can and should choose the cause over 
their lives.
Conclusions: The fear of death, on a societal level, can motivate people to heroism. In the 
case of the Tamils, suicide terrorism has been framed in a light such that it is marketed as 
heroism (p. 15). The author suggests that counterterrorism and modern technology cannot 
eliminate suicide bombings, but that there are steps that can end suicide terrorism in Sri 
Lanka: understand the aim, history and the people; teach both sides that they are part of 
the problem and the solution; show that it does not matter who started the war as both 
sides sustain it; demonstrate that the standards of ‘winning’ are different than in a non-
asymmetric war; have each side take proposals of peace talks seriously; address the societal 
mindset towards suicide bombing; and address the leadership that supports the use of 
suicide bombing as a tactic.
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Jackson, Sara Wade and Dan Reiter. “Does Democracy Matter?: Regime 
Type and Suicide Terrorism.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 2 
(2007): 329-348. .
Terrorist Organization Focus: Focus on all suicide attacks from the Freedom House and 
Polity data combining Pape (2003) and Pedahzur’s (2005) datasets.
Research Method: Using Freedom House and Polity data, the authors conducted quantitative 
tests on the relationship between regime type and suicide terrorism from 1980- 2005. The 
article builds on Pape’s assertion that suicide attacks are almost exclusively perpetrated 
against democracies that are perceived to be occupiers.
Supporting Arguments: The results of the tests showed mixed results for the relationship 
between economic development and suicide terrorism. There was a positive correlation 
between larger states and an increase in suicide terrorism as well as a significant positive 
correlation between Muslim states and being victims of suicide terrorism. There was also a 
limited statistical correlation between democracies and being victims of suicide terrorism.
Conclusions: The authors hypothesized that democracies and especially mixed regimes 
would be more likely to experience suicide terrorism. This hypothesis was not supported by 
their research. However they did find nation size, Islam, and national and global experience 
with suicide terrorism to be correlated to suicide terrorism. The study found that regime 
type is uncorrelated with suicide terrorism but was marginally correlated to the number of 
religious minorities at risk within the nation. The authors suggest that further research on 
the relationship between suicide terrorism and non-suicide terrorism will help to improve 
the direction of causal research.
 
Gibson, Kyle Richard. “The Roles of Operational Sex Ratio and Young-Old 
Ratio in Producing Suicide Attackers.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Utah, 2011).
Terrorist Organization Focus: All
Research Method: The author collected information on individual suicide attackers using 
data from three studies conducted prior to this one for 1208 suicide attackers from attacks 
that took place from 1981 to 2007. The data were analyzed to determine if there was a 
correlation between age, gender, and marriage demographics in a given country and the 
likelihood of that country producing suicide bombers.
Supporting Arguments: The author found that higher ratios of marriageable men to women, 
higher polygyny rates, percentages of Muslims, and larger populations were correlated to 
greater production of suicide bombers. Also, countries with a greater ratio of young men to 
old were less likely to produce suicide bombers.
Conclusions: The author suggests a multifaceted approach to counter suicide terrorism due 
to the influence of individual, social, and strategic elements of motivation. Limiting the appeal 
of suicide attacks to groups and individuals while addressing societal feelings of oppression 
and humiliation can be used in the counterterrorism effort. This research suggests that 
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decreasing operational sex ratios, decreasing the young-old ratio, and decreasing polygyny 
may decrease suicide attacks.
 
Benmelech, Efraim, Claud Berrebi, and Esteban F. Klor. “Economic 
Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism.” The Journal of Politics 
74, no. 1 (2012).
Terrorist Organization Focus: Palestinian suicide terrorists acting against Israeli targets 
from 2000 to 2006.
Research Method: The dataset used for this research consisted of 157 suicide terrorists 
gathered from the Israeli Security Agency’s reports on Palestinian suicide terrorists that 
attacked or attempted to attack in Israel, the West bank and the Gaza Strip from September 
2000 to December 2006. The data cover terrorist age, education, previous terror activity, 
target, the economics and demographics of the target area, and security measures in place.
Supporting Arguments: Other research suggests a similar relationship to the one that the 
authors propose: that when unemployment is low, there are desirable mainstream jobs 
for potential suicide attackers and only low-ability attackers that cannot find jobs can be 
recruited. The authors’ research indicates that higher unemployment is correlated with 
more educated, mature and experienced suicide attackers that carry out attacks on more 
important targets closer to the area from which they originate. The correlation between the 
economy and the outcome of attacks is more indirect. The research indicated that higher 
quality suicide attackers are less likely to be stopped and more likely to cause more fatalities 
(p. 122).
Conclusions: Although the authors acknowledge previous research that disqualifies 
poverty as a causal factor in the quantity of terror attacks, they suggest that poor economic 
conditions, especially high unemployment, allow terrorist organizations to recruit better 
educated, more mature suicide terrorists to their cause and improve the quality of potential 
targets.
Previous research has begun to disqualify the impact of the economy on the quantity of 
suicide terrorism, leading some to argue against maintaining ‘the war on poverty’ approach 
to counterterrorism. This, and other research that demonstrates the importance of the 
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Appendix E
Summary of Reviewed Articles that Suggest Suicide 
Terrorism is Caused by a Combination of Individual, 
Organizational and/or Societal-Level Factors
 
Merari, Ariel.“The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the 
Middle East.” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, 
States of Mind, by Walter Reich and Walter Laqueur, (Washington D.C.: The 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990).
Terrorist Organization Focus: Terrorists in the Middle East active in suicide car bombings 
between 1983 and 1986.
Research Method: The author examined the facts collected on 31 cases of suicide terrorism 
by car bomb in the Middle East from 1983-1986 (p. 203).
Supporting Arguments: Suicide terrorists often engage in two levels of indoctrination: 
the first is at the cultural level throughout their upbringing; and the second is mission 
oriented (p. 199). Situational factors, including group pressures, can be seen in other suicide 
situations throughout history, for example mass suicides, chain suicides, and suicides for an 
audience. The only personality factor that the author noted with any level of certainty, due 
to the difficulty in profiling and analyzing psychological elements of suicide terrorists, is the 
common element of a broken home.
Conclusions: The author argues that four distinct groups of factors influence an individual’s 
decision: “cultural factors, indoctrination, situational factors, and personality factors.” (p. 
196) The person is suicidal while the organization simply provides the excuse. The author 
suggests that the individual suicide terrorists wish to die for personal reasons and the 
terrorist organizations provide them with an excuse to act. Terrorist groups legitimize the 
violent act that would normally be unacceptable (p. 206). For this reason, terrorism should 
be addressed separately at the group level while suicide needs to be addressed at the 
individual level.
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Atran, Scott.“Genesis of Suicide Terrorism.” Science 299 (2003): 1534-1435.
Terrorist Organization Focus: All
Research Method: Narrative describing the evolution of suicide terrorism throughout 
history and some of the more common theories of causes.
Supporting Arguments: Institutional factor: the relationship between peers and the loyalty 
to cohorts is especially important in determining suicide-terrorism behavior. Often this 
relationship between members of the group, known as fictive kin, is built and strengthened 
by the organization through religion.
Conclusions: The author argues that suicide terrorism is used as a weapon of psychological 
warfare against the greater population by an organization. On an individual level, a 
combination of psychological and cultural elements make individuals susceptible to 
recruitment. Preventing bombers from reaching their target is likely an ineffective strategy 
due to high cost and low likelihood of success. Strategies aimed at literacy, poverty, and 
reducing military occupation have the potential to be slow, ineffective, or counterproductive. 
Institutional-level programs have the most promising outlook on counterterrorism (p. 1537).
 
Moghadam, Assaf. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: 
Motivations and Organizational Aspects.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
26, no. 2 (2003): 707-729.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Palestinian suicide bombers that attacked in the first 21 
months of the Second Intifada.
Research Method: The author creates a framework of analysis that examines the process of 
the suicide attack from initial motivation to execution at both the individual and organizational 
level and proceeds to apply it to various theories of motivation for the bomber and aspects 
of the organization.
Supporting Arguments: Several researchers have supported the idea that suicide terrorism 
is rooted in an interconnected relationship between the individual, the organization and 
the society. Interviews with attackers, families, and friends as well as evidence from many 
different suicide attacks show support for the many different individual motivations that 
the author proposes, with varying degrees of influence for each motivation depending on 
the individual. Support for the strategic and tactical benefits to the organizations, as well as 
the consistent presence of the orientation phase of training and preparation support the 
organizational level of the author’s proposal.
Conclusions: The author argues that a combination of individual and organizational level 
motivations contribute to the use of suicide terror as a tactic. At the individual level, several 
factors influence the potential suicide bomber but they are not always the same combination 
of factors. At the organizational level, organizational goals and strategies are integrated in 
recruitment, training and indoctrination to support the use of suicide terror as a tactic. It is 
unlikely that a single factor, either at the individual or organizational level, is solely responsible 
for a suicide attack. The author’s framework of analysis is designed to analyze both levels of 
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influence and can be applied on a larger scale. Policy and prevention strategies should also 
be developed along these lines, integrating individual-level programs and organizationally-
targeted response. However, in the short term, organizationally-targeted policy may be 
more effective due to the difficulty in addressing individual motivations.
 
Ariel Merari. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the 
Middle East.” in Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives 
on Terrorism and its Consequences by Andrew Silke (West Sussex, England: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2003).
Terrorist Organization Focus: The focus is on Islamic terrorist groups although at the group 
level the author presents factors applicable to other groups as well.
Research Method: This article is a narrative that uses examples to show that the suicide 
terrorist is not suffering from any pathological disorders or mental illness and that religion 
is not a motivating factor in the way that is sometimes perceived in the Western world when 
considering Islam. He also describes group-level factors that are similar across groups. 
Although this seems to suggest a group-level motivational theory, with the incorporation of 
societal factors in the group discussion, it can be seen as a combination theory.
Supporting Arguments: There is no evidence that suicide bombers suffer from mental 
illness or psychopathology. In one instance (the PKK) there is evidence that members were 
coerced into becoming suicide bombers, but otherwise, bombers are generally volunteers 
and believe in their goal. Understanding of Islam demonstrates that many of the perceptions 
in the Western world about motivations for martyrdom and after-death expectations 
are false. There are several group-level factors that are seen across groups, including the 
support of the bombers’ families, desperation of the group in conflict, cultural precedent for 
self-sacrifice, and indoctrination of the bomber.
Conclusions: The strategic advantage of suicide bombing over hardened targets means that 
the tactic will always be attractive to terrorists. The author argues though, based on previous 
evidence, that no group remains committed to suicide terrorism for an extended amount of 
time and concludes that the groups involved in suicide terrorism now will graduate to less 
drastic tactics in the near future.
 
Atran, Scott. “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism.” The Washington Quarterly 
27, no. 4 (2004): 67-90.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
Research Method: The author focuses on demonstrating by example how modern 
counterterrorism, although focused on current theories, is ineffective due to the invalidity 
of these individual theories to be applied in a blanket manner. He suggests that a layered 
approach that addresses various contributory factors will be more successful in countering 
suicide attacks (p. 72).
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 9 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Harmon, Mujkic, Kaukinen & Weir,  Causes & Explanations of Suicide Terrorism: A Systematic Review  43
Supporting Arguments: correlation between a lack of civil liberties and terrorism. Suicide 
terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunctional attributes or suicidal symptoms. There is 
correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and terrorist attacks against 
U.S. targets (p. 74).Many suicide terrorists are educated, able- bodied, and committed to the 
cause, possibly because this type of person makes a more reliable recruit. Small cells within 
the organizational network allow for the development of ‘fictive kin’ and a strengthening of 
the bond between individuals – the theory of banality of evil (p. 80).
Conclusions: The author suggests that suicide terrorism is the result of the cumulative 
effect of multiple variables but puts strong emphasis on organizational and institutional 
role in motivations. Effective counterterrorism will be the result of a coordinated, integrated 
strategy with multiple layers to address a variety of contributing factors. These layers 
include: defense of critical infrastructure and emergency response; intelligence collection; 
and political, social and economic programs addressing root causes of suicide terrorism 
aimed at reducing potential recruits’ receptivity to terrorist recruitment.
Hisham H. Ahmed. “Palestinian Resistance and ‘Suicide Bombing’: Causes 
and Consequences.” in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways 
Forward by Tore Bjørgo. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005).
Terrorist Organization Focus: Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Research Method: The author presents a narrative describing events throughout the 
Palestine-Israel conflict that seem to have instigated changes in suicide bombing frequency. 
Testimony from lawyers and would-be bombers is used to describe the difference between 
suicide and martyrdom. A study conducted by Shafiq Masalha on Palestinian children age 
10-11 is also used within the research to demonstrate the state of the psychology of the 
Palestinian population.
Supporting Arguments: Peaceful protest prior to 1987 Intifada was ineffectual. Testimony 
suggests belief in the equivalence of suicide bombing to the tactics of Israeli troops (p. 
93). The testimony of a would-be bomber suggests that Israeli occupation and repression 
has scarred the psyche of the Palestinian people. 15% of Palestinian children involved in 
Masalha’s study had dreams about becoming martyrs. When military operations by Israeli 
forces increase, suicide operations do as well.
Conclusions: The author suggests a combination of conceptual, military, psychological, 
social, religious, and political motivations for suicide bombings. The solution is political in 
nature and will require action on both sides as the two act in retaliation to the actions of the 
other and the ‘chicken before the egg’ argument cannot be solved without compromise and 
political action.
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Berman, Eli and David D. Laitin. “Rational Martyrs vs. Hard Targets: 
Evidence on the Tactical Use of Suicide Attacks.” in Suicide Bombing from 
an Interdisciplinary Perspective by Eva Mayerson Milgrom, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004). and Berman, Eli and David D. Laitin. 
“Hard Targets: Theory and Evidence on Suicide Attacks.” (Working Paper, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2005).
Terrorist Organization Focus: The data the authors use are limited to the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict and they note that the LTTE specifically do not fit into their model. They suggest 
extensions to the model to make it more applicable to other suicide terrorists.
Research Method: The authors build a framework that fits suicide terrorists and the 
organizations that support them into a rational-choice model by combining data on suicide 
attacks and club theory.
Supporting Arguments: Within this model, it is necessary that the martyrs be ‘rational’, 
which the authors argue is easily achieved given a belief in the cause and either a belief 
in reward for their actions in the afterlife or a sense of altruism towards those who will 
survive and a belief that their lives will be bettered. Radical religious groups both demand 
sacrifice of their members and provide social interaction. Coreligionists are generally softer 
targets and can be attacked using conventional tactics if desired. “The stronger the social 
service provision function of the club, the greater the proportion of its attacks will be suicide 
attacks… [and] the more damage it will do per suicide attack.” (p. 24)
Conclusions: The authors argue that suicide terrorism is a rational decision that incorporates 
an assessment that a successful attack on a hard, well-protected target that will withstand 
a conventional insurgency attack outweighs the cost of losing one member and that radical 
religious organizations are well suited to organize such attacks. The authors acknowledge 
that terrorist groups out of Sri Lanka, Chechnya and Kurdistan likely do not fit into this 
model but suggest an extension that incorporates the threat to outside members as part 
of the club model. The authors suggest that their model has demonstrated that “weakening 
the benign activities of clubs reduces their ability to carry out attacks” (p. 28) which can be 
achieved directly or indirectly by strengthening competitor activities.
 
Elster, Jon. “Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions.” in Making 
Sense of Suicide Missions by Diego Gambetta. (Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).
Terrorist Organization Focus: Palestine, 9/11, Lebanon, Kamikaze, LTTE, PKK, Teenage 
Martyrs in Iraq-Iran War, Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq.
Research Method: The author divides suicide missions into two levels of actors: individual 
attackers and the organizations that incite and enable the attacks. It is important to note 
that the definition that the author uses for suicide missions encompasses much more than 
suicide terrorism, as many other researchers consider it and may present different results.
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Supporting Arguments: The author suggests that peer pressure, attachment to a cause 
larger than the self, indoctrination, revenge, and benefit to family/friends/society/future 
generations all contribute to an individual’s motivations. Religion is not a motivating factor, 
although it may act to disinhibit the attacker. Previously considered individual causes that 
have been discounted in recent years, such as poverty and education, may still contribute 
at the population level. At the organizational level, motivations can be viewed in terms of 
goals, which are territorial (i.e. recovery of homeland, defense of homeland or expulsion of 
occupiers), religious (defense of holy sites or destruction of infidels), or both.
Conclusions: In the Middle East and Sri Lanka especially, the author suggests that feelings 
of inferiority and resentment have a significant impact. For Palestinian attackers, the belief 
that suicide missions are effective and that Israel is evil has a significant impact.
 
Merari, Ariel.“Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide 
Terrorism.” in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward 
by Tore Bjørgo. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005).
Terrorist Organization Focus: Bombers involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Research Method: The author conducted interviews with family and friends of suicide 
attackers, failed attackers, and trainers of attackers and consulted media reports to analyze 
individual and organizational-level motivations for suicide terrorism.
Supporting Arguments: Although the author examines individual factors and psychological 
causes, he rules them out. Theories that consider suicide to be acts of aggression or depression 
cannot explain suicide terrorism. The closest explanation of this type is Durkheim’s concept 
of Optional Altruistic Suicide, however the author does not think that suicide terrorists fit 
this model either. Public support will influence a group’s willingness to use suicide terror as 
a tactic as will the number of volunteers. No case is known of an individual carrying out a 
suicide attack on their own without an organization supporting them.
Conclusions: The author suggests that perceived necessity plays a more important role in an 
organization’s decision to use suicide attacks than culture and ideology. Given his conclusions, 
the author suggests that counterterrorism should focus on physical defensive measures, 
deterring the organization, and influencing the opinion of the terrorists’ constituency.
 
Atran, Scott. “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism.” The 
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2006): 127-147.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Islamic extremist groups with some mention of political and 
revolutionary groups.
Research Method: This article focuses on countering the premises of Robert Pape’s “Dying 
to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” arguing that Pape’s data apply to a recently 
outdated form of suicide terrorism and are no longer applicable. Using examples that 
contradict data and conclusions made in “Dying to Win,” the author argues for a different root 
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cause of suicide terrorism. The author also conducted individual interviews with displaced 
youth about their perception of martyrdom.
Supporting Arguments: Throughout his interviews, the author found that many of the 
youth with whom he interacted professed support for global jihadi movements (p. 128). 
Suicide terrorists are “frequently middle-class, secularly well educated, but often ‘born-
again’ radical Islamists… embrac[ing] apocalyptic visions for humanity’s violent salvation.” 
(p. 128) Pape’s data analysis consisted of suicide attacks from 1980-2001, however, more 
suicide attacks were conducted between 2001-2005 than in this period.
Conclusions: The author suggests that analyzing the individual terrorists and attempting 
to develop a profile of the suicide terrorist is inconsequential. The focus should be placed 
on society’s perception of global jihad and the organizational and group dynamics of the 
greater terrorist networks but specifically of the cells involved in suicide terrorism.
 
Hafez, Mohammed M. “Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making 
of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative 
Case Study.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 2 (2006): 165-185.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Palestinian Suicide Bombers for the case study, however, the 
author notes several other groups that employ suicide attacks.
Research Method: The author employs a case study of Palestinian suicide bombers in order 
to illustrate the validity of an analytical method that incorporates rationalist, cultural, and 
structural approaches to explaining suicide terrorism.
Supporting Arguments: Organizational leaders on the Palestinian side of the Palestine-
Israel conflict have stated their principle reason for employing suicide bombing as its 
relative effectiveness in comparison to conventional terrorism (p. 173). At the individual 
level, the author suggests that bombers use a redemptive logic to justify their actions, 
arguing, “martyrdom operations” are necessary to fulfill one’s commitment to God.” (p. 175) 
At the societal level, the ethnic conflict between Palestine and Israel combined with a recent 
(since the 1970s) resurgence of Islamic activism and religion can help to explain the cultural 
acceptance of suicide tactics.
Conclusions: Similarly to the assertions of some of the other researchers included in this work, 
the author argues that the three levels of motivation: individual, organizational and social, 
are interrelated to one another (p. 181). Religious interpretation that promotes martyrdom 
is essential to the individual decision (p. 180). At the organizational level, strategic decisions 
in relation to asymmetric conflict promote the use of suicide bombers. At the societal level, 
support of these operations requires three conditions: cultural norms, legitimate authorities 
condoning the tactics, and feelings of victimization at the community level (p. 181).
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Pape, Robert. “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” 
The Australian Army Journal 3, no. 3 (2006): 25-37.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Although a large portion of the article addresses al-Qaeda 
specifically, it also considers other Islamic, Palestinian, and Sri Lankan groups.
Research Method: The article uses data from the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism. 
The data used in the Chicago Project are collated from open-source data in Arabic, Hebrew, 
Tamil, Russian, and English. The author presents some of the findings of this project.
Supporting Arguments: “Every suicide campaign since 1980 has been waged by terrorist 
groups whose principal goal has been to establish self-determination.” (p. 28) 301 of 315 
attacks since 1980 were part of a larger terrorist campaign designed for political or secular 
gain (p. 28). Individual suicide terrorists tend to come from countries with foreign (American) 
combat presence (p. 30).
Conclusions: The author suggests a combination of strategic, social, and individual logic 
supports suicide terrorism as an effective form of terrorism. However, the strategic element 
unifies the others and ultimately enables the terrorists’ agenda. The author suggests that 
each of the influencing factors in suicide terrorism combine to produce a strategically logical 
explanation for suicide terrorism. Combination approaches like this incorporate a variety of 
observations that individual theories may overlook.
 
Bloom, Mia. “Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism.” in Root 
Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom by Ami 
Pedahzur. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).
Terrorist Organization Focus: General discussion of groups that use suicide tactics.
Research Method: Narrative incorporating previous research conducted by the author and 
other subject matter experts.
Supporting Arguments: The author breaks down the discussion of motivations into two 
levels: individuals and organizations. At each level the author presents interview excerpts 
that suggest the basis for using suicide attacks as a tactic. At the individual level, perpetrators 
have incentives from various aspects of their lives including religious, material, social, and 
cultural elements (p. 35). At the organizational level, the strategic advantage against a 
materialistically superior enemy along with the cultural and societal perception and influence 
are of significance to the organization. The author especially focuses on group competition 
and outbidding and its impact on the use of suicide attacks as a tactic.
Conclusions: The author suggests that a combination of individual-level motivations and 
organizational motivations contribute to the perpetration of a suicide attack. The author 
suggests that countering this ‘outbidding’ can be done as part of counterterrorism policy 
by employing a concept of ‘outbidding the outbidder’ or by emphasizing elements of 
policy that the terrorist group is incapable of delivering (p. 46), although this will be more 
easily accomplished for nationalistic groups than for religious ones. Financially-targeted 
counterterrorism efforts may be the key to beginning this outbidding process.
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Brym, Robert J. and Bader Araj. “Suicide Bombing as Strategy and 
Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada.” Social Forces 84, no. 4 (2006): 
1969-1986.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Insurgent and state violence in Israel, the West Bank, and 
Gaza from Oct 26 2000 to July 12 2005.
Research Method: Review and analysis of data collected from “the online database of the 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ITC) in Herzliya, Israel; the website of 
Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the East Coast evening edition of the New York Times; 
and two authoritative Arabic newspapers – al-Quds, published in Jerusalem, and al-Quds 
al ‘Arabi, published in London.” (p. 1974) The collected information was analyzed on 128 
variables.
Supporting Arguments: The authors were able to confirm their data by comparing Israeli-
published reports with Arabic publications. Their model found statistical significance between 
assassinations and suicide bombings, other intifada-related deaths and suicide bombings, 
and a reciprocal relationship between suicide bombings and Palestinian prisoners (p. 1983).
Conclusions: The authors suggest that the motivations behind suicide bombings are mixed 
and complex. Organizational strategy is only one element of the motivation behind a suicide 
attack and often revenge and retaliation are important elements at both an individual level 
and an organizational level. Specifically they found 5 types of personal motives for the 
attacks ranging from a desire for personal revenge to a desire to achieve a religious goal. 
They also found 5 organizational rationales and 5 precipitant elements.
 
Grimland, Meytal, Alan Apter, and Ad Kerkhof. “The Phenomenon of 
Suicide Bombing: A Review of Psychological and Non-psychological 
Factors.” Crisis 27, no. 3 (2006): 107-118.
Terrorist Organization Focus: All
Research Method: The authors evaluated research and theories from a variety of 
contributors to the field and provided evidence that supports the importance of many 
diverse factors to the cause of suicide terrorism.
Supporting Arguments: Common elements throughout the process of becoming a suicide 
bomber support the theory of a multidimensional approach. The authors saw evidence that 
cultural, religious, and societal influences, including from the media and other technologies, 
contributed to the process, as did individual-level factors, the indoctrination period, and 
organizational and strategic forces.
Conclusions: The authors suggest a complex interaction between many contributory forces 
as the root cause of suicide terrorism. The counterterrorism way ahead is first and foremost 
through efforts to change the media’s glorification of suicide attacks followed closely by 
similar efforts to de-glorify acts of suicide terror in education and the community. They 
also highlight the importance of preventing the humiliation, oppression, and abuse of 
subdivisions of the civilian population.
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Isaac, Jeffrey C., Karen Rasler, Eli Berman, David Laitin, Roxanne Euben, 
Ian Shapiro and Gilles Kepel, “Review Symposium: Understanding Suicide 
Terror.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 1 (2007). 117-140.
Terrorist Organization Focus: All
Research Method: A review symposium that reviewed three books: Pape’s 2005 Dying to 
Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Gambetta’s 2005 Making Sense of Suicide Missions, 
and Bloom’s 2005 Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. Each of the authors presents a 
unique perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of the books and suggests potential 
issues or theories that were not addressed in the books under study.
Supporting Arguments: Suicide terrorists are not mentally unstable or psychotic but are 
suggested to be ‘altruistic communitarians’. At the tactical level, suicide attacks are useful 
within asymmetric warfare when conditions in the area are not conducive to conventional 
insurgency and there is a desire to compel a state to change. Societal constraints including 
support and organizational constraints such as defection influence the decisions of a terrorist 
organization. Collective societal humiliation may be an essential contributor to community 
support (p. 136). Although Islam is not causal to suicide terrorism, the role of religion is 
undeniable (p. 126) as it presents a potential meaning that can be adopted by attackers and 
used as a selective interpretive frame for their views (p. 130).
Conclusions: Berman and Laitin suggest an ecological theory of rebellion to better examine 
suicide missions in a more dynamic light than these three books have. Following from this 
theory, a stronger foundation for policy would be developed. They suggest strengthening 
local organizations’ (other than the terrorist organizations) ability to provide social services 
and education in competition with those terrorist groups that provide these services now and 
devoting more resources to eliminating current and future tactics of asymmetric warfare. 
Rasler argues that the policy recommendations concerning counterterrorism efforts that 
strive to minimalize negative impacts to local populations are essential and policies that 
distinguish between moderate and radical groups will be the most effective (p. 121). The 
books under review suggest alternative perspectives to rational choice theories which, in 
this case, seem incapable of adequately explaining suicide terrorism (Shapiro).
 
Crenshaw, Martha. “Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay.” 
Security Studies 16, no. 1 (2007): 133-162.
Terrorist Organization Focus: This article compares various elements of 13 different books 
published on suicide terrorism since 2002 and therefore considers a variety of terrorist 
organizations.
Research Method: Qualitative comparison of 13 different books using three main questions: 
why sponsoring organizations would see suicide attacks as effective, why a community 
would support them, and why individuals would engage in suicide missions. The author then 
compares the various policy recommendations.
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Supporting Arguments: Even among these published books there is no consensus 
about causes of suicide terrorism. However, the research seems to demonstrate a multi-
dimensional integration of social, psychological, and political interactions.
Conclusions: The author suggests that the interaction between individual, organizational 
and societal factors results in the use of suicide tactics. She notes that many of the authors 
included in her review consider individual emotions, religious influences, community 
support, and organizational strategy among the many elements that eventually lead to 
the use of suicide tactics. The author noted areas for improvement in research including: 
comparing suicide and non-suicide attacks by the same group, considering the role of media 
as an amplifier of global and individual reactions, distinguishing between types of suicide 
attacks, and distinguishing between the expected outcomes of the attack while refraining 
from lumping all attacks together simply given the expected death of the perpetrator.
 
Gill, Paul. “A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing.” Journal of 
Conflict and Violence 1, no. 2 (2007): 142-159.
Terrorist Organization Focus: All including some organizations that have not engaged in 
suicide-terror attacks as comparison groups.
Research Method: The author synthesizes empirically-based, one-dimensional research by 
other authors into a multidimensional concept. He analyzes theories from three different 
dimensions to build a model that takes into account interconnected influencing factors 
(individual, organizational, and community dimensions).
Supporting Arguments: Various studies have been conducted in order to explain suicide 
terrorism and multiple theories have been explored including individual-level theories such 
as pathological disposition to violence and rational choice, and others such as organizational-
level theories, for instance, strategic motives and public support, and societal-level theories 
such as political freedom and poverty (pp. 144-145). Noting the interconnectivity between 
each of the elements presented by other researchers supports the author’s model.
Conclusions: The author suggests a complex combination of factors from the individual, 
organizational, and community levels with emphasis on political and social psychology and 
group dynamics as the root causes of suicide terror. Further research is needed to refine the 
model. If confirmed, the theory suggests that a wide variety of policies at the various levels 
can be employed to counter suicide terrorism.
 
Gill, Paul. “Suicide Bomber Pathways among Islamic Militants.” Policing 2, 
no. 4 (2008): 412-422.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Suicide bombers that have acted outside of a conflict area 
or outside of their own state as well as Palestinian, Tamil, Chechen, and Lebanese suicide 
bombers.
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Research Method: The author uses examples of various suicide attacks and the actions of 
suicide bombers to describe a common progression through the life of a suicide bomber 
in order to establish the contributions of individual, group, and societal factors to suicide 
terrorism.
Supporting Arguments: In the initial phase, the author describes the importance of 
community support, media attention, and legitimization of suicide bombings. The second 
phase, the catalyst, can take many forms and can be religious, political, or personal, from 
religious radicalization to personal loss. The third phase, pre-existing ties, sets the stage for 
greater opportunity to join a terrorist organization. The final phase prior to the attack, in-
group radicalization, includes solidifying ideologies, declarations of intent, and preparations 
for the act itself.
Conclusions: The author outlines a process or pathway from socialization, to the catalyst, 
to social bond, to the internalization of relevant group norms that solidifies the path of the 
suicide bomber. The author highlights that although he outlined one pathway to suicide 
terrorism, it is important to note that the elements may occur in a different order and that 
individuals can experience different catalysts, but he argues that each phase is essential to 
the process.
 
Kruglanski, Arie W., Xiaoyan Chen and Agnieszka Golec. “Individual 
Motivations, The Group Process and Organizational Strategies in Suicide 
Terrorism.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counterterrorism 1, no. 3 
(2008): 70-84.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Islamic extremist focus.
Research Method: The article is a narrative incorporating the research of several authors 
into a theory that incorporates individual motivations, group and peer influence, and 
organizational strategy.
Supporting Arguments: The average suicide bomber is male between the ages of 18 and 27 
(p. 71). At this age, higher levels of testosterone and greater susceptibility to social influence 
as well as likelihood to experiment with social roles contribute to individual motivations. At 
the group level, indoctrination of the individual in their new role as living martyr solidifies 
their path (p. 75). Solidifying the ideology of the group and the influence of an authority 
figure is also essential. At the organizational level, strategic considerations and the influence 
that the group has over the individual work together and lead to the bombing activity.
Conclusions: The authors consider the process of becoming a suicide bomber to be 
a combination of individual motivations, group pressure, and organizational strategy. 
Given that training of the bombers must take place somewhere, the authors argue that 
organizational cooperation with a host state is essential. Addressing state sponsorship is a 
critical element to counterterrorism. The authors also argue that negotiation with terrorists 
is inevitable and deterrence needs to be incorporated into counterterrorism efforts.
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Piazza, James A. “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism: A Cross-
National Study.” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 1 (2008): 28-39.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Various groups involved in suicide and non-suicide terrorism 
from 1998-2005.
Research Method: The author used empirical tests to analyze common theories and correct 
for perceived selection bias in other studies. Using data from 4660 suicide and non-suicide 
terrorist attacks from 1998-2005 and a logistical regression, the author tested 4 hypotheses.
Supporting Arguments: The study found that terrorists who are nationals of non-democratic 
states are more likely to engage in suicide attacks (p. 28). The authors tested strategic 
theories and democracy theories of suicide terrorism but found no empirical evidence to 
support them. They did, however, find statistical correlation between suicide terrorism and 
foreign occupation, religious diversity, and group typology.
Conclusions: “Suicide terrorism is a product of political and organizational features of 
the terrorists themselves.” (p. 28) There was no evidence of correlation between suicide 
terrorism and occupation by regime type. Democracies were determined to be less likely to 
produce suicide terrorists. Groups with universal or abstract political goals were more likely 
than groups with domestic political goals to engage in suicide terrorism.
 
Post, Jerrold M., Farhana Ali, Schuyler Henderson, Steven Shanfield, 
Jeff Victoroff and Steven Weine. “The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism.” 
Psychiatry 72, no. 1 (2009): 13-31.
Terrorist Organization Focus: Terrorism is discussed broadly but the main emphasis is on 
militant Islam.
Research Method: Review of current literature on the psychology of suicide terrorism with 
the intention of informing mental health professionals to help improve understanding of the 
phenomenon of suicide terror.
Supporting Arguments: Social and cultural elements of the life course shape the collective 
identity. Socialization begins long before entering into a terrorist group, for instance, the 
authors provide an example of pro-suicide terrorism propaganda in a kindergarten class 
in Gaza City (p. 19). Adolescent psychology can be used to help explain the predominance 
of adolescent males as the core group of suicide terrorists (p. 20) focusing on the stage 
of experimentation, identity, and group influence. The authors explain the social process 
model, moral disengagement, intergroup relations theory, leader-follower relationships, 
and ‘deindividuation’ to describe group influence in the suicide terrorism process.
Conclusions: Collective identity and normality form a psychological perspective, although 
economics, history, politics, and anthropology contribute as well. The authors argue that 
“suicide terrorism is the result of a complex psychological pathway,” (p. 27) and in order 
to limit suicide terrorists and prevent future attacks, policies should address the issue in 
a way that does not allow individuals to enter onto this path in the first place. They also 
suggest that dissension within the group, facilitated exit from the group, and delegitimizing 
the leaders will help to reduce suicide terrorism.
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Pedahzur, Ami. “Toward an Analytical Model of Suicide Terrorism – A 
Comment.” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (2010): 841-844.
Terrorist Organization Focus: The author’s focus is on societies and communities that 
suffered from repression and were involved in a long- lasting struggle (which excludes some 
of Al-Qaeda’s suicide terrorists).
Research Method: This article is a comment on a previous article. The author proposes an 
alternative model to the argument of the previous article as a result of prior research and 
knowledge on the subject. The author states that the amount of time allowed for a response 
did not afford the ability to describe in great detail or present the arguments with sufficient 
supporting facts.
Supporting Arguments: The author noticed trends in the suicide bombing process that 
support this three-stage model. The first stage includes a strategic decision by the organization 
and requires a permissible social environment. The second stage includes recruitment 
based on a personal experience or loyalty to the group and once again requires a social 
environment where suicide terrorism is permissible. The final stage is at the organizational 
level and includes training and confirmation of the bomber’s commitment.
Conclusions: The author presents a three- stage model for explaining suicide terrorism: 
Stage 1) Organizational leadership decision-making; Stage 2) Individual motivations; Stage 
3) Organizational recruitment, socialization and employment process (where stages 1 and 2 
will likely co-occur). The author suggests continuing research along the lines of the proposed 
three-stage model. Although a more defined model than many others, it follows the same 
multidimensional approach of other researchers.
 
Karademir, Kutluer. “Suicide Terrorism as a Multidimensional Process: 
A Complex Relational Approach.” International Journal of Security and 
Terrorism 4, no. 2 (2013).
Terrorist Organization Focus: 17 different organizations that were active from 1981 to 
2006 and are included in Gambetta and Tzvetkova’s (2006) dataset (listed by group on p. 28) 
(as cited in Karademir, 2013).
Research Method: Using a database compiled by Gambetta and Tzvetkova in 2006 (as 
cited in Karademir, 2013), the author applies a theoretical framework of analysis devised by 
Stacey (2001) to examine the interactive elements of suicide terrorism and show that these 
complex relationships between factors are the root causes of suicide terrorism.
Supporting Arguments: The author’s focus is to present Stacey’s (2001) theoretical 
framework as a potentially useful tool for future research, and to demonstrate the 
applicability of the framework, he provides examples of its application. He highlights 
arguments of cultural humiliation and betrayal and their influence on suicide terrorism and 
describes the procedure of becoming a suicide terrorist in the context of captured Al Qaeda 
militants from the 2003 suicide mission in Istanbul.
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Conclusions: The author suggests a complex relationship between individual, social, and 
organizational factors. Policy responses need to incorporate and address interactions 
among people, groups, and society as a whole, taking into account the individual, social, and 
organizational factors that contribute to the phenomenon. The author suggests that future 
research should apply this framework in order to gain the greatest understanding of the 
phenomenon and find the most applicable policy responses.
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Abstract
This article describes a specific, promising concept for a traffic-based radiation detector 
network concept deployed on roads/highways/stoplights/etc. The detector network concept 
is intended to help defend urban areas against nuclear attack by adversaries. The network 
has two potential functions: to detect and localize the covert transport of nuclear materials 
or weapons (specifically plutonium-based), and to monitor nuclear fallout in post-attack 
scenarios. This work analyzes the basic technical feasibility of the network, including detector 
hardware, deployment, and detection statistics. It will provide an overview of efforts to 
defend against nuclear terrorism and to develop concepts related to networked detection. 
Finally, the article discusses considerations that may affect the policy of the development 
and deployment of such a system. Included in these considerations is a rough-order-of-
magnitude estimate of the cost of detector system deployment, a brief examination of the 
potential benefits and drawbacks of the radiation detector network, and a review of other 
concepts that could be, or are currently employed for nuclear detection.
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Introduction
The threat of nuclear terrorism has loomed over the United States and the international 
community for decades. World leaders, U.S. Presidents, and politicians spanning time, 
geography, political rank, and party recognized this threat as serious. Nuclear weapons 
or materials for a weapon may originate from countries that hold nuclear weapons, have 
nuclear weapons programs, or operate internal enrichment or reprocessing facilities. 
Radiological materials, on the other hand, may be accessed from devices or facilities that 
utilize radiological isotopes, including blood irradiators and therapy tools in hospitals, well 
loggers, or thermoelectric generators. Bad actors may weaponize highly enriched nuclear 
material into improvised nuclear devices (INDs) capable of great destruction or weaponize 
radiological material into radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). Either can be utilized to attack 
governmental or financial centers, populace, or critical infrastructure. The consequences of 
a nuclear weapon or IND detonation could be substantially higher, compared to the use of 
an RDD, in terms of lives lost, damage to infrastructure, spread of radioactive fallout, and 
subsequent disruption to the economy.1 It is for this reason that the author emphasizes the 
examination of nuclear materials, rather than radiological materials, in this work.
Here, we will examine a specific concept to aid nuclear threat interdiction by detecting nuclear 
weapons or INDs being smuggled into a city. The concept also aims to augment consequence 
management by measurement of post-detonation fallout radiation. The concept involves a 
methodology of threat detection that relies on the placement of radiation detectors, in a 
networked fashion, along roadsides, highways, intersections, etc. We will discuss the prior 
work conducted in this area and the efforts of various government agencies in dealing with 
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the threat of nuclear terrorism. We will investigate the technical feasibility of this concept by 
utilizing calculations and simulations, which will provide insight into the concept’s effective 
application and its shortcomings. The article will also discuss cost considerations, benefits 
and drawbacks of such a concept, as well as alternative concepts that are in place or could 
be incorporated. Finally, future work will provide guidance on what additional efforts should 
be undertaken.
Current Efforts at Preventing Nuclear 
Terrorism
In order to reduce the risk of attack by a nuclear weapon, homeland security authorities 
utilize a layered defense system. This type of approach focuses on reducing the quantity 
and number of locations of source materials, while strengthening the physical security of 
remaining sites.2 International efforts along these lines have included the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI), which was established within the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) under the Department of Energy (DOE). These efforts have helped 
to improve the security of nuclear facilities, processes, and materials outside the U.S. These 
improvements included upgrading security of nuclear facilities, disposal of surplus fissile 
materials, strengthening regulatory and inspection regimes, and providing detection and 
interdiction capabilities.3
Meanwhile, the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), which is coordinated by the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
has improved capability to detect nuclear materials smuggled into the U.S. In cooperation 
with agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard, and 
the NNSA, for example, the DNDO administers the detection and interdiction regime to 
reduce the risk of nuclear attacks by the non-destructive assay and physical inspection 
of cargo, vehicles, and persons travelling into the U.S. through ports, airports, or border 
crossings.4
Despite the on-going efforts to secure and intercept nuclear material, the risk remains that 
these threat materials could still be accessed, smuggled, and utilized in an attack, due to 
substandard security and the existence of rogue actors. The growth and possible spread of 
terrorist ideologies to countries with access to nuclear materials or weapons underscores 
the significance of this threat.5
Introduction to a Networked Detector 
Concept
Detection of threat materials typically relies on detection of radiation, notably gamma-
rays and neutrons. The detection of nuclear materials is complicated by the many potential 
entryways or transport modes available for smuggling.6 Additionally, the radiation signals 
detected from these materials are relatively weak and especially difficult to detect at distance. 
For example, the neutron emission from a HEU (highly enriched uranium) -based weapon 
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would be equal to the level of ambient background neutrons for a detector measurement 
less than two meters away. While the gamma-ray emissions from a HEU-based weapon are 
of relatively high energy and intensity (compared to a Pu-based weapon), they are easily 
shielded by a few centimeters of lead.7 Further absorption and scattering of the emitted 
neutrons and gamma-rays takes place by surrounding hydrogenous mediums, air between 
the weapon and detector, and the transport vessel’s or vehicle’s steel or aluminum siding. 
Often, the technical difficulties are magnified by operational constraints, such as the demand 
for speedy cargo throughput at seaports.8
This article will examine the potential of detectors to identify and track nuclear weapons 
or weapon materials. The detection of nuclear materials could play a role in thwarting such 
attacks as part of an integrated defense concept. We will describe a network concept for 
detecting the local transport of such materials within an urban area. If integrated with 
appropriate operational responses, such a network might interrupt an attack, or even deter 
its attempt due to its presence. This research shows that a network of these detectors may 
be able to offer some performance against a Pu-based weapon unless the weapon is highly 
shielded.
The concept of detector networks has been identified to enhance both detection and, as 
discussed below, consequence management.9 Detector networks combine many individual 
detector nodes that are geographically dispersed with each detector capable of sharing 
information with each other or with a central processing node.10 These networks have the 
potential to serve multiple roles including detection for counter-smuggling, pinpointing a 
location of attack, and post-blast fallout monitoring. The ubiquity of detectors in a network 
may increase detection of nuclear materials by preventing an adversary from detouring 
around known checkpoints at borders and ports. Additionally, the ability of the detector 
network to pinpoint attack location and monitor fallout would aid emergency response and 
enhance consequence management.
Consequence Management after a Nuclear 
Detonation
Obviously, the prevention of such attacks is the focus of many efforts. But prevention may 
fail, and coping with the consequences of an attack present challenges as well. Fallout 
from a nuclear weapon may cause prompt radiation poisoning, as well as increasing 
lifetime cancer risk for those exposed to intermediate-to-high dose levels. Consequently, 
the radioactive debris would restrict the operational deployment of emergency-response 
personnel and resources in the area of the blast site and downwind. This places a priority on 
understanding the distribution of such radioactive debris. Currently, the primary method of 
assessing the dose and providing information for decision making is to combine information 
from radiation pagers carried by emergency-response personnel with computational 
models that consider the location of the blast, local geography, and weather conditions.11 
Unfortunately, this approach places emergency-response personnel at risk and can waste 
time, by potentially requiring the redeployment of resources which have inadvertently 
entered or find themselves in higher dose areas, and may waste resources, by requiring 
personnel who have acquired administrative dose limit levels to be restricted from activity 
in potentially radiation-contaminated regions and requiring decontamination of personnel 
and equipment.12
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The concept of consequence management plays an increasing role for state and federal 
agencies in response strategies for mitigating the risk of nuclear terrorism.13 Consequence 
management may be aided by efficient and informed decision-making for the deployment 
of emergency-response personnel and resources.
The specific network described in this article is a concept that may provide a means to gather 
the real-time assessment of dose from fallout across a city or geographic region that can 
aid decision making for the deployment of emergency response personnel and resources. 
Together with the network’s potential to detect or deter covert transport of some weapons, 
the concept explored within this article appears promising and justifies further detailed 
analyses that investigate topics such as placement and density of detectors in a network; 
who operates, supports, and manages the detector network; and what procedures should 
be carried out by local, state, and federal authorities in the instance of detection.
Description of a Traffic-Based Detector 
Network
The detector network is made up of many detector nodes that are, ideally, deployed at an 
existing traffic-monitoring device location, such as locations of speed or stop-light camera 
systems. Unlike some other detector network concepts, the network concept described 
here is intended to be in place and operational well before a search for a nuclear weapon is 
undertaken or a nuclear detonation takes place. Pairing the detectors with traffic-monitoring 
devices will allow information from the detector and traffic-monitoring device to be fused 
(or correlated). Also, communication and electrical power may be accessed through existing 
feeds that supply communication and power to the existing traffic-monitoring devices. 
The detectors may be deployed across a city adjacent to roads, highways, on/off-ramps, 
intersections, or construction zones. Each detector node communicates to a central node 
that can process and fuse detector information, such as count rate, radiation type, time, and 
detector location, with information from the traffic-monitoring device, such as photographs 
of the vehicle, license-plate information, or speed and direction of travel.
Nuclear Material Model in a Detector 
Network Scenario
Figure 1 shows an illustration of a scenario of a threat vehicle passing by a single detector 
node paired with a traffic-monitoring device. The radiation detector detects neutrons and 
is installed under the highway signs, as in Figure 1a. As the threat vehicle, which contains 
a WGPu (weapons grade Pu) weapon drives toward, under, and away from the detector, 
the detector neutron measurement displays the presence of neutron-emitting material, as 
shown in Figure 1b. The detection of an amount of neutrons above a predefined threshold 
triggers the traffic-monitoring device to activate (photograph), as displayed in Figure 1c. If 
the detector neutron measurement exhibited an exceptionally large amount of neutrons 
above background, information from the traffic-monitoring device could be used by local 
authorities to interdict the vehicle. Otherwise, an additional detector measurement may be 
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taken if the vehicle travels by a second detector node to verify the initial detector reading, 
and information from the second traffic-monitoring device can be used to corroborate the 
identity of the threat vehicle.
The probability of detecting a threat vehicle is, in-part, a function of conditions that may be 
out of the control of those designing or operating the detection network. Conditions such 
as the route taken to the destination and traffic or road conditions can affect the detection 
probability in a stochastic manner. Primarily, however, detection probabilities increase for a 
growing number of detector nodes encountered on a given route, reduced distance between 
the threat vehicle and detector, and increasing time spent in the vicinity of a detector. Hence, 
the network’s effectiveness would be improved if detector nodes were located at choke 
points, like bridges, or where vehicles are necessarily slowed, like intersections or on/off-
ramps. The puzzle of where to place a limited number of detectors to cover a wide possibility 
of routes to maximize the overall detection probability of the network is a challenging task. 
This task is not researched here but is an active area of study.14
 
Figure 1: a) A scenario of a vehicle containing threat material (Pu-based weapon) passing by 
a traffic-monitoring device (traffic camera) and under a radiation detector. b) The neutron 
measurement of the detector as the threat vehicle travels toward, under (at distance = 0 m), 
and away from the radiation detector. c) The traffic-monitoring device provides additional 
information of the threat vehicle, such as a photograph of the vehicle or license plate, or 
speed information.
A distinct scenario from nuclear materials detection and interdiction is that in which a nuclear 
attack has already taken place. In this scenario, reliable information of dose as a function 
of geography and time is important to prevent sending emergency response into high-
dose areas. Detector nodes in the blast radius would be destroyed and power may be lost 
to otherwise operational detectors. However, installing batteries with the detector nodes 
can mitigate loss of power. Other detonation effects, such as the blast, thermal radiation, 
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and electromagnetic pulse effects will have impact on the operational survivability of the 
nodes within the network. It is not expected that the addition of batteries will mitigate these 
effects to individual nodes, as these effects will likely also damage beyond operability the 
more fragile radiation detection equipment of an affected node before reducing battery 
performance. Thus, the addition of a battery is to provide power in the event of grid-
wide power loss. The information provided by the detector network may be utilized by 
emergency-response personnel for assessment of radiation-dose levels at node locations 
and the time and dose evolution of fallout due to weather conditions across a geographical 
area of the detector network. This information may aid in the decision making regarding 
the deployment of emergency personnel and resources via roads and highways or provide 
information to guide possible public alerts for sheltering or evacuation.
Prior Work
Research into general detector networks has recently gained momentum through the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), under the Department of Defense (DOD), and 
the DNDO. DARPA recently funded (as of 2014) the SIGMA program, which aims to spur the 
development of lower cost, more capable detectors. These detectors may be deployed in 
a ubiquitous or networked fashion and enable the enhancement and development of new 
concepts-of-operation to counter nuclear terrorism.15
A more direct parallel to the study undertaken here is the recently completed work by DNDO 
(ending in 2014) on the Intelligent Radiation Sensing System (IRSS) that attempted to develop 
technologies to determine the location of a radiation source through networked portable 
detectors.16 DNDO has also funded work (since 2014) on the Radiation Awareness and 
Interdiction Network (RAIN). RAIN has the goal of developing technologies for monitoring 
for radiation sources in free-flow traffic fused with other detectors, such as video cameras 
or license plate readers. To date, it appears that technical analyses from these projects have 
largely focused on specific technology development or statistics-based analysis of network 
systems. While some literature exists focused on the specific aspects of technical feasibility, 
limiting operational considerations, or policy implications of a radiation-detector network, 
these publications rarely consider the overlap of all these aspects, particularly for a concept 
combining the roles of both detection and fallout monitoring. Herein, the overlap of these 
aspects is considered.
The concept of a network for detection and location of nuclear materials has been studied 
from the aspects of detector hardware and experimentation,17 detection and localization 
statistics,18 communications between detector nodes or with a central processing node,19 and 
operational concepts.20 One such study investigated a concept that involved the deployment 
of detectors into personal vehicles to be scanned at scan stations similar to tolling stations.21 
While deployment of a detector onto a personal vehicle would extend the integration time 
of the detector and enhance the proximity of the detector to potential threat materials, a 
difficulty of the concept is in having public acceptance of invasive monitoring of personal 
property and susceptibility of the detectors to removal, spoofing, or sabotage. There is an 
existing literature on policy-related aspects such as preventing nuclear terrorism,22 and 
measuring the effects of a nuclear blast in a city.23
The concept analyzed in the paper herein does not rely on invasive deployment into personal 
property. Moreover, it can employ logistics of maintenance already in existence for traffic-
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monitoring systems. Additionally, the detectors deployed in the entailed concept are less 
susceptible to sabotage, especially when attached to above-road signs. While deployment 
of detectors on a roadside (on the ground) would present a higher potential for sabotage, 
failures of or abnormal readings from individual detector units may be quickly recognized 
through existing communication networks and addressed.
Analysis of the Technical Feasibility of 
Detection
The detection of radiation emitted from nuclear materials involves the absorption of 
gamma-rays or neutrons in the detector medium. Gamma-ray detection relies on the 
absorption of the gamma-ray energy, whereas neutron detection typically relies on the 
thermalization of neutrons through scattering in a hydrogenous medium in order to enhance 
absorption by isotopes such as 10B or 6Li, for a converter-style detector.24 Once the neutron is 
absorbed, the energy of the reaction particles is absorbed in the detector medium forming 
a detection event. It is possible for a detector to detect both gamma-rays and neutrons. 
Analog electronics or digital algorithms such as pulse height or pulse shape discrimination 
are utilized to distinguish the difference. To model accurately the number of detection 
events in a given detector medium, it is first necessary to determine what materials (and 
subsequent emission type and energy spectrum) should be considered for modeling and 
then to model the emitting source and intermediary media. Finally, the number of energy- 
depositing absorption events may be calculated for a detector of a given detection medium 
thus facilitating the evaluation of the efficacy of a detector system.
Difficulties of Detecting Nuclear Materials
Detection and interpretation of gamma-ray signals are typically easier than that for neutrons, 
due to the detection equipment used, relative ease of obtaining spectrographic information 
from gamma-ray detection, the need for radiation-type discrimination in neutron detection, 
and use of thermalization mediums for neutron detection.25 However, gamma-ray detection 
of threat materials is complicated by the much higher prevalence of gamma-ray emitting, 
naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), such as bananas (40K ) or cat litter (232Th 
decay chain). NORM may cause unacceptable rates of false alarms in detector systems or 
may be utilized to mask the signal from threat materials. Additional complications are added 
due to the relative ease of gamma-ray shielding, which may be accomplished with a few 
centimeters of high-Z materials such as lead and unavoidably by the frame and siding of 
vehicles. Finally and importantly, the signal received by the detector from a threat source 
may be masked by gamma-ray background radiation, which is approximately an order of 
magnitude higher for gamma rays than neutrons.26
Considering alone the relative difficulty of gamma-ray detection (vs. neutron detection) of a 
nuclear weapon in the presence of background radiation, a ‘back-of-the-envelop’ calculation 
is performed, with results in Table 1. The calculation 1) assumes a number of emitting 
gamma rays and neutrons from the surface of a weapons grade U (WGU) and WGPu weapon 
source; 2) determines the number of gamma rays or neutrons that reach a detector surface 
by estimation of the source-detector solid angle; and 3) compares the number of gamma 
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rays and neutrons reaching the detector surface to the background radiation at the detector 
surface by the respective radiation type. The calculation does not consider absorption of 
radiation in air, as this is assumed negligible, or the detection efficiency of the detector, as it 
is assumed that the detection efficiency of signal and background of a given radiation type 
are similar. Table 1 shows the low number of gamma rays that may be detected relative to 
background. Table 1 also shows the low number of neutrons that may be detected from WGU 
relative to background, and the high number of neutrons that may be detected from WGPu 
relative to background. Partially given the results of Table 1 and the other complications 
of gamma-ray detection, this study will investigate the efficacy of a detector system for 
detection of WGPu.
Table 1: The results of a calculation considering emission of neutrons and gamma rays from 
the surface (labeled ‘Surface’) of a weapons grade U weapon (WGU, 12 kg) and a weapons 
grade Pu weapon (WGPu, 4 kg), as adapted from S.Fetter, et al. (1990).27 The table shows the 
number of neutrons or gamma rays arriving at a detector of area 1000 cm2 at a distance 
of 5 m from the weapon of interest (labeled ‘Detector’). The table also shows the ambient 
background neutrons and gamma rays for the same detector with background flux of 0.01 
n/s-cm2 and 0.3 g/s-cm2 for neutron and gamma-ray background, respectively (labeled 
‘Bg’).28
 Neutron (n/s) Gamma-ray (g/s)
 WGU WGPu WGU WGPu
Surface 1400 400000 100000 60000
Detector 0.3 99.9 25.0 15.0
Bg 10 10 300 300
Simulation and Calculations of Detecting 
Nuclear Materials
The study undertaken herein investigates a hypothetical WGPu weapon. The model adapts 
that created by S.Fetter, et al. (1990)29 and integrates a 4 kg shell of WGPu into a weapon form. 
The model considers a 1000 cm2 area Zinc Sulfide (ZnS) -based detector 5 or 10 m from the 
WGPu weapon and includes intermediary air. The model is created in a Monte Carlo-based 
computational simulation to determine the flux of neutrons travelling onto the surface of 
the ZnS-based detector. The Monte Carlo simulation (MCNP6.1.1) computes scattering, 
absorption, and fission of source neutrons in the weapon itself as well as scattering and 
absorption in the intermediary air.30 Information regarding neutron and gamma-ray emission 
rates is based on S.Fetter, et al. (1990)31 and G.W. Philips, et al. (2005)32.
The detector used in this study is a 6Li:F loaded ZnS(Ag) plate. ZnS(Ag) is a scintillating 
material that, when loaded with 6Li:F, becomes sensitive to neutrons due to neutron capture 
by the 6Li and scintillation by energy deposition of the reaction particles. Previous studies 
have shown ZnS-based detectors to be potentially the most promising 3He-free neutron 
detector technology, due to the relatively high neutron detection efficiency and potential for 
neutron-gamma discrimination capability.33 Additionally, for this study the large detection 
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areas that may be obtained and the commercial availability of ZnS-based detectors are 
important. Due to the limited world-wide supply of 3He, 3He-free neutron detectors or 
replacement technologies have become an important area of research, can be implemented 
into neutron detection systems, and are often considered the “gold-standard” for use in 
neutron detection.34 For the purposes of calculating the absorption of neutrons into the 
detection medium, the material properties (including atomic density of 6Li and mass density 
of the ZnS plate) of EJ-426HD2 by Eljen Technology are considered.35
The calculations are conducted in two parts: first, the number of neutrons that reach the 
detector face (flux) are determined as a function of neutron energy. The neutron flux spectra 
for both emitted neutrons from the WGPu at a distance of 5 m and from background are 
shown in Figure 3a. Second, the number of neutrons absorbed by the detection medium is 
calculated considering the absorption spectrum generated by the 6Li isotopic density in a 
single plate of the ZnS-based detector and the flux spectra for emitted neutrons from WGPu 
and from background, also shown in Figure 3a. The absorption cross section is determined 
from ENDF libraries.36 It is important to perform the calculations in terms of energy spectra, 
as absorption is not uniform across the energy range. The neutron spectra may then be 
summated to arrive at the total number of neutrons expected for flux and to be absorbed, 
as in Figure 3b. In Figure 3b a distance of 10 m and at the surface of the WGPu weapon is also 
considered. As expected from the calculations in Table 1, Figure 3b shows higher flux (and 
absorption) for a distance of 5 m compared to background, however, at 10 m the flux (and 
absorption) and background are similar.
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Figure 2: a) The neutron flux from WGPu at a detector distance of 5 m (solid line, black 
triangle markers) and due to background37 (solid line, empty circle markers) is shown as a 
function of neutron energy. Neutron absorption into the detector as a function of neutron 
energy is also shown for neutrons from WGPu (dotted line, empty triangle markers) and 
background (dotted line, solid circle markers). On the right axis, the absorption probability 
for a 1 cm2 portion of the ZnS-based (based on a single plate of EJ-426HD2 manufactured 
by Eljen Technology)38 detector is shown (solid red line, star markers). b) Summation of 
the neutron spectra in a) yields the total number of neutrons incident onto the detector 
face (flux, in grey) on the left; while on the right the total number of neutrons absorbed 
into the detector (absorbed, in blue) is shown (background labeled as ‘bg’, source-detector 
separation distances of 5 and 10 m labeled as ‘5 m’ and ‘10 m’, respectively). In addition, the 
neutron flux and absorption is shown for the surface of the WGPu weapon (labeled ‘Surf’). 
The calculations of flux and absorption only consider a single plate of the ZnS-based detector 
and an efficiency of converting an absorbed neutron into a detection event (count) as unity. 
Neutron-detector systems utilizing ZnS-based plates are likely to be formed of several plates 
with absorption-to-count efficiencies less than unity.39 To address both these issues, it was 
assumed that the ZnS-based detector would meet an absolute neutron detection efficiency 
standard developed by R.T. Kouzes, et al. (2009)40, which states that the detector would be 
able to generate 2.5 counts/second-nanogram from a 252Cf source at a distance of 2 m from 
the detector. This standard was applied to the calculation results in Figure 3 by correcting 
the relative efficiency of the detector to meet to the standard, thereby forming a detector 
that considers multiple plates and a non-unity absorption-to-count efficiency.
Once the detector was corrected with the efficiency standard of R.T. Kouzes, et al. (2009)41, 
it was scaled to an area of 1000 cm2 and was studied in a traffic scenario to investigate and 
predict potential measurement results. The area of 1000 cm2 was selected because it is 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 10 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Cazalas,  A Radiation Detector Network for Ground Based Traffic  12
large enough to be effective in detecting WGPu at smaller distances (5 m, in this study), but 
is small enough to be feasible for commercial manufacturing and deployment. The traffic 
scenario examines the passage of a vehicle by a network detector, as in Figure 1. Figure 3a 
and b show sample temporal distributions of the predicted detector response and analytical 
response as a function of vehicle distance from crossing the detector. The responses are for 
total neutron counts (neutrons from WGPu and background). The analytical response is the 
probability of the detector producing counts from the passage of the vehicle by the detector, 
considering background neutrons. The predicted sample detector response discretizes the 
analytical response to whole counts and employs a random number generator to disperse 
counts according to the predicted detector response and the total number of counts 
within the full distance range displayed. In Figure 3c, the receiver-operator characteristic 
(ROC) curves show the probabilities of detecting WGPu vs. producing false alarms due to 
background neutrons. The ROC curves are given to exemplify the effects of vehicle speed 
and distance of closest approach to the detector, dm. The distance of closest approach occurs 
when the vehicle is crossing nearest by the detector. Speeds were selected to approximate 
vehicles travelling on the highway (60 mph), using on/off ramps or roads (30 mph), and in 
heavy traffic or turning through an intersection (15 mph). The distance of closest approach 
of 5 m was selected as this distance roughly corresponds to the clearance height of a sign or 
bridge above a road, as in Figure 1. A distance of 10 m was selected as this distance roughly 
corresponds to a lane and a half of highway, including the shoulder, as in Figure 1 if the 
detector were placed on the ground at the base of the pole holding the traffic camera.
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Figure 3: a) Displayed is the analytical response (dotted line) and predicted sample detector 
response (solid line) as a function of distance from crossing the detector for a scenario of 
a threat vehicle passing a network detector at minimum approach distance, dm = 5 m, at a 
speed of 15 mph and b) 60 mph. c) The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are 
given for dm = 5 m (dotted black lines) and dm = 10 m (solid red lines) for 15 (circle marker), 30 
(triangle marker), and 60 (square marker) mph.
Figure 3a shows that the predictions for the passage of a vehicle containing the WGPu at a 
speed of 15 mph and dm = 5 m would generate a clearly greater than background detector 
response (solid black line). Meanwhile, at a speed of 60 mph (Figure 3b), it becomes difficult 
to determine, by eye, the presence of the WGPu. However, according to the ROC curve in 
Figure 3c, the vehicle travelling at a speed of 60 mph and dm = 5 m (dotted black line, black 
square markers) would have a fairly good probability to be detected, even for relatively 
small probabilities of false alarm. For dm = 5 m, speeds less than 60 mph (i.e. 30 and 15 
mph) have a much greater probability of detection for even smaller probabilities of false 
alarm. Unfortunately, at dm = 10 m, the probability of detection is low compared to dm = 5 m, 
regardless of vehicle speed. The conclusion drawn from Figure 3c is that vehicle speed is less 
important than distance of closest approach of vehicle to the detector, even for slower (15 
mph) vehicle speed at larger distances. This conclusion is expected due to the non-linear (one 
over the distance squared) reduction in count-rate due to increasing distance as compared 
to the linear drop of count-rate due to reduction of counting time (represented by higher 
vehicle speed). Also, at dm = 5 m detection probability is only marginally increased by slowing 
the vehicle lower than 30 mph. Finally, the detector is capable of detecting WGPu at dm = 5 m 
up to highway speeds, with reasonably low probabilities of false alarm. While it is generally 
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expected that distance between the vehicle and detector is more important than count time 
(vehicle speed), the use of distance and speed parameters that closely resemble what would 
likely be encountered in a detector deployment scenario illustrate the importance of this 
effect.
Threat Interdiction and Fallout Monitoring
Detection probability rates can be increased by combining measurements of several 
detectors along the line of travel of a vehicle. When a sufficient number of neutrons are 
recorded by a detector node within a time window, as in Figure 3a, and this number is 
greater than a predefined threshold, a detection alarm occurs, which may activate a traffic-
monitoring device such as a camera or speed tracker. This information may be used to 
identify and predict the line of travel of the vehicle. Should the line of travel pass by additional 
detector nodes, the detector measurements can be combined. By aggregating several 
measurements of independent detector nodes, detection probability rates can be improved 
by increasing the total measurement time. Importantly, information from multiple traffic-
monitoring devices can confirm that the measurements are taken of a particular vehicle 
(by photograph, for example) and that the vehicle’s time of arrival at a subsequent detector 
position is reasonable considering the vehicle’s speed (if measured). While not examined 
here, of notable importance is the stochastic nature of the network’s effectiveness based on 
possible vehicle route and placement of detectors and traffic-monitoring devices. Hence, the 
deployment of a detector network would benefit from a thorough study of this stochastic 
effect on detector placement considering any particular city’s roadway layout.
Interdicting a Threat Vehicle
In the traffic-based detector network concept, detection of threatening nuclear material 
is only a part of the equation to help prevent nuclear terrorism. Another major aspect is 
the interdiction of the threat-containing vehicle. By coupling the detector with a traffic-
monitoring device, the network may obtain the vehicle’s identity or appearance along with 
information such as location, direction of travel, and speed. This information on the threat 
vehicle can aid local law enforcement to search for and interdict the vehicle.
A benefit of any prototype effort would be the development of the operational concept 
for the use of any detection alarm and the subsequent development of a command and 
control system that supports that operational concept. The development of concepts 
of operation (CONOPs) focused on detection and interdiction of a threat vehicle would 
require forethought into how a network detection concept may be integrated with existing 
communication, assessment, and response assets. Once a concept for the interdiction 
response is established and practiced, such a command and control system would link the 
processed traffic information to a dispatch system that can communicate to police in the 
field for interdiction.
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Detector Network for Fallout Measurement
In the unfortunate circumstance that a nuclear device detonates or an accident occurs, 
radioactive fallout would likely be dispersed. Emergency-response personnel and resources 
would be distributed around the blast zone to help evacuate and triage victims. Many 
emergency-response personnel units carry radiation detection equipment, such as personal 
radiation monitors, or pagers.42 These radiation monitors can assess dose rate for the person 
wearing the device once they have already entered the fallout zone. Depending on the dose 
rate, the emergency responders may have limited time to conduct activities, or may have to 
evacuate themselves from the area. Evacuation may be tricky, due to the quickly evolving 
nature of fallout, which is dependent on local weather conditions. Generally, there is not an 
efficient method of ascertaining dose rate as a function of location and time other than the 
use of radiation monitors worn by emergency responders (with some exceptions, such as the 
deployment of radiation monitors at firehouses in the District of Columbia).43 This method of 
assessing dose rates may place response personnel at risk of excessive radiation exposure. 
Time and resources may potentially be wasted if, for example, repeated redeployment is 
necessitated by unpredictably changing dose rates.
Given that a communications network would need to support the transfer of nodal 
information, the radiation detector network could provide information of fallout dose 
rates as a function of location and in real-time. This information may be relayed from the 
decision makers at the central node. While some detector nodes would be destroyed in the 
blast, there would still be an array of nodes outside the blast zone, depending on the size 
of the blast. These surviving nodes can continue operating with backup batteries in the 
case of loss of electrical power. However, the damage to electronics and communications 
due to electromagnetic pulse effects would also have to be considered and studied. There 
would also need to be contingencies for the event that the local central node is damaged or 
destroyed, such as the implementation of a remote central node.
Calculations of mRem/hr dose to count rate for a137Cs (662 keV) gamma ray suggest that for 
an unshielded ZnS-based detector the effective range of dose measurement is between 
0.1 to 1000 mRem/hr. below 0.1 mRem/hr, and the gamma-ray flux at the detector is not 
great enough to determine the certain existence of radioactive fallout. Above 1000 mRem/
hr, the detector becomes overwhelmed by the gamma-ray flux and detector dead-time and 
pulse pileup begins to affect the detector performance,44 however it may still be possible 
to correlate detector measurements to dose above 1000 mRem/hr. The calculations do not 
consider the use of an electronic-based gamma-ray discrimination algorithm, which may 
be shut off during measurements of gamma rays. Assuming that the information from the 
detector network is transmitted to and processed by a central node, this information can 
then be forwarded to decision makers directing emergency response efforts. The range 
of dose that the ZnS-based detector can measure places its utility within a “hot zone” area 
where lifesaving activities can be conducted under close monitoring of accumulated dose 
of response personnel.45 While the assessment of fallout and dose in urban environments 
after a nuclear blast can be predicted with computational models, the modeling results may 
not be immediately available. Also, dose information from the detector network provides 
actual data points that can be appropriated by models and compared with model results. 
The ability of the detector network to provide dose-rate information may be important 
in deciding if, when, and where emergency response personnel and resources may be 
deployed. The detector network can provide information of potential evacuation routes, 
and can track the evolution of dose from fallout.
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The exact nature and evolution of the fallout would be dependent on detonation location. 
The detonation target and actual location where detonation takes place may not be the 
same. It is assumed that the likely target for the blast in many cities would be the city center. 
However, the actual location of the blast would be dependent on factors like size of the 
weapon, routes taken by the vehicles, and possible premature detonation. Assessments 
of likely target locations would be beneficial in determining deployment locations and 
densities of network nodes to prevent the weapon’s detonation at the target or to redirect 
the detonation location to a less devastating area. Also, assessment of likely detonation 
locations could inform models to analyze likely routes to those locations. Modeling of likely 
detonation locations (and effective blast radius) would be beneficial in determining the 
efficacy of the network in fallout monitoring and detector-node placement. However, it is 
noted here that optimal placement of nodes for the objective of fallout monitoring may not 
be at the same locations as for the objective of threat detection (identification of vehicles on 
the way to a likely blast location).
Cost of a Prototype Network
The cost of deploying a prototype detector network for ground traffic is roughly estimated, 
producing a ROM (rough-order-of-magnitude) cost. For this estimate, the city of Washington 
D.C. was used as an example with detectors installed at 140 traffic-monitoring device 
locations, particularly all red light cameras (50 estimated)46 and all speed traps (90 
estimated)47. The anticipated cost per installation is $25,000, while the cost per detector is 
assumed to be $200,000 for Li-based scintillating neutron detector systems.48 The estimated 
ROM expenditure for deployment of a detector network for ground traffic is expected to be 
approximately $32 million dollars for the city of Washington D.C. It is possible that economies 
of scale can reduce the cost of the detector systems, but that is not assumed. This cost 
also does not consider the likely significant expenditures required for communications 
network installation, monitoring, and maintenance, nor does it consider the cost to ensure 
network security standards, which are necessary to prevent hacking. The security of the 
communications network would likely need to be more robust and resilient to hacking than 
those implemented for traffic cameras.
In order to provide useful information on real false alarm rates, as well as to catalyze the 
development of operational responses, the system must be maintained and operated. The 
operational costs of the network, and of repairing and replacing parts of the network, are 
not estimated in detail here. Still, a very rough estimate helps bound these costs. Older, film-
based, red light cameras in 2001 had operational costs of approximately $60,000 per year 
per location.49 Since this requires regular access to the camera for film change, processing, 
etc., the purely electronic information from the nuclear detectors is assumed to be cheaper 
to access, but at the same time, the cost of spare parts and maintenance might be more. 
Using that number, though, would indicate about $8.4 million per year in operational costs, 
or approximately the acquisition cost for 4 years of operation (for Li-based detectors). This 
cost does not consider the operational cost of law enforcement interdiction activities, reach-
back support, or cost to develop, test, and train on CONOPs.
The deployment of detectors onto mobile platforms, such as law enforcement vehicles, may 
add deterrence value, as discussed in Section VII. If such an approach is considered, the 
cost of installation of the detector is considered in this study to be negligible compared to 
the cost of the detector itself. Thus, the cost of deployment of the studied detectors onto 
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law enforcement vehicles would be approximately $200,000 per vehicle,50 or the cost of 
the detector. For the same $31.5 million that could be used to deploy a detector network 
at traffic-monitoring systems (140 locations) in Washington D.C., approximately 160 law 
enforcement vehicles could be equipped with the same technology. It should be noted that 
additional studies should be carried out to assess the technical efficacy of such a method 
of detection and deployment. Again, this cost does not consider the operational cost of law 
enforcement interdiction activities, training, or reach-back support.
Determining the affordability of such a detection network is challenging due to factors such 
as actual damage done by a nuclear detonation (i.e. if the detonation was a full or only 
partial yield), location of the blast, amount of destruction and remediation of damage and 
fallout required, and the full cost of the network itself. One comparative scenario is the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11th 2001. The 
total economic impact to New York City due to the 9/11 attacks is approximated as at least 83 
billion dollars with about $22 billion due to physical destruction and $9 billion dollars of that 
accounted by human potential loss.51 Assuming that the devastation caused by a nuclear 
blast in a city of similar density would result in at least an order of magnitude larger area of 
destruction and lives lost, the economic impact could result in the magnitude of hundreds of 
billions to trillions of dollars in impact from physical damage and human potential loss alone. 
It would seem such a calculation easily suggests the affordability of deploying a detection 
network, which is estimated to be less than a hundred million dollars. However, there are 
some probabilistic points regarding the cost equivalent of the consequences of a possible 
attack, including: a) an actual attack is carried out, b) the weapon is Pu-based (which, also has 
cost implications for development and deployment of the detector network), c) the weapon 
is detected by the network, and d) interdiction occurs without detonation or is detonated 
off-target.
Potential Benefits of the Network
The described radiation detection network has several advantages not necessarily true 
of other detection networks. First, the detectors may be coupled with existing traffic-
monitoring devices. By doing so, costs of providing power can be reduced as they may be 
shared with the existing traffic-monitoring device. The traffic-monitoring device can also 
provide supplementary information (photograph, for example) of the threat vehicle, which 
can be fused with detector measurements to verify measurements made by additional 
detector nodes and thus increase the probability of detection. The same supplementary 
information can be used for identifying the threat vehicle to aid in search and interdiction of 
the vehicle. It should be noted that there exist uncertainties in a given threat vehicle route 
and difficulties in detecting threat material at longer distances and shorter measurement 
times (faster vehicle speeds) with greater difficulty for increasing distance. While there are 
technical challenges in the fusion of data, such as temporally aligning detector data with 
traffic-monitoring information, such a concept has been previously proposed, for example, 
in Operation Sentinel.52 Second, the detector network has dual purposes: to help prevent 
an attack with a nuclear device by detecting and aiding the interdiction of threat materials, 
and to assist emergency response in the event of a nuclear attack by collecting dose-rate 
information as a function of location and time. Decision makers can utilize the dose-rate 
information to aid the determination of efficient deployment of emergency personnel and 
resources.
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Third, the concept of the detector network can first be utilized in the development of 
operational CONOPs and in understanding and navigating policy implications. However, 
given the fairly advanced state of work of neutron detectors and their commercial availability, 
limitations of deploying such a detector network are beginning to shift from detector 
capabilities to operational considerations.53 A limited prototype network that couples with 
traffic-monitoring systems could be set up to assess the efficacy of individual detectors 
and the whole network, which can be iteratively applied to improve the design and data 
analysis of the detectors, the network, the data they produce, and the method and means 
of interdiction. Importantly, the operational aspects of the use of the detection network can 
be established, studied, and grounded in testing experiences. They may also be integrated 
with other modalities of detection. As noted above, such operational aspects include the 
cooperation of various local, state, and federal resources to interdict a threat vehicle, or 
experimenting with various detector deployment locations or configurations to enhance 
detection probability and speedy interdiction. Development of CONOPs and exercises would 
provide valuable knowledge that may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of command 
and control systems, and threat response. The lessons learned from deploying, operating, 
and improving such a limited prototype network would likely provide valuable insights for 
other detector modalities or other types of networked threat search and monitoring. The 
development of CONOPs, however, would likely need additional analyses to identify the 
most likely targets of an attack and effective sensor-deployment locations and density to 
interdict approaches to these potential target epicenters.
Potential Drawbacks of the Network
The radiation detection network explored in this work also has some drawbacks. 
Unpredictability of node locations or node density may help to deter nefarious activities 
by adding an unknowable aspect to an adversary’s plan. However, in this concept, unlike 
some radiation detector networks that are based on moving, unlocatable, or otherwise 
unpredictable node locations or density, the detectors of the network in this work are fixed 
in location. Not only are the locations of the detectors fixed, but also they are knowable 
since the detectors are deployed in the vicinity of a traffic-monitoring device.
To overcome the important issue of unpredictability and deterrence of the network, moving 
detector nodes should be also explored, which would be an addition to and would work 
in cooperation with the network. Such moving nodes may include detectors installed on 
vehicles. Given the size of the detector studied (1000 cm2), mobile detector systems could be 
deployed on law enforcement vehicles, for example, that monitor nearby or passing vehicles 
for the presence of WGPu. In the occurrence of a detection alarm, the law enforcement vehicle 
carrying the detector could attempt to follow the potential threat vehicle to accumulate 
longer measurement times, lowering the probability of false alarm. The advantages of 
identification of the threat vehicle for aiding interdiction, as carried out by the coupling 
with traffic-monitoring systems, would be assumed by the law enforcement officer. Mobile 
platforms could increase deterrence value by adding uncertainty to the prospect of being 
discovered, as the presence of law-enforcement vehicles or which ones are equipped with 
a detection system cannot be preplanned by an adversary. Another method to increase 
deterrence value is the deployment of dummy detectors, or equipment that mimics the 
appearance of a functional detector system. These dummy detectors would add deterrence 
value by varying the adversary’s calculus of planning to avoid detection. Adversaries may 
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reconsider executing an attack, given an encounter with a much larger and denser network 
of potentially functional detectors. Even with the knowledge that some detectors are 
dummies, not knowing which ones are functional would add some deterrence value to the 
detection network concept.
Second, for the passive detectors investigated in this study, the use of sufficient amounts of 
appropriate shielding can attenuate neutrons exiting the source, hiding the nuclear material 
from the detector. Such shielding certainly complicates the plan to transport a weapon, which 
would have some indeterminate deterrent effect, but it is feasible. In the case of shielding, 
parameters of network node density, detector size, vehicle speed, or source-detector 
distance may be of little importance. In part, it is because of this shielding problem that 
active interrogation detector systems are a large and essential part of on-going research in 
the field of nuclear-materials detection.54
Third, the detection probability of a detector within the network was analyzed for only 
WGPu due to the relatively small number of neutrons emitted from uranium. It is estimated 
that the detection of uranium would not be feasible in the network-detection concept for 
ground-based traffic. This leaves a sizable gap in nuclear materials detection capability.
Comparison with Other Alternatives
There are alternatives to the concept explored in this paper for threat-source search and post-
blast fallout and radiation monitoring. Some of these alternatives include the deployment of 
personal radiation detectors (PRDs) onto law enforcement and first responder vehicles and 
personnel, or the use of radiation sensors on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Both of these 
alternative concepts may be utilized in threat-source search and post-blast radiation and 
fallout monitoring. Here, we will briefly examine some of the costs, benefits, and drawbacks 
of these alternatives. Another strategy to source-search is the scanning of vehicles and 
cargo at border crossings, ports, and airports. This strategy relies on a wall-like defense 
against the smuggling of nuclear materials into the country. This strategy will also be briefly 
discussed.
Personal radiation detectors (PRDs) are typically belt-worn or handheld pager-sized detectors 
with electronics that allow ease of use and  customized setting of exposure alarm, all at a 
price usually below $10,000 per unit.55 They can be worn by law enforcement officers and 
first responders, and the concept of implementing them as part of the strategy to detect 
nuclear and radiological materials has already been undertaken as part of “Securing the 
Cities” program of DHS.56
A first approximation of the number of PRDs that would likely be worn by law enforcement 
officers in D.C., for example, would be 2800, or the number of body cameras deployed.57 
The officers who would wear body cameras are also likely the officers that would provide 
operational impact to nuclear materials search and radiation monitoring by wearing PRDs. 
Considering a lower-end price of $2,000 per PRD would bring the total equipment cost 
to $5.6 million, or about 17.5% of the equipment cost of the traffic detector network. The 
equipment cost does not consider required training, reach-back support, or cost to respond 
to detection-alert scenarios. A benefit of these detectors is the ability to distribute them 
widely, due to the low price point per unit. Another benefit is that the PRD can alert officers, 
who already have some authority to stop attacks and maintain public safety, to localized 
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elevated rates of radiation. Yet another benefit is the relatively random distribution of law-
enforcement officers and their PRDs about a city. While an adversary may likely try to avoid 
close proximity to an officer, this cannot be guaranteed, thereby adding to deterrence. A 
drawback of PRDs is their significantly smaller volume of detection (typically no larger than a 
few cm2), which requires the detector to be in much closer proximity to the radiation source 
or to have much longer dwell time than the detector analyzed for the traffic network concept.
Another alternative to source-search and post-blast fallout and radiation monitoring is the 
use of radiation detectors on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The technology of compact 
UAVs has advanced significantly in the past years to the point where UAVs equipped with 
radiation detection capabilities are commercially available. While many of these systems are 
designed for gamma-ray detection, a custom setup could be built, using a detector panel 
from the traffic detector network concept fixed onto a UAV. A 1000 cm2 ZnS:LiF detector 
would weigh approximately 3 lbs.58 Even with required electronics and power supply, the 
weight of the detection system would be within the payload capacity of current commercially 
available UAVs (20-25 lbs.), such as the DJI Agras MG-1.59
If we use the DJI Agras MG-1 as an example, the cost per UAV is approximately $15,000. With 
the previously calculated cost per detector at $200,000,60 the equipment cost per detector-
equipped UAV comes to $215,000. This does not consider the cost of required communications 
systems, reach-back support, usage training, or any modifications to extend flight time or 
range. If we consider the number of UAV detector systems to equal the number of traffic-
based detector systems (140), the total equipment cost of this alternative is $30.1 million, 
which is approximately equal to that of the traffic-based detector network concept cost.
A benefit of UAV-based detection concept is the control, within the limits of the physical 
range and battery life of the UAV, of where, when, and for how long the detectors dwell at a 
location. Another benefit is the ability to follow objects of interest (within the speed limitation 
of the UAV) or bring multiple detectors to a point of interest for better detection capability. 
In post-blast fallout and radiation monitoring, UAVs have an advantage of potentially being 
deployed after the blast, thereby preserving them from destruction. They also have the 
advantage of being mobile to assess radiation levels along evacuation routes or to develop 
understanding of the nature of the fallout due to weather conditions. Drawbacks, however, 
can be operationally substantial with limitations on the operation time and range of a given 
UAV. Additionally, while the CONOPs of a UAV-based system would need to be fleshed out, 
perpetual deployment would seem unlikely. The UAVs would instead likely be deployed 
during major events (e.g. sporting events) or in response to information that threat material 
was in the area or that an attack was imminent. This contrasts with the relatively perpetual 
operation of the detectors in the traffic-based concept. However, when UAVs are deployed in 
source-search, deterrence value is added due to the highly mobile nature of the UAVs.
An alternative to placing detectors in urban environments is the strategy of scanning 
vehicles and cargo coming into the U.S. through ports, airports, and border crossings, which 
is already carried out by DNDO in cooperation with other federal agencies.61 As this line of 
defense is a fundamental part of preventing nuclear smuggling into the U.S., it should strive 
continuously for improvement. Covert field tests of the integrity of this line of defense were 
carried out by the CBP and showed varied levels of success. A Government Accountability 
Office report recommended a risk-assessment study should be conducted to prioritize 
the makeup and deployment of resources.62 Additionally, an unavoidable deficiency with 
this defense includes susceptibility to circumvention by going around or avoiding known 
checkpoints.63 While there may be some deficiencies with this particular line of defense, it is 
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part of a multi-layered defense strategy of the GNDA that also includes inland inspection of 
trucking cargo at weigh stations.64 The concept of a traffic-based detector network explored 
in this article is not intended as a replacement for existing defenses but may be integrated 
as yet another layer of this multi-layered strategy. In the event that port, airport, or border 
detection fails, the traffic-based detector network provides scanning opportunities at likely 
targets of substantial devastation – in the cities.
A strong defense against a nuclear attack would likely rely on the combination of detection 
concepts. The benefits of the described concepts may overlap to overcome drawbacks. In 
any case, CONOPs of the system would need to be developed, which ideally emphasize 
the key benefits of each concept, such as the pervasiveness of PRDs, mobility of UAVs, 
and operational perpetuality of traffic-based detectors. The radiation detection concepts 
discussed here could also become a part of the multi-layered defense strategy that includes 
the GTRI, which secures nuclear materials and processes at facilities,65 and the GNDA, which 
seeks to reduce the risk of nuclear attacks by inspection of cargo, vehicles, and persons 
travelling into the U.S. through ports, airports, or border crossings.66 
Conclusion
The threat of nuclear terrorism to U.S. cities is serious and the consequences of such an 
attack would be significant. The potential consequences of a nuclear detonation in a city 
include loss of life, widespread destruction, and a substantial negative impact on the 
economy. The U.S. government has responded by establishing and supporting agencies, such 
as the NNSA and the DNDO, with the purpose of reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. 
These agencies advance programs that reduce and secure nuclear materials and strengthen 
inspection regimes at home and abroad. These agencies and others (such as the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) along with 
their parent departments (DOE, DHS, and DOD) have made appreciable investments into 
radiation-detection technologies and research to help track, scan, and search for nuclear 
materials and weapons.
This article reviews and investigates one such concept in terms of technical feasibility – the 
use of radiation detectors in a networked configuration and deployed next to roads for 
ground-based traffic monitoring with the possibility of deployment onto mobile platforms. 
This investigation lays out the basis of the concept, however analysis of the integration of 
such a network with command and control systems, the details of the operational process, 
and assessing the likely epicenter targets, vehicle travel routes, and optimal placement of 
detectors is also required for any successful development of even a prototype test network.
Detectors within the network measure the presence of neutron radiation from nuclear 
materials and weapons that may be contained in passing vehicles. The detectors would be 
deployed at existing traffic-monitoring system locations (stop light or red light cameras, 
for instance) such that when a detection alarm occurs, the traffic-monitoring device can be 
activated to identify the threat vehicle. While not explicitly analyzed here, additional detector 
measurements and traffic-monitoring device information may be taken along a vehicle’s line 
of travel to verify vehicle identity and increase the certainty of detection. Other aspects 
of the concept not explored here but which would require further investigation are how 
measurements from the detector and information from the traffic-monitoring device would 
be communicated to a central node, how that information is fused and interpreted, and the 
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decision-making process of vehicle interdiction. If interdiction were carried out, information 
from the traffic-monitoring device(s) would aid the search for the threat vehicle. In a scenario 
in which a nuclear weapon detonation or nuclear accident has already occurred, the detector 
network could provide location and time-dependent measurements of radioactive fallout. 
Measurements of dose rate can be fed to the central node, interpreted, and utilized to aid in 
the decision-making for the deployment of emergency-response personnel and resources. 
Here again, transfer and interpretation of information, and decision-making are aspects 
that would require in-depth investigation.
The study finds that the detection network concept appears to be feasible for neutron 
detection of weapons grade plutonium, but not uranium, up to highway speeds (60 mph) 
at a minimum detector distance of 5 m from the plutonium, which is plausible. The neutron 
emission from weapons-grade uranium, compared to background, was estimated to be 
too low to be detected by a detector in the concept of ground-based traffic. At a minimum 
detector distance of 10 m from the plutonium, the detector is capable of detecting the 
presence of plutonium but at relatively low probabilities of detection. It was shown that 
decreasing the minimum detector distance from the plutonium is more important than the 
vehicle speed for the speeds studied (15, 30, 60 mph).
Opportunities for Future Work
Future work analyzing the detector network for ground-based traffic concept should include 
the evaluation of other neutron (other than ZnS-based) detector types and detector sizes to 
optimize the potential efficacy of the network and/or minimize costs, and should examine 
how to fuse the detector measurement and traffic-monitoring system information in order 
to identify a threat vehicle. Further studies should explore the effect of aggregating multiple 
detector measurements and investigate the concept of moving detector nodes to enhance 
the detection network concept’s deterrence value. Additional future work should also be 
carried out to understand the effects of shielding on detection capabilities, traffic-flow 
modeling for optimal detector placement, and likely epicenter targets and blast radii for 
understanding the capability of the network for fallout monitoring. This additional future 
work would reveal limitations of the concept that may affect its overall feasibility or point 
to aspects of the concept which may be strengthened. Finally, future work should also be 
carried out to explore the effectiveness of the combination of multiple detection modalities.
Importantly though, the concept explored here is not expected to be only solution to the 
challenging issue of nuclear terrorism. Instead, further investigation should be carried 
out to explore how this traffic-based detector network concept and potential alternative 
technologies and concepts can be appropriately mixed to strengthen the layered defense 
homeland security strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 10 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Cazalas,  A Radiation Detector Network for Ground Based Traffic  23
About the Author
Edward Cazalas is an Assistant Professor of the Nuclear Engineering program within the 
Civil and Environmental Engineering Department at the University of Utah. Edward was 
also a former postdoctoral researcher at the Air Force Institute of Technology and a former 
Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at RAND Corporation where he performed the 
origination of this work. Edward holds a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the Pennsylvania 
State University. He has research interests in developing radiation-detection science and 
technologies and advancing the understanding of dosimetry for nuclear and radiological 
exposure events and processes. He may be reached at edward.cazalas@utah.edu.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 10 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Cazalas,  A Radiation Detector Network for Ground Based Traffic  24
Notes
1 C. Meade, & R.C.Molander, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation (2006), Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR391.html.
2 Bunn, et al., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline? Cambridge, 
MA: Report for Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 
Kennedy School (2016).
3 National Nuclear Security Administration, Prevent, Counter, and Respond – A Strategic Plan to Reduce 
Global Nuclear Threats (2017) https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/11/f46/fy18npcr_final_
november_2017%5B1%5D_0.pdf.
4 K. Guthe, “The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and the Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism,” 
Comparative Strategy 33, 424–450 (2014).
5 W.Stern and E. Baldini, “Global Threat Reduction Initiative Efforts to Prevent Radiological Terrorism, “ 
Federation of American Scientists: Public Interest Reports 44 (2013).
6 L.Cuéllar, et al., “Probabilistic Effectiveness Methodology: A Holistic Approach on Risk Assessment of 
Nuclear Smuggling, “ IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security, 325–331 (2011).
7 S. Fetter et al., “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” Science and Global Security 1, 225–253 (1990).
8 A.D. Lavietes et al., “Technical Review of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Transformational and 
Applied Research Directorate’s Research and Development Program, “ IEEE Access 1 , 661–690 (2013).
9  T. Kijewski-Correa et al., “Real-time Plume Detection in Urban Zones Using Networked Sensing Data,“ 
Proceedings of Chem-Bio Defense Physical Science and Technology Conference (2008).
10 R.W. Nelson, “Concept of Operations for CBRN Wireless Sensor Networks,” (Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012).
11 B.R. Buddemeier et al., National Capital Region Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear 
Terrorism, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, LLNL-TR-512111 (2011).
12 International Atomic Energy Agency, Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Energency, (2006), 
available at: https://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/7606/Manual-for-First-Responders-to-a-
Radiological-Emergency.
13 C. Meade and R.C. Molander, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack, (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2006), Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR391.html.; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, (2014) available at: https://www.
dhs.gov/quadrennial-homeland-security-review.
14 A. Liu, Simulation and Implementation of Distributed Sensor Network for Radiation Detection, Master’s 
Thesis, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 2010.
15 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA SIGMA (2016), available at: http://www.darpa.mil/
program/sigma.
16 Department of Homeland Security, FY 2016 Congressional Budget Justification, (2016), available at: https://
www.dhs.gov/publication/congressional-budget-justification-fy-2016.
17 T. Kijewski-Correa, et al., “Real-time Plume Detection in Urban Zones Using Networked Sensing Data,” 
Proceedings of Chem-Bio Defense Physical Science and Technology Conference (2008); S.M. Brennan, A.M Mielke, 
and D.C. Torney, “Radioactive Source Detection by Sensor Networks, “ IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science 52, 
813–819 (2005).
18 R.J. Nemzek et al., “Distributed Sensor Networks for Detection of Mobile Radioactive Sources,” IEEE 
Transactions on Nuclear Science 51, 1693–1700 (2004); J.C. Chin et al., “Identification of Low-level Point 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 10 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Cazalas,  A Radiation Detector Network for Ground Based Traffic  25
Radioactive Sources Using a Sensor Network,” ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks 7, 21:1–21:35 (2010); 
D.S.Hochbaum and B.Fishbain, “Nuclear Threat Detection with Mobile Distributed Sensor Networks,” Annals 
of Operations Research 187, 45–63 (2011); H.Wan, T. Zhang and Y.Zhu, “Detection and Localization of Hidden 
Radioactive Sources with Spatial Statistical Methods, “ Annals of Operations Research 192, 87–104 (2012); K. 
Grunden, G. Guerra and W. Leonard, Ubiquitous (CB)RN(E) Sensor Networks: Analysis and Framework Study, 
TASC INC. (2014); L.M. Wein and M.P. Atkinson, “The Last Line of Defense: Designing Radiation Detection-
Interdiction Systems to Protect Cities from a Nuclear Terrorist Attack,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science 54, 
654–669 (2007).
19 Y. Yang et al., “A Network Protocol Stack Based Radiation Sensor Network for Emergency System,” 
International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security 8, 312–318 (2008); F. Ding et al., “A GPS-Enabled 
Wireless Sensor Network for Monitoring Radioactive Materials,” Sensors and Actuators A: Physical 155, 210–215 
(2009).
20 R.W. Nelson, “Concept of Operations for CBRN Wireless Sensor Networks,” (Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012); D. Srikrishna, A.N Chari and T.Tisch, “Deterence of Nuclear Terrorism with Mobile Radiation Detectors,” 
Nonproliferation Review 12, 573–614 (2005); S. Johnson, “Stopping Nuclear Terrorism is a Game of Odds, Not 
Certainty,” Wired (2015).
21 D. Srikrishna, A.N Chari and T. Tisch, “Deterence of Nuclear Terrorism with Mobile Radiation Detectors.”
22 A. Mauroni, “ Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?” Homeland Security Affairs 8, Article 9 ( June 2012). 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/222.
23 R.Harney, “Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear Weapon Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear 
Terrorism Preparedness,” Homeland Security Affairs 5, Article 3 (September 2009). https://www.hsaj.org/
articles/97 .
24 Government Accountability Office, Neutron Detectors: Alternatives to Using Helium-3, GAO-11-753 (2011).
25 G.F. Knoll, Radiation Detection and Measurement, 3rd Ed. (Wiley, 2011).
26 G.W. Philips, D.J. Nagel and T. Coffey, A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons. 
Defense Technology Paper 13 (2005); G.E. McMath, G.W. McKinney and T. Wilcox, MCNP6 Cosmic & Terrestrial 
Background Particle Fluxes – Release 4, Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR-14-24445 (2015).
27 S. Fetter et al., “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” Science and Global Security 1, 225–253 (1990).
28 G.W. Philips, D.Nagel, and T.Coffey, A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons, 
Defense Technology Paper 13 (2005); G.E. McMath, G.W. McKinney and T. Wilcox, MCNP6 Cosmic & Terrestrial 
Background Particle Fluxes – Release 4. Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR-14-24445 (2015).; S.Fetter et al., 
“Detecting Nuclear Warheads.”
29 S. Fetter et al. “Detecting Nuclear Warheads.”
30 T. Goorley, MCNP6.1.1-Beta Release Notes, (2014).
31 S. Fetter. et al., “Detecting Nuclear Warheads.”
32 G.W. Philips, D. Nagel and T. Coffey, A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons.
33 J.H. Ely et al., Final Technical Report for the Neutron Detection without Helium-3 Project, (2013), Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory, PNNL-23011 (2013).
34 S. Fetter et al., “Detecting Nuclear Warheads.”
35 Thermal Neutron Detector EJ-426, Eljen Technology (2016), available at: http://www.eljentechnology.com/
index.php/products/neutron-detectors/ej-426.
36 Brookhaven National Laboratory - Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF/B-VII.1), National Nuclear Data Center 
(2011), available at: https://www.nndc.bnl.gov/exfor/endf00.jsp.
37 S. Fetter et al., “Detecting Nuclear Warheads.”
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 10 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Cazalas,  A Radiation Detector Network for Ground Based Traffic  26
38 Thermal Neutron Detector EJ-426, Eljen Technology (2016), available at: http://www.eljentechnology.com/
index.php/products/neutron-detectors/ej-426.
39 J.H. Ely et al., Final Technical Report for the Neutron Detection without Helium-3 Project.
40 R.T. Kouzes et al., Neutron Detector Gamma Insensitivity Criteria, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 
PNNL-18903 (2009).
41 Ibid.
42 B.R. Buddemeier et al., National Capital Region Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear 
Terrorism, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, LLNL-TR-512111 (2011).
43 Ibid.
44 J.H. Ely et al., Final Technical Report for the Neutron Detection without Helium-3 Project; J.B. Mosset et 
al., “Evaluation of Two Thermal Neutron Detection Units Consisting of ZnS/6LiF Scintillating Layers with 
Embedded WLS Fibers Read Out with a SiPM,” Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: 
Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment 764, 299–304 (2014).
45 B.R. Buddemeier et al., National Capital Region Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear 
Terrorism.
46 Red-Light Camera Locations, Metropolitan Police Department (2016), available at: https://mpdc.dc.gov/
publication/automated-traffic-enforcement-camera-locations.
47 Speed Camera Locations, Metropolitan Police Department (2016), available at: https://mpdc.dc.gov/
publication/automated-traffic-enforcement-camera-locations.
48 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Injury Prevention & Control: Motor Vehicle Safety – Invention Fact 
Sheets for Automated Enforcement, (2015), available at: http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/calculator/
factsheet/redlight.html.
49 Ibid.
50 Department of Homeland Security, Standoff Radiation Detectors Market Survey Report, National Urban 
Security Technology Laboratory (2013).
51 W.C. Thompson, One Year Later - The Fiscal Impact of 9/11 on New York City, Report by the Comptroller of the 
City of New York, 2002.
52 A.Baker, “City Would Photograph Every Vehicle Entering Manhattan and Sniff Out Radioactivity,” The New 
York Times,” (2008).
53 R.Stone, “Researchers Rise to the Challenge of Replacing Helium-3,” Science. 353, 15-16 (2006).
54 A.D. Lavietes et al., “Technical Review of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Transformational and 
Applied Research Directorate’s Research and Development Program,” IEEE Access 1 , 661–690 (2013); J. 
Medalia, Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations, Congressional 
Research Service, R40154 (2010).
55 Department of Homeland Security, Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) and Spectroscopic PRDs Market 
Survey Report, National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (2017).
56 Department of Homeland Security, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, FY 2018 Congressional Budget 
Justification, (2018), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CFO/17_0524_
Domestic_Nuclear_Detection_Office.pdf .
57 Metropolitan Police Department, Annual Report (2016), available at: https://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/
files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/MPD%20Annual%20Report%202016_lowres.pdf#page=41.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 10 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Cazalas,  A Radiation Detector Network for Ground Based Traffic  27
58 M. Schear et al., “Monte Carlo Modeling and Experimental Evaluation of a 6LiF:ZnS(Ag) Test Module for 
Use in Nuclear Safeguards Neutron Coincidence Counting Applications (IAEA-CN--220),” Symposium on 
International Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency (2015).
59 G. J. Herrera, J.A. Dechant and E.K Green, “Technology Trends in Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) 
and Counter-UAS: A Five-Year Outlook,” Institute for Defence Analyses (2017).
60 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Injury Prevention & Control: Motor Vehicle Safety – Invention 
Fact Sheets for Automated Enforcement (2015), available at: http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/calculator/
factsheet/redlight.html.
61 K. Guthe, “The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and The Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism.”
62 Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Risk-Informed Covert Assessments and 
Oversight of Corrective Actions Could Strengthen Capabilities at the Border, GAO-16-191T (2015).
63 L. Zaitseva and F. Stienhausler, “Illicit Trafficking of Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material: Facts and 
Uncertainties,” Physics & Society, American Physical Society, vol. 33, no. 1 (2004).
64 K. Guthe, “The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and the Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism,” 
Multimodal Integrated Safety, Security and Environmental Program Strategy, Transportation Research Board, 
87th Annual Meeting, 08-2644 (2008).
65 National Nuclear Security Administration, Preventing Proliferation of Nuclear Materials and Technology (2011), 
available at: https://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/dnnfactsheet2011.
66 K. Guthe, “The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and The Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism.”
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 14 Article 10 (December 2018) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Cazalas,  A Radiation Detector Network for Ground Based Traffic  28
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by the author(s). Homeland Security Affairs is an 
academic journal available free of charge to individuals and institutions. 
Because the purpose of this publication is the widest possible 
dissemination of knowledge, copies of this journal and the articles 
contained herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed 
for personal, research or educational purposes free of charge and 
without permission. Any commercial use of Homeland Security Affairs 
or the articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the 
written consent of the copyright holder. The copyright of all articles 
published in Homeland Security Affairs rests with the author(s) of the 
article. Homeland Security Affairs is the online journal of the Naval 
Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
(CHDS). Cover image by Millertime83
Sponsored by
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
National Preparedness Directorate, FEMA
 The Nation’s Homeland Security Educator
